diff --git a/packages/iios-contracts/src/capability.ts b/packages/iios-contracts/src/capability.ts
index 29b60fd..df7e852 100644
--- a/packages/iios-contracts/src/capability.ts
+++ b/packages/iios-contracts/src/capability.ts
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ export interface CapabilityRequest {
   target: string;
   payload: Record<string, unknown>;
   idempotencyKey: string;
+  /** CMP purpose code for the consent check (e.g. 'outbound_message', 'marketing'). */
+  purpose?: string;
   dataClass?: DataClass;
 }
 
@@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ export interface CapabilityResult {
   outcome: CapabilityOutcome;
   errorCode?: string;
   latencyMs?: number;
+  /** The CMP consent receipt this egress went out under (provenance). */
+  consentReceiptRef?: string;
 }
 
 /** What a provider reports; the broker normalizes `outcome` into CapabilityResult. */
diff --git a/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.spec.ts b/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.spec.ts
index 3587644..8e9d096 100644
--- a/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.spec.ts
+++ b/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.spec.ts
@@ -52,4 +52,47 @@ describe('CapabilityBroker (P9 — governed egress)', () => {
   it('unknown channel → fails closed (throws, no silent egress)', async () => {
     await expect(broker(makeFakePorts()).invoke(req({ channelType: 'CARRIER_PIGEON' }))).rejects.toThrow();
   });
+
+  // ── CMP consent-at-egress (P9 slice 2) ──────────────────────────
+  it('CMP allow → SENT and carries the consent receipt', async () => {
+    const ports = makeFakePorts();
+    ports.cmp.setStatus('ALLOW');
+    const r = await broker(ports).invoke(req());
+    expect(r.outcome).toBe('SENT');
+    expect(r.consentReceiptRef).toBe('fake-receipt');
+  });
+
+  it('CMP DENY → BLOCKED (CONSENT_DENIED), provider never called', async () => {
+    const ports = makeFakePorts();
+    ports.cmp.setStatus('DENY');
+    const registry = new CapabilityProviderRegistry();
+    let called = false;
+    registry.register({ name: 'spy', channelTypes: ['WEBHOOK'], capabilities: { canSend: true }, async send() { called = true; return { providerRef: 'x', outcome: 'SENT' }; } });
+    const r = await new CapabilityBroker(ports, registry).invoke(req());
+    expect(r.outcome).toBe('BLOCKED');
+    expect(r.errorCode).toBe('CONSENT_DENIED');
+    expect(called).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('CMP NOT_REQUIRED → SENT (no receipt required)', async () => {
+    const r = await broker(makeFakePorts()).invoke(req()); // default fake is NOT_REQUIRED
+    expect(r.outcome).toBe('SENT');
+    expect(r.consentReceiptRef).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('purpose-aware: deny "marketing" but allow "support" for the same target', async () => {
+    const ports = makeFakePorts();
+    ports.cmp.denyPurpose('marketing');
+    const blocked = await broker(ports).invoke(req({ purpose: 'marketing' }));
+    const sent = await broker(ports).invoke(req({ purpose: 'support', idempotencyKey: 'k2' }));
+    expect(blocked.outcome).toBe('BLOCKED');
+    expect(sent.outcome).toBe('SENT');
+  });
+
+  it('OPA is consulted before CMP (policy deny short-circuits consent)', async () => {
+    const ports = makeFakePorts();
+    ports.opa.deny('not allowed');
+    ports.cmp.setStatus('ALLOW');
+    await expect(broker(ports).invoke(req())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
+  });
 });
diff --git a/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.ts b/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.ts
index 3ea77ad..67adf8c 100644
--- a/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.ts
+++ b/packages/iios-service/src/capability/capability.broker.ts
@@ -27,21 +27,34 @@ export class CapabilityBroker {
       target: req.target,
     });
 
-    // 2. Enforce obligations BEFORE touching a provider.
+    // 2. Enforce policy obligations BEFORE touching a provider.
     for (const ob of decision.obligations) {
       if (ob.kind === 'DENY_OUTBOUND' || ob.kind === 'REVIEW') {
         return { providerRef: 'blocked', outcome: 'BLOCKED', errorCode: ob.kind };
       }
     }
+
+    // 3. Consent gate (CMP). Authorization (OPA) is not consent — a DENY here means the
+    //    recipient did not consent to this purpose, so nothing is sent. Checked at send
+    //    time, not enqueue time. NOT_REQUIRED/ALLOW proceed; ALLOW carries a receipt.
+    const consent = await this.ports.cmp.checkPurpose({
+      purpose: req.purpose ?? 'outbound_message',
+      scopeId: req.scopeId,
+      subject: req.target,
+    });
+    if (consent.status === 'DENY') {
+      return { providerRef: 'blocked', outcome: 'BLOCKED', errorCode: 'CONSENT_DENIED' };
+    }
+
     const payload = this.applyMasks(req.payload, decision.obligations);
 
-    // 3. Route to the channel's provider (unknown channel fails closed in the registry).
+    // 4. Route to the channel's provider (unknown channel fails closed in the registry).
     const provider = this.registry.forChannel(req.channelType);
     const result = await provider.send({ ...req, payload });
 
-    // 4. Normalize the provider's outcome.
+    // 5. Normalize the provider's outcome + record the consent receipt for provenance.
     const outcome = result.outcome === 'SENT' ? 'SENT' : result.outcome === 'RATE_LIMITED' ? 'RATE_LIMITED' : 'FAILED';
-    return { providerRef: result.providerRef, outcome, errorCode: result.errorCode, latencyMs: result.latencyMs };
+    return { providerRef: result.providerRef, outcome, errorCode: result.errorCode, latencyMs: result.latencyMs, consentReceiptRef: consent.receiptRef };
   }
 
   private applyMasks(
diff --git a/packages/iios-testkit/src/fakes/cmp.ts b/packages/iios-testkit/src/fakes/cmp.ts
index 2ef94a2..2d8dc2a 100644
--- a/packages/iios-testkit/src/fakes/cmp.ts
+++ b/packages/iios-testkit/src/fakes/cmp.ts
@@ -1,20 +1,36 @@
 import type { IiosPlatformPorts } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
 
 type CmpPort = IiosPlatformPorts['cmp'];
+type CmpStatus = 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'NOT_REQUIRED';
 
-/** Deterministic CMP (consent) fake. Defaults to NOT_REQUIRED. */
+/** Deterministic CMP (consent) fake. Defaults to NOT_REQUIRED; supports purpose-aware decisions. */
 export class FakeCmp implements CmpPort {
-  private status: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'NOT_REQUIRED' = 'NOT_REQUIRED';
+  private status: CmpStatus = 'NOT_REQUIRED';
+  private deniedPurposes = new Set<string>();
+  private allowedPurpose?: string;
 
-  setStatus(s: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'NOT_REQUIRED'): this {
+  setStatus(s: CmpStatus): this {
     this.status = s;
     return this;
   }
 
-  async checkPurpose(_input: unknown): Promise<{ receiptRef?: string; status: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'NOT_REQUIRED' }> {
-    return {
-      receiptRef: this.status === 'ALLOW' ? 'fake-receipt' : undefined,
-      status: this.status,
-    };
+  /** Deny one specific purpose while other purposes follow the default status. */
+  denyPurpose(purpose: string): this {
+    this.deniedPurposes.add(purpose);
+    return this;
+  }
+
+  /** Allow only this purpose; every other purpose is denied. */
+  allowOnly(purpose: string): this {
+    this.allowedPurpose = purpose;
+    return this;
+  }
+
+  async checkPurpose(input: unknown): Promise<{ receiptRef?: string; status: CmpStatus }> {
+    const purpose = (input as { purpose?: string } | undefined)?.purpose;
+    let status = this.status;
+    if (purpose && this.deniedPurposes.has(purpose)) status = 'DENY';
+    if (this.allowedPurpose !== undefined) status = purpose === this.allowedPurpose ? 'ALLOW' : 'DENY';
+    return { receiptRef: status === 'ALLOW' ? 'fake-receipt' : undefined, status };
   }
 }