A valid actor token is no longer enough. This adds the trust-layer core so IIOS
can require a signed CONTEXT ATTESTATION from an authorized parent (AppShell etc.)
before a privileged request — defeating a hacked app replaying a stolen token.
- prisma: IiosClientRegistry (registered clients allowed to attest, per app) +
IiosAttestationNonce (single-use replay ledger). Migration applied.
- ContextAttestationVerifier + ports (ClientRegistryPort, NonceStorePort) + a dev
signer. Verifies: registered+active client, signature, aud=iios, app_id matches
the token AND is allowed for the client, freshness, single-use nonce. Fail-closed.
- Prisma-backed stores; nonce reserve is atomic via the unique PK (P2002 = replay).
- Tests (9 pass): happy path + the five rejection cases the CEO named
(unknown client, wrong audience, expired, replayed nonce, app-mismatch) +
forged-signature + disabled-client; a DB atomicity test (skips if engine offline).
Decoupled from the request path on purpose — wiring it into the messaging guard
(the three-proof gate) + demoting be-crm to an attestation forwarder is the next step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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