Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
maaz519 e39caa3c80 feat: verify context attestations via ES256/JWKS + rename client to appshell-crm
Proof #3 now supports the production asymmetric path, not just the dev shared secret.

- context-attestation.ts: PublicKeyResolverPort seam; verify() picks ES256 (JWKS by
  kid) when the client has a jwksUri, else HS256 (dev). signDevAttestationES256 helper.
- attestation-stores.ts: JwksPublicKeyResolver (jwks-rsa, one cached client per URI,
  refetch on rotation, fail-closed to NO_KEY).
- attestation.module.ts: inject the resolver into the verifier; dev-seed the client as
  clientType APPSHELL (it is the CRM browser-flow parent per the July-12 notes).
- rename the registered client crm-support-widget -> appshell-crm (the name reflects the
  attesting parent, not a widget).
- specs: ES256 (valid via JWKS, wrong key -> BAD_SIGNATURE, unknown kid -> NO_KEY, no
  resolver -> NO_KEY) + two stolen-token gate cases (wrong app binding -> APP_MISMATCH,
  wrong audience -> WRONG_AUDIENCE).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 12:56:10 +05:30
maaz519 dd6a4cd4fa feat(iios): context-attestation verifier — the July 12 stolen-token proof (§1)
A valid actor token is no longer enough. This adds the trust-layer core so IIOS
can require a signed CONTEXT ATTESTATION from an authorized parent (AppShell etc.)
before a privileged request — defeating a hacked app replaying a stolen token.

- prisma: IiosClientRegistry (registered clients allowed to attest, per app) +
  IiosAttestationNonce (single-use replay ledger). Migration applied.
- ContextAttestationVerifier + ports (ClientRegistryPort, NonceStorePort) + a dev
  signer. Verifies: registered+active client, signature, aud=iios, app_id matches
  the token AND is allowed for the client, freshness, single-use nonce. Fail-closed.
- Prisma-backed stores; nonce reserve is atomic via the unique PK (P2002 = replay).
- Tests (9 pass): happy path + the five rejection cases the CEO named
  (unknown client, wrong audience, expired, replayed nonce, app-mismatch) +
  forged-signature + disabled-client; a DB atomicity test (skips if engine offline).

Decoupled from the request path on purpose — wiring it into the messaging guard
(the three-proof gate) + demoting be-crm to an attestation forwarder is the next step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 20:11:04 +05:30