53 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
maaz519 b4104b9769 feat(media): allow HTML/Markdown/CSV uploads; serve scriptable types as downloads
- media upload policy now allows text/html, text/markdown, text/x-markdown,
  text/csv (in addition to images/av, pdf, txt, zip, office docs)
- blob endpoint adds X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and forces
  Content-Disposition: attachment for script-capable types (html, xhtml, svg,
  xml) so an uploaded file can't render/execute inline from the IIOS origin
  (stored-XSS). Images/video/audio/pdf still serve inline for preview.
- dev-opa test covering the allowed types + unknown/oversize denials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 14:30:25 +05:30
maaz519 32aa04503d Merge pull request 'Feat/s3 storage' (#4) from feat/s3-storage into dev
Reviewed-on: #4
2026-07-18 12:28:22 +00:00
maaz519 c8c2d0811b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev' into feat/s3-storage 2026-07-18 17:57:21 +05:30
maaz519 ce33834d56 feat(threads): governed group settings — rename, list members, remove participant
- MessageService.renameThread / removeParticipant / listParticipants,
  each fail-closed via OPA (kernel stays generic — no dm/group branching)
- dev OPA: iios.thread.update + iios.thread.participant.remove rules
  (group requires ADMIN; ungoverned threads unchanged)
- REST: PATCH /v1/threads/:id, GET + DELETE /v1/threads/:id/participants
- tests: admin renames/removes, member is denied, member list carries roles
  (message.spec + dev-opa.port.spec)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 17:34:28 +05:30
maaz519 b164ef945c feat(mail): in-app attachments on internal mail + surface media parts in thread reads
- MailInternalDto accepts attachments[]; deposit() stores each as a media
  part (image/video→MEDIA_REF, audio→VOICE_REF, else FILE_REF)
- ingest now persists part sizeBytes; contract + DTO carry it
- threads.getMessages returns mimeType + sizeBytes so mail readers can
  render inline images / file chips
- test: internal mail stores an image attachment as a MEDIA_REF part

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 17:24:49 +05:30
maaz519 18498ee9fa Merge pull request 'feat(mail): tag mail threads source=crm-mail (list separately from chat)' (#3) from feat/s3-storage into dev
Reviewed-on: #3
2026-07-18 11:12:35 +00:00
maaz519 40c98522dc feat(mail): tag mail threads source=crm-mail (list separately from chat)
ingest() puts metadata on the interaction, not the thread, and listThreads filters
THREAD metadata — so MailService now tags the thread directly after deposit
(source=crm-mail). Lets the CRM list mail threads apart from Messenger chat
(source=crm-messenger). 7 tests. NOTE: requires an IIOS redeploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 16:30:28 +05:30
maaz519 50f9b3213d Merge pull request 'Feat/s3 storage' (#1) from feat/s3-storage into dev
Reviewed-on: #1
2026-07-18 09:06:39 +00:00
maaz519 0c6650f3c6 feat(media): S3/MinIO storage adapter (StoragePort)
Drop-in S3-compatible backend for object storage (media + email attachments) —
the swap the StoragePort seam was designed for. MinIO/self-hosted/R2/Supabase all
work via endpoint + path-style.

- S3Storage implements StoragePort (put/get/remove); sha256 computed locally on put
  (matches LocalDiskStorage); a missing object reads back as null, not an error.
- Env-driven binding in MediaModule: IIOS_S3_BUCKET + keys set → S3Storage, else
  LocalDiskStorage. forcePathStyle defaults true (MinIO); endpoint omitted → AWS.
- S3 client is injectable so tests run with no live server.

6 unit tests (config parse, put size/sha, get round-trip, NoSuchKey→null, remove).
Full suite 300/300, boundary + build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 14:26:53 +05:30
maaz519 d28c873d40 feat(mail): email attachments over SMTP
Email can now carry attachments (e.g. an invoice PDF). The kernel already stored
attachments as message parts + the media StoragePort holds the bytes; the gap was
the email envelope.

- EMAIL payload carries attachment REFS ({filename, contentRef, mimeType}), not
  bytes — the ledger + T8 PII redaction stay small; bytes are fetched at send time.
- SmtpProvider takes an AttachmentResolver; resolves each ref via storage and attaches
  (nodemailer). FAILS CLOSED if a declared attachment can't be resolved (or no resolver
  is wired) — never send a receipt/invoice missing its file; a FAILED command retries.
- CapabilityProviderRegistry injects the resolver from STORAGE_PORT (@Optional);
  MediaModule exports STORAGE_PORT, CapabilityModule imports MediaModule. No cycle.
- TemplatedSender + MailService + the /v1/mail/send DTO pass attachments through.

Verified: 6 new unit tests (attach, fail-closed x2, plain-unaffected, resolver,
pass-through) + a REAL Ethereal SMTP send WITH a PDF attachment (SENT). Full suite
294/294, boundary + build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 14:14:20 +05:30
maaz519 9b075f46f9 feat(mail): inbox mirror + INTERNAL (app-to-app) delivery
MailService renders a template then deposits it as an EMAIL interaction on a
per-email thread (thread model: one thread per email), reusing IngestService.
Because ingest adds no participants and a thread is only visible to its
participants, it ensureParticipant()s BOTH sender and recipient — so the mirror
is actually visible.

- postInternal: app-to-app mail, no SMTP → recipient's in-app inbox.
- sendExternalWithMirror: SMTP send (TemplatedSender) + mirror an interaction
  ONLY for a registered recipient (pre-registration sends are email-only — no
  inbox exists yet). Idempotent across both the send and the mirror.
- Writes Interactions, NEVER InboxItems (the projector owns those — KG-15).
- POST /v1/mail/internal, POST /v1/mail/send. MailModule in AppModule.

Verified over HTTP: internal mail → recipient SEES the thread in their inbox;
external send → command + mirror; no-source/no-auth 400. 7 unit tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 13:54:32 +05:30
maaz519 bba5fae061 docs(mail): inbox mirror + INTERNAL delivery plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 13:49:19 +05:30
maaz519 74cca2d534 feat(smtp): SMTP egress provider (nodemailer) for the EMAIL channel
Makes external email actually leave the building (was sandbox-only). SmtpProvider
implements CapabilityProvider; env-activated (accounts@ primary, ceo@ fallback);
transporter injected for tests.

- send() maps target+payload -> {from,to,subject,html,text,inReplyTo,references};
  providerRef = nodemailer's real Message-ID (so replies thread via In-Reply-To).
- Fallback ONLY on pre-acceptance failures (connect/auth/timeout) — a post-acceptance
  error is terminal, so a message the server already took can't be double-delivered.
- Never throws — transport failure -> FAILED, per the adapter doctrine.
- Registry precedence via registration order: SMTP > HTTP relay > sandbox for EMAIL.

Verified: 13 unit tests (config/envelope/fallback/precedence) + a REAL SMTP round-trip
against nodemailer Ethereal (SENT, genuine Message-ID). Full suite 281/281, boundary+build clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 13:31:04 +05:30
maaz519 7d7c75915a docs(smtp): SMTP provider plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 13:25:37 +05:30
maaz519 65023ce404 feat(templates): T8 PII redaction of outbound commands (fast-follow)
An email/SMS command holds PII: the recipient address (target) and the rendered
body (payload). RetentionService now snapshots outbound commands and, once aged,
redacts target->'[redacted]' and payload->{redacted:true} in place while KEEPING
the template provenance (key/version/locale/hash) — so 'which template version did
we send?' stays answerable after the PII is gone.

- ensureOutboundSnapshots: one snapshot per command, dataClass 'outbound',
  archiveAfter==deleteAfter (PII goes straight to redact, no archive phase).
  Nullable command scope uses an 'unscoped' tag so the global sweep still reaches it.
- applySweep redact branch switches on targetType; compliance holds honored; audit
  'retention.redacted' resourceType 'outbound_command'.

Closes lever #2 of the PII-minimization plan. 3 new + 6 regression tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:56:22 +05:30
maaz519 b44f795ba4 feat(templates): T6 controller + DTOs + module wiring
POST /v1/templates/send (render→queue) and /preview (render only). OPA-gated in
the sender: iios.template.send, and iios.template.send.inline for ad-hoc HTML
(arbitrary markup to a customer is riskier than a reviewed stored template).
Scope resolved from the caller's principal. TemplateModule registered in AppModule.

Verified over HTTP against a local boot: preview + send of the seeded
payment.receipt (SENT via sandbox, provenance persisted), XSS name escaped,
idempotent replay → 1 row, unknown key 404, bad channel/no-source/no-auth 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:39:04 +05:30
maaz519 37407cb0af feat(templates): T5 boot seeder + default seeds
TemplateSeeder (OnModuleInit) seeds repo file defaults as global (scopeId NULL)
templates if absent. Idempotent per (key,channel,locale,version): re-boot inserts
nothing; a bumped version adds a new row and keeps the old for audit. Seeds:
welcome (email), payment.receipt (email+sms), onboarding.reminder (email) —
placeholder copy for marketing to replace. 3 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:33:12 +05:30
maaz519 10f3545a25 feat(templates): T4 sendTemplated() + outbound provenance
- IiosOutboundCommand gains templateKey/version/locale/renderedHash (migration).
- OutboundService.send accepts an optional opaque `provenance` and writes it into
  the command on BOTH the PENDING and RATE_LIMITED create paths — the only way to
  stamp provenance by construction, since send() creates the row itself (review
  finding). OutboundService still neither renders nor resolves templates.
- TemplatedSender.sendTemplated: render -> OutboundService.send -> provenance, one
  entry point. EMAIL payload = {subject,html,text}; SMS = {text}. Idempotent per key.

Tests: 4 sender + 16 adapters regression green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:30:19 +05:30
maaz519 8ce647552a feat(templates): T3 render() service (resolve+render, inline, version pin)
TemplateService.render(source, vars, opts) → { content, provenance }. Stored
key → resolve+render; inline → render without a DB row (key/version null);
explicit version pins. Provenance = {templateKey, version, locale, sha256(content)}.
10 tests (svc + repo).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:25:27 +05:30
maaz519 b3afd44d00 feat(templates): T2 IiosMessageTemplate table + resolve()
Schema + migration for the template source table, and TemplateRepository.resolve:
highest active version for (key,channel,locale), scoped override preferred over
the global (scopeId NULL) default.

Migration adds a PARTIAL unique index WHERE scopeId IS NULL so two platform
defaults for the same key can't coexist (Postgres treats NULL as distinct under
a plain UNIQUE — the scoped constraint alone wouldn't catch it). 6 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:23:44 +05:30
maaz519 8768af96c1 feat(templates): T1 pure Handlebars renderer
renderTemplate(raw, vars) → {subject, html, text}. HTML body auto-escaped
(customer names into email = XSS risk); subject/text verbatim. Throws on a
missing declared variable — never send a half-rendered receipt. 5 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:21:09 +05:30
maaz519 cea0a27118 docs(templates): email/message template module plan
Design + 8-task TDD plan for the IIOS template module. Self-reviewed:
provenance-write path, nullable-scope unique index, PII minimization.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:18:26 +05:30
maaz519 6dc9e4ffee feat: reject socket-scoped tokens on REST (the other half of realtime delegation)
The delegated socket token (aud=IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE) was only narrow in one direction: the
gateway accepts ONLY that audience, but REST never checked the actor token's audience — so a
leaked browser socket token still drove privileged REST, i.e. a full actor token with extra steps.

RealtimeTokenRestGuard closes it, registered GLOBALLY (APP_GUARD) because every REST route is a
target — only 2 of 15 controllers sit behind ContextAttestationGuard, so inbox/media/interactions/
ai/... would otherwise stay open.

It is a decode-only REJECT filter, never an authenticator:
- does not verify signatures (controllers still call SessionVerifier); stripping `aud` to bypass it
  invalidates the signature downstream,
- no bearer -> pass through (health, metrics, HMAC adapter webhooks),
- ws context -> pass through (the gateway enforces the mirror rule),
- unset IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE -> no-op, the same switch that turns on the socket half.

So one env now enables the whole boundary: socket accepts only iios-message, REST refuses it.
8 tests; typecheck + build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 20:29:59 +05:30
maaz519 3298401772 feat: enforce realtime delegation audience on the message socket
The socket used to accept any valid token, so a full REST/actor token could open the
live stream. Now it can require a narrowly-scoped delegated token (aud=iios-message),
so a leaked socket token can't drive privileged REST, and vice-versa.

- MessagePrincipal gains `audience`, surfaced from both verify paths (OIDC aud, and the
  app-token `aud` claim).
- message.gateway: when IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE is set, handleConnection accepts only a
  token whose aud matches (opt-in, like IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION; unset = no change).
- spec: verifier surfaces aud; gateway accepts iios-message, rejects iios-core / no-aud
  when enforcing, passes through when off.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 12:56:19 +05:30
maaz519 e39caa3c80 feat: verify context attestations via ES256/JWKS + rename client to appshell-crm
Proof #3 now supports the production asymmetric path, not just the dev shared secret.

- context-attestation.ts: PublicKeyResolverPort seam; verify() picks ES256 (JWKS by
  kid) when the client has a jwksUri, else HS256 (dev). signDevAttestationES256 helper.
- attestation-stores.ts: JwksPublicKeyResolver (jwks-rsa, one cached client per URI,
  refetch on rotation, fail-closed to NO_KEY).
- attestation.module.ts: inject the resolver into the verifier; dev-seed the client as
  clientType APPSHELL (it is the CRM browser-flow parent per the July-12 notes).
- rename the registered client crm-support-widget -> appshell-crm (the name reflects the
  attesting parent, not a widget).
- specs: ES256 (valid via JWKS, wrong key -> BAD_SIGNATURE, unknown kid -> NO_KEY, no
  resolver -> NO_KEY) + two stolen-token gate cases (wrong app binding -> APP_MISMATCH,
  wrong audience -> WRONG_AUDIENCE).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 12:56:10 +05:30
maaz519 85a78eb21e feat(iios-kernel-client): per-request header factory → 0.1.4
RestConfig.headers now accepts a function, invoked once per request, so a caller can
mint a FRESH context attestation (new single-use nonce) each call. A static header was
replay-rejected on the 2nd request of a multi-call operation. Published 0.1.4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 23:26:33 +05:30
maaz519 3e66c7a5db perf(iios): listThreads fetches last-message-per-thread in one query
Replaced the per-thread findFirst inside Promise.all (N parallel queries) with a
single Postgres DISTINCT ON query. A caller with many threads no longer fans out
and exhausts the connection pool (the conversation.list 500 under accumulated data).
message.spec 16/16 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 21:28:37 +05:30
maaz519 9e0411bfe6 feat(iios-kernel-client): RestClient custom headers passthrough → 0.1.3
Adds optional RestConfig.headers, merged into every request, so a server-side
caller (be-crm's glue) can carry X-Context-Attestation (the July 12 proof #3)
alongside the bearer token. Backward compatible. Published 0.1.3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 21:03:45 +05:30
maaz519 f2d590b04d feat(iios): wire the three-proof gate into the request path (§1b)
Applies the context-attestation verifier at the request boundary via a guard, so a
stolen/forged/replayed attestation is rejected before IIOS acts — while staying safe
to roll out.

- ContextAttestationGuard: if an X-Context-Attestation header is present, verify it
  (its app_id must match the actor token's app_id) → 403 on any failure; if absent,
  allow only when IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION != 1 (dev/zero-trust), else 403. The flag is
  read per-request and defaults OFF, so existing callers keep working until AppShell/
  be-crm start forwarding attestations.
- AttestationModule (@Global): provides the verifier + Prisma stores + guard, and
  dev-seeds the crm-support-widget client so locally minted attestations verify.
- Guard applied to ThreadsController + SupportController.
- Tests (5 pass, no DB): not-required-allows, required-rejects, valid, forged, replayed.

Workload/mTLS (proof #2) stays a mesh concern. Next: SDK header passthrough + demote
be-crm IiosClient to forward an attestation, then flip the flag to prove end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 20:49:40 +05:30
maaz519 dd6a4cd4fa feat(iios): context-attestation verifier — the July 12 stolen-token proof (§1)
A valid actor token is no longer enough. This adds the trust-layer core so IIOS
can require a signed CONTEXT ATTESTATION from an authorized parent (AppShell etc.)
before a privileged request — defeating a hacked app replaying a stolen token.

- prisma: IiosClientRegistry (registered clients allowed to attest, per app) +
  IiosAttestationNonce (single-use replay ledger). Migration applied.
- ContextAttestationVerifier + ports (ClientRegistryPort, NonceStorePort) + a dev
  signer. Verifies: registered+active client, signature, aud=iios, app_id matches
  the token AND is allowed for the client, freshness, single-use nonce. Fail-closed.
- Prisma-backed stores; nonce reserve is atomic via the unique PK (P2002 = replay).
- Tests (9 pass): happy path + the five rejection cases the CEO named
  (unknown client, wrong audience, expired, replayed nonce, app-mismatch) +
  forged-signature + disabled-client; a DB atomicity test (skips if engine offline).

Decoupled from the request path on purpose — wiring it into the messaging guard
(the three-proof gate) + demoting be-crm to an attestation forwarder is the next step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 20:11:04 +05:30
maaz519 77dd5bac82 fix(iios): use extended query parser so nested metadata filters parse
NestJS 11 runs Express 5, whose default 'simple' query parser ignores nested
params like ?metadata[key]=value — so GET /v1/threads silently dropped the
metadata filter, causing e.g. an app's "reuse existing thread for this customer"
check to match ANY thread. Set the qs-based 'extended' parser.

Verified: filtering by a non-existent metadata value now returns 0 (was returning
all); the be-crm support smoke goes 12/12 (was 10/12 once a prior thread existed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 14:33:28 +05:30
maaz519 b918a21083 feat(iios): generic opaque metadata + manual ticket assign (glue prereqs)
Generic kernel primitives so app backends (e.g. a CRM support glue) can link
their domain to interactions WITHOUT the kernel learning any app vocabulary:

- thread: accept an opaque `metadata` bag on create (merged with membership),
  echo it in listThreads, and filter listThreads by `?metadata[key]=value`
  (equality on the opaque bag — the kernel never interprets the keys).
- support: accept opaque `metadata` on createTicket/escalate (thread bag
  inherited); add SupportService.assignTo — a policy-gated manual assignment
  of a ticket to a target actor (POST /v1/support/tickets/:id/assignee).
- SDK @insignia/iios-kernel-client 0.1.2: createThread(metadata),
  listThreads({metadata}) filter, createTicket(metadata), escalate(metadata),
  assignTicket; ThreadSummary/Ticket expose the opaque bag.

Generic-safety gate holds: no crm/customer/lead in kernel code (opaque values
only). Tests: +2 (metadata create/filter, ticket metadata + assignTo); 31 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 18:39:30 +05:30
maaz519 8c70b6d31f feat(iios-kernel-client): reconcile to chat-web surface, publish 0.1.1
Brings the shared SDK up to the fuller client chat-web had vendored, so
frontends consume one source of truth instead of copying it:

- types: Message gains senderId/senderName/attachment/parentInteractionId/
  annotations; add Attachment, AnnotationGroup, AnnotationEvent, ThreadSummary,
  SavedItem, LoginResult; MessageEvents gains `annotation`; SocketLike gains
  connected + optional timeout.
- MessageSocket: onConnected, openThread(opts), richer sendMessage(opts)
  (attachment/mentions/parentInteractionId, back-compatible with contentRef),
  pin/save/react via annotate, focus, reconnect-re-subscribe-all.
- RestClient: login, listUsers, listThreads, createThread, listSaved,
  addParticipant.

Bump 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1. Whole monorepo still builds (Message change is additive
for iios-message-web/iios-support-web/demos).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 17:49:25 +05:30
maaz519 64c498a97a build: publish @insignia/iios-* SDKs to the Gitea package registry
- .npmrc routes the @insignia scope to https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/
  (auth via ${GITEA_TOKEN} env — no secret committed).
- The 9 frontend SDK packages (contracts, kernel-client, adapter-sdk, *-web) are now
  publishable: private dropped, version 0.1.0, publishConfig pinned to Gitea. iios-service
  and iios-testkit stay private (pnpm publish skips them).
- Root `release` / `release:dry` scripts; a Gitea Actions workflow publishes on a v* tag.
- PUBLISHING.md documents publish + consumer (.npmrc) setup.

Verified: dry-run packs cleanly and workspace:* deps resolve to 0.1.0 in the tarball.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 17:13:55 +05:30
maaz519 5abee1b5b7 docs: add repo-local project memory under .claude/memory/
Versioned, per-topic project memory (index + entries): IIOS overview, the generic-safety
rule, run/test + the replay.spec flake workaround, recent features (Supabase auth,
reactions/pins/saves, mentions, media, notifications), the chat-web consumer, and workflow
conventions. CLAUDE.md points to it as the accumulating-notes companion to the canonical rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 19:55:38 +05:30
maaz519 58ebaf1982 docs: add CLAUDE.md — project rules for future Claude Code sessions
Captures what IIOS is, the #1 generic-safety guardrail (no chat vocabulary in the
kernel; meaning lives in OPA policy + opaque attributes + the app), the architecture
(kernel + platform ports + fail-closed + outbox/projectors), tech stack, run/test
commands (isolated iios_test DB, the replay.spec flake note), conventions (commit
email, IIOS_DEV_TOKENS off in prod), and current build state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 19:48:10 +05:30
maaz519 6fc03fa4c3 docs(iios): notifications — API guide §5.11 (endpoints + engine diagram), env, counts
- API guide §5.11 Notifications: vapid-public-key / subscribe / unsubscribe / thread
  mute endpoints, the focus_thread presence signal, the three gates, and the engine
  flow diagram; SDK reference (registerPush/muteThread/focus); VAPID env; tests 205.
- DEPLOYMENT: VAPID env + the in-memory-presence → Redis (multi-replica) caveat.
- CEO overview: counts (205 tests, 54 tables / 20 migrations) + notifications in the
  "P9 has begun" note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 19:45:11 +05:30
maaz519 0a8544b6fc feat(iios): notification engine — presence-gated Web Push (engine phase)
Deploy iios-service / build-deploy (push) Failing after 4m37s
CI / build (push) Successful in 5m25s
Generic notification engine: reacts to message.sent and runs three gates before
delivering — policy (DM always; group only on @mention or reply-to-you), presence
(skip if the recipient is focused on that thread), mute (per-thread). Delivery via a
swappable NotificationPort (Web Push/VAPID adapter); a 'gone' (404/410) prunes the sub.

- PresenceService + gateway `focus_thread` signal + disconnect cleanup (room membership
  != viewing, since the sidebar joins every thread room).
- IiosNotificationSubscription table + `muted` on IiosThreadParticipant (migration).
- Endpoints: GET vapid-public-key, POST/DELETE subscribe, POST threads/:id/mute|unmute;
  listThreads returns the caller's `muted`.
- DM-vs-group read from the opaque `membership` attribute in the notification POLICY only
  — kernel stays generic (grep-verified).

Tests: 13 new (3 gates + reply-to-you + prune + web-push adapter states); full suite 205
green. Verified live: module boots, subscribe stored, mute/unmute round-trips.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 19:16:53 +05:30
maaz519 f2ef8922ce chore: remove notifications planning docs (dropping the superpowers workflow)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 18:59:02 +05:30
maaz519 48c2e6589c docs(plan): notifications implementation plan (10 tasks, TDD, 3 phases)
Phase 1 frontend quick win (desktop notif + tab-title), Phase 2 IIOS engine
(schema, PresenceService + focus signal, NotificationPort + Web Push, projector
with policy/presence/mute gates, endpoints, module wiring), Phase 3 SDK+app
(service worker, registerPush, focus emit, mute toggle, deep-link) + smoke/docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 18:52:20 +05:30
maaz519 ba2d5f4193 docs(spec): notifications design (engine in IIOS + Web Push, per-thread mute)
Approved design: IIOS notification engine (PresenceService, NotificationProjector with
policy/presence/mute gates, swappable NotificationPort → Web Push VAPID, subscription +
participant.muted data) + host-app experience (service worker, registerPush, mute toggle,
deep-link). Trigger policy: DMs always, group only on @mention or reply-to-you. Phased:
frontend quick win → IIOS engine → SDK/app.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 18:44:49 +05:30
maaz519 e49a71feaf docs(iios): bring API guide, DEPLOYMENT, and CEO overview up to as-built
API & SDK guide:
- §5.3 Threads & Messaging fully filled in: GET/POST /v1/threads, participants,
  my-annotations; the Message shape (senderId, attachment, annotations); the full
  socket event set (open_thread/send_message/add_participant/annotate/read/typing +
  server message/receipt/typing/annotation); reactions/pins/saves as the generic
  interaction-annotation primitive; mentions → MENTION inbox item.
- §5.4 inbox MENTION kind; SDK reactions/pins/saves + listThreads/createThread;
  vocab adds MENTION, message-part kinds, attachment kind, annotation types.

DEPLOYMENT:
- Real-IdP auth env (SUPABASE_URL/AUTH_ISSUERS via JWKS, no secret) + MEDIA_SECRET.
- Media StoragePort in topology: dev local disk → prod object storage; ⚠ local disk is
  single-instance/non-durable; bytes flow client↔storage direct (scales independently).

CEO overview: refreshed counts (192 tests, 53 tables / 19 migrations) and noted P9 has
begun — real Supabase auth (first stubbed port turned real) + generic reactions/pins/
saves/mentions/media on the kernel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 01:48:29 +05:30
maaz519 ac7f790303 docs(iios): media section (endpoints + governed flow diagram), real-IdP auth, media env
- New §5.10 Media: presign-upload/download + upload/blob endpoints, attachment shape,
  governance notes (25MB + type allowlist via OPA, signed tokens, tenant fence), and a
  sequence diagram of the presign→upload→send→signed-download flow with the OPA gate.
- SDK: uploadMedia/mediaUrl; send() attachment/mentions.
- Auth §3: real OIDC (Supabase/AUTH_ISSUERS) JWKS verification alongside dev HS256.
- Env: MEDIA_DIR/MEDIA_SECRET/PUBLIC_URL/SUPABASE_URL/AUTH_ISSUERS; test count 192.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 01:38:37 +05:30
maaz519 24a87f6fb6 feat(iios): media sharing — presigned storage port + attachments on messages
Deploy iios-service / build-deploy (push) Failing after 3m35s
CI / build (push) Successful in 3m47s
Media the industry way: the DB stores a reference, bytes live behind a storage port.
- StoragePort + LocalDiskStorage (dev). MediaService presigns short-lived signed
  upload/download URLs (HS256 tokens) pointing at IIOS's own endpoints; the bytes
  never touch the kernel. Prod swaps STORAGE_PORT to S3/Supabase — same as auth.
- MediaController: presign-upload / PUT upload/:token (raw stream) / GET blob/:token /
  presign-download. Uploads are OPA-governed (iios.media.upload: 25 MB cap +
  image/video/audio/pdf/office allowlist); downloads are tenant-fenced by object key.
- send() + MessageDto carry an attachment (contentRef/mimeType/sizeBytes → generic
  MEDIA_REF/VOICE_REF/FILE_REF part; DTO exposes kind image|video|audio|file).

Tests: media.service.spec (6) — round-trip, oversize/type denied, oversized PUT
refused, tampered token rejected, tenant fence. Full suite 192 green. Verified live:
presign→upload→send→history→signed download round-trips the exact bytes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 01:15:03 +05:30
maaz519 1256664361 feat(iios): expose senderId (stable externalId) on MessageDto
CI / build (push) Successful in 4m53s
Deploy iios-service / build-deploy (push) Failing after 8m37s
The app needs a reliable "is this message mine?" signal. senderActorId worked only
with a lazily-learned actorId, which Supabase token-refresh wipes. senderId is the
sender's externalId (email/username) — always present and comparable to the session
user — so message alignment is deterministic. Verified: senderId round-trips = email.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:58:10 +05:30
maaz519 0ecc8a4ada feat(iios): multi-issuer session verifier (many IdPs/apps → isolated appId scopes)
SessionVerifier now holds a REGISTRY of trusted OIDC issuers instead of a single
Supabase project. A token is routed by its `iss` claim to that issuer's entry,
verified against that issuer's JWKS (ES256, no secret), and stamped with that
entry's appId/orgId — so two Supabase projects / IdPs map to two isolated app
scopes on one IIOS (chat vs a future support app). App A's tokens can't reach B.

- Config: `AUTH_ISSUERS` (JSON array of { url, appId, orgId? }); the single
  `SUPABASE_URL` (+ SUPABASE_APP_ID) still works as a one-entry shorthand.
- Per-issuer JWKS cache; untrusted issuer → reject; forgery (right issuer claim,
  wrong key) → reject.
- HS256 app-token path (dev/tests) unchanged.

Tests: new session.verifier.spec (4) — routes to correct appId, second issuer →
different appId, untrusted issuer rejected, cross-issuer forgery rejected.

Note: outbox `replay.spec` has a pre-existing clock-skew flake (nextAttemptAt vs
Postgres now()) that surfaces under certain suite orderings — unrelated to this
change (fails in isolation on a clean tree; passes when another spec runs first).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:38:30 +05:30
maaz519 e956ad3cb9 feat(iios): verify real Supabase access tokens (ES256 via JWKS)
SessionVerifier gains a Supabase mode (set SUPABASE_URL): user SATs are ES256,
verified against the project's public JWKS — no shared secret. Keys are fetched at
startup (onModuleInit) and cached as PEM so verify() stays synchronous; a rotated
kid triggers a background refresh. Claims map to MessagePrincipal with userId=email
(stable, human-readable → mentions/directory keep working; RealMDM canonicalises
later). The legacy HS256 app-token path is unchanged (dev/tests untouched).

senderName now prefers the actor display name over the raw handle, so real names
show on bubbles when identity is an email.

Verified end-to-end against a live project: signup → real ES256 SAT → GET /v1/threads
200 → thread created + owned by the resolved email principal. Full suite 182 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:14:28 +05:30
maaz519 8c814d9b86 feat(iios): @mentions via inbox fan-out + my-annotations query (pins/saves)
Mentions ride the existing event-driven inbox — no chat parsing in the kernel:
- send() carries an OPAQUE mentions[] (userIds) into the message event; the kernel
  never parses "@". The app supplies the notify-list.
- InboxProjector fans out a MENTION inbox item (new generic inbox kind) to each
  mentioned *participant* (never the sender), idempotent per source message; reading
  the thread resolves the reader's MENTION + NEEDS_REPLY items to DONE.
- New MENTION value in the generic IiosInboxItemKind taxonomy (migration).

Pins/saves reuse the annotation primitive; new generic query powers a Saved list:
- MessageService.listMyAnnotated(principal, type) + GET /v1/threads/my-annotations
  returns the caller's annotated messages (type "save") with thread context.

Tests: 182 pass (+4: mention fan-out, resolve-on-read, saved query, opaque mentions).
Verified live: mention→inbox delivery, read→resolve, pin/save persistence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 01:35:30 +05:30
maaz519 f3c4ba72b5 feat(iios): generic interaction-annotation primitive (backs emoji reactions)
Adds IiosInteractionAnnotation — an actor attaches an OPAQUE (annotationType, value)
label to an interaction. The kernel stores + aggregates them but never interprets the
strings (the chat app writes type "reaction" / value = emoji); the same primitive backs
pins/saves/flags/tags later. No chat vocabulary in kernel code — verified by grep.

- MessageService.toggleAnnotation(): governed (participant-only via new OPA rule
  iios.interaction.annotate), idempotent toggle keyed on
  (scope, interaction, actor, type, value); history DTO carries aggregated
  { type, value, users[] } groups.
- Gateway: `annotate` event → broadcasts `annotation` (refreshed user list) to the room.
- DevOpaPort: annotate allowed only for thread members (real OPA can tighten later).
- Migration add_interaction_annotations (additive; dev data untouched).

Tests: 178 pass (+3: toggle/aggregate, coexisting values, non-member denied).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:20:47 +05:30
maaz519 c4206f9809 fix(iios): thread subject on create, graceful open_thread error, isolated test DB
- openThread/createThread accept a generic `subject` (group name) — stored on the
  thread, echoed via listThreads; kernel never interprets it.
- Gateway open_thread now returns an ACK'd { error } on failure instead of throwing
  (which never acked → clients hung on "loading"). Non-member/missing-thread opens
  fail cleanly.
- Tests run against an isolated `iios_test` database (vitest globalSetup creates +
  migrates it; test.env overrides DATABASE_URL) so `pnpm test` can never TRUNCATE the
  dev database again. Verified: full suite green, dev DB row counts unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:39:19 +05:30
maaz519 1af10d0f4a feat(iios): message senderName + dev user directory
- Messages now carry senderName (resolved actorId → sourceHandle.externalId) so
  clients render usernames instead of raw actor cuids.
- GET /v1/dev/users exposes the dev directory (DEV_USERS keys) so a host app can
  validate add-by-username; real apps validate against their user store / MDM.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 17:11:20 +05:30
maaz519 31f7682a46 feat(iios): include participant names in listThreads (generic)
GET /v1/threads now returns participants[] (member usernames) so a host app can
render conversation titles / member lists without a second call. Still generic —
it only lists members of threads the caller belongs to.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 16:27:47 +05:30
maaz519 ba745bb71a feat(iios): policy-enforced membership + threaded replies + dev IdP (generic)
Enriches the platform PLANE, not the kernel:
- DevOpaPort: the dev OPA stub now evaluates a small policy table (behind the
  same opa.decide) — DM capped at 2, add-participant requires member/group-admin,
  governed self-join for membership threads. Real OPA swaps in unchanged.
- Dev IdP login (POST /v1/dev/login) issues the same JWT claims a real IdP would.
- PolicyDeniedFilter maps fail-closed denials to HTTP 403.

Generic kernel additions (no chat vocabulary — 'dm'/'group' live only as OPA
policy + an opaque thread attribute):
- MessageService.addParticipant (governed membership by userId), governed
  openThread self-join (scoped to threads with a membership attribute),
  parentInteractionId on send (reply link), and a generic listThreads.
- REST: GET /v1/threads, POST /v1/threads, POST /v1/threads/:id/participants;
  socket add_participant + membership/parentInteractionId. ensureParticipant
  gains a role.

Tests: dev-opa.port.spec + message.spec (DM cap / group admin / governed join /
listThreads / reply). smoke-membership.mjs; realtime smokes updated for governed
join. 175 unit tests + all smokes green; kernel free of dm/group literals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 16:27:47 +05:30
130 changed files with 7211 additions and 161 deletions
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# IIOS Project Memory — Index
Repo-local, versioned project memory. The full canonical rules are in the repo root
**`CLAUDE.md`**; these files are granular, per-topic memories that accumulate across sessions.
Read the relevant ones before working in that area; add/update files as the project evolves.
- [project_iios_overview.md](project_iios_overview.md) — what IIOS is (generic interaction OS; kernel + specializations + platform ports)
- [feedback_generic_safety.md](feedback_generic_safety.md) — THE #1 rule: no chat/domain vocabulary in the kernel
- [reference_run_and_test.md](reference_run_and_test.md) — run command, isolated `iios_test` DB, and the `replay.spec` flake workaround
- [project_recent_features.md](project_recent_features.md) — the "real-providers" era: Supabase auth, reactions/pins/saves, mentions→inbox, media, notifications
- [reference_chat_web_consumer.md](reference_chat_web_consumer.md) — chat-web is the reference app driving IIOS feature work
- [feedback_workflow.md](feedback_workflow.md) — commits (email + co-author), IIOS_DEV_TOKENS off in prod, TDD, build-before-restart
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---
name: feedback_generic_safety
description: THE #1 locked rule — the kernel must never hardcode chat/domain vocabulary
metadata:
type: feedback
---
**The kernel must stay generic.** No `'dm'` / `'group'` / `'reaction'` / `'emoji'` / `'mention'`
literals in kernel or messaging *logic*. If a reviewer asked "is this a chat backend now?" the
answer must stay **no**.
**Why:** IIOS is a generic interaction OS; chat is one consumer. Baking chat meaning into the
kernel destroys reuse (support/community/meetings share the same core).
**How to apply:** domain meaning lives in exactly three places, never the kernel —
1. **OPA policy** (`DevOpaPort` → real OPA): DM-cap, group-admin, governed-join, media limits,
notification triggers.
2. **Opaque attributes** the kernel stores but never interprets: `thread.metadata.membership`
(`dm`/`group`), interaction annotations (opaque `annotationType`+`value` → app writes
`reaction`/`pin`/`save`), `mentions[]` (opaque userId notify-list; kernel never parses `@`).
3. **The app** (chat-web): rendering + product semantics.
Reading an opaque attr inside a **policy/notification gate** (`membership === 'dm'` in
`DevOpaPort` or `notification.projector.ts`) is OK — that file IS the policy plane. Everywhere
else, keep generic. Verify before committing:
`grep -rniE "'dm'|'group'|reaction|emoji" packages/iios-service/src | grep -v spec` — hits only
in policy/notification/app-facing layers or comments. Also run `pnpm boundary`.
Related: [[project_iios_overview]].
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---
name: feedback_workflow
description: Working conventions — commits, prod flags, TDD, rebuild-before-restart
metadata:
type: feedback
---
- **Commits:** conventional (`feat:`/`fix:`/`docs:`/`chore:`), git email
**`maaz@insigniaconsultancy.com`**, co-author every commit with Claude. The user commits
directly to `main` in this project (fine); branch only if asked.
- **⚠ `IIOS_DEV_TOKENS` MUST be `0`/unset in production** — it exposes `/v1/dev/*` (unauth token
minting, chaos, retention sweep). The single most important prod-hardening flag.
- **TDD** — write the failing spec first; verify it fails; implement; verify it passes.
- **Rebuild before restart** — after backend changes, `nest build` then restart from `dist`;
`lsof -ti :3200 | xargs kill -9` first or the old build keeps serving (stale-dist bites).
- **New kernel capability = a generic primitive only** — add domain meaning in OPA policy + the
app, never the kernel. See [[feedback_generic_safety]].
- The user prefers **direct, fast iteration** (implement → verify end-to-end → commit), not
heavyweight multi-agent/spec ceremony. Include "how to test" in summaries; report failures honestly.
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---
name: project_iios_overview
description: What IIOS is — a generic multi-tenant interaction OS; kernel + specializations + swappable platform ports
metadata:
type: project
---
IIOS (Insignia Interaction OS) = one NestJS service (`@insignia/iios-service`) + SDKs, in a
pnpm monorepo (`packages/*`). Every interaction (chat message, ticket, routed post, AI
suggestion, meeting) is the **same kernel object** inside a **tenant scope** (`IiosScope`:
org/app/tenant/…), behind the **same fail-closed gates**, emitting the **same audit trail**.
Products (messaging, inbox, support, routing, AI, calendar, media, notifications) are thin
**specializations** on top of a tiny kernel — never the reverse (`pnpm boundary` enforces it).
Platform seams are **ports** (`IiosPlatformPorts`, DI token `PLATFORM_PORTS`; dev = permissive
`LocalDevPorts`): session, opa, cmp (consent), mdm, sas, capability, plus `StoragePort` (media)
and `NotificationPort` (push). **Dev stubs swap to real adapters with zero consumer changes.**
Every op passes `decideOrThrow(ports, {action,…})` fail-closed. Events go through a
transactional outbox → `OutboxBus` → idempotent projectors (inbox, notifications).
See the repo `CLAUDE.md` and `docs/IIOS_API_AND_SDK_GUIDE.md` (as-built reference) for detail.
Related: [[feedback_generic_safety]].
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---
name: project_recent_features
description: The "real-providers" era — Supabase auth, reactions/pins/saves, mentions→inbox, media, notifications
metadata:
type: project
---
Beyond P0P8 (kernel → messaging → inbox → support → adapters → routing → AI →
calendar/meetings), recent work (mostly driven by the chat app, the start of P9 "real
providers"):
- **Real Supabase auth** — `SessionVerifier` verifies real OIDC tokens against issuer JWKS
(ES256, no secret), a **multi-issuer registry** routed by the `iss` claim → per-issuer `appId`
scope (`AUTH_ISSUERS` JSON, or `SUPABASE_URL` single-issuer shorthand). `userId = email`.
Legacy HS256 app-token path (`APP_SECRETS`) stays for dev/tests.
- **Reactions / pins / saves** — one generic `IiosInteractionAnnotation` primitive (opaque
`annotationType`+`value`); socket `annotate` event → `annotation` broadcast;
`GET /v1/threads/my-annotations?type=save`.
- **@mentions → Inbox** — `send(... mentions[])` (opaque userId list) → `InboxProjector` fans out
a `MENTION` inbox item to mentioned participants; reading resolves it.
- **Media** — `StoragePort` (dev = local disk `MEDIA_DIR`; prod swap to S3/Supabase), presigned
upload/download (signed HS256 tokens, OPA-gated size/type, tenant-fenced), `attachment` on
`MessageDto`; parts use generic `MEDIA_REF/VOICE_REF/FILE_REF`.
- **Notifications** — presence-gated Web Push: `NotificationProjector` runs 3 gates
(policy=DM/mention/reply-to-you · presence=`focus_thread` signal · per-thread `muted`) →
swappable `NotificationPort` (Web Push/VAPID); dead sub (410) pruned. Presence is in-memory
(single-instance) → Redis for multi-replica.
- `senderId` (stable externalId) on `MessageDto` for reliable "is this mine?".
~205 tests. Keep `docs/IIOS_API_AND_SDK_GUIDE.md` current when adding endpoints.
Related: [[reference_chat_web_consumer]], [[feedback_generic_safety]].
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---
name: reference_chat_web_consumer
description: chat-web is the reference consumer app that drives IIOS feature work
metadata:
type: reference
---
**chat-web** (separate repo, `~/Documents/insignia-work/chat-web`) is the reference app on IIOS —
a 1:1 + group chat UI (Vite + React + TanStack Router/Query + socket.io-client + supabase-js).
It's frontend-only; IIOS provides identity, threads, messages, realtime, reactions, mentions,
media, notifications.
Feature work usually spans **both repos**: a generic primitive/port in iios + the app UI in
chat-web. The layer split we follow: **service** owns storage/auth/governance, the **SDK layer**
(`chat-web/src/lib/*`, mirrors `@insignia/iios-kernel-client`) owns client plumbing
(e.g. `uploadMedia`/`mediaUrl`, `registerPush`), the **app** owns rendering.
chat-web uses real Supabase login (`VITE_SUPABASE_URL` + anon key in its `.env`); identity =
email. Run it with `pnpm dev`. Commit both repos with git email `maaz@insigniaconsultancy.com`.
Related: [[project_recent_features]].
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---
name: reference_run_and_test
description: How to run the service + the test-DB isolation and the replay.spec flake workaround
metadata:
type: reference
---
**Infra:** Postgres in docker `iios-db` on **:5434** (db `iios`), Redis on :6379. If Docker is
down: `open -a OrbStack` then `docker start iios-db`.
**Run** (dev auth via Supabase; media + push enabled):
```
pnpm --filter @insignia/iios-service exec nest build # rebuild after backend changes
SUPABASE_URL=https://<ref>.supabase.co REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 PORT=3200 \
APP_SECRETS='{"portal-demo":"dev-secret"}' MEDIA_DIR=/tmp/iios-media \
VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=… VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY=… VAPID_SUBJECT=mailto:dev@insignia \
node packages/iios-service/dist/main.js # :3200 ; GET /health
```
Restarting: `lsof -ti :3200 | xargs kill -9` first (stale instance → EADDRINUSE / old build served).
**Tests:** `pnpm test` (Vitest) runs against an **isolated `iios_test` DB** (globalSetup creates
+ migrates it; `DATABASE_URL` overridden) — it **never wipes the dev `iios` DB**. TDD: spec next
to code; DB specs use `resetDb()`.
**⚠ Known flake — `outbox/replay.spec`:** clock/ordering-sensitive, pre-existing. If it fails in a
full run, it's stale `iios_test` state, NOT a regression. Fix:
`docker exec iios-db psql -U iios -d postgres -c "DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS iios_test WITH (FORCE)"`
then re-run. Prove it's not yours by stashing changes and re-running.
`pnpm boundary` = import-boundary check (must stay OK). Smokes: `packages/iios-service/scripts/smoke-*.mjs`.
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name: publish-sdks
# Publish the @insignia/iios-* SDK packages to the Gitea npm registry on a version tag.
# Requires: Gitea Actions enabled + a runner, and a repo secret GITEA_PUBLISH_TOKEN
# (a token with `write:package` scope for the `insignia` org).
on:
push:
tags:
- 'v*'
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
with:
version: 10
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: 22
- run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- run: pnpm -r build
- run: pnpm -r publish --no-git-checks
env:
# maps to ${GITEA_TOKEN} in .npmrc; private packages (service, testkit) are skipped
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_PUBLISH_TOKEN }}
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# @insignia SDK packages publish to / install from the Gitea package registry.
# Auth comes from the GITEA_TOKEN env var (never commit the token itself).
# publish → token needs the `write:package` scope
# install → token needs `read:package`
@insignia:registry=https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/
//git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/:_authToken=${GITEA_TOKEN}
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# IIOS — Claude Code Rules
> **Project memory:** granular, versioned per-topic notes live in **`.claude/memory/`** — read
> `.claude/memory/MEMORY.md` (the index) and the relevant entries before working in an area, and
> add/update memories as the project evolves. This file is the canonical rules; those are the
> accumulating notes.
## What IIOS is
**IIOS (Insignia Interaction OS)** is a **generic, multi-tenant "interaction OS"** — one
NestJS service (`@insignia/iios-service`) + a family of SDKs. Every interaction (a chat
message, a support ticket, a routed post, an AI suggestion, a meeting) is the **same kernel
object** inside a **tenant scope**, behind the **same fail-closed gates** (policy/consent),
emitting the **same audit trail**. Products (messaging, support, community, AI, meetings) are
thin **specializations** on top of the kernel — never the other way around.
`chat-web` (separate repo) is the reference consumer app.
## THE #1 LOCKED RULE — generic-safety (read this before touching the kernel)
**The kernel must never hardcode chat/domain vocabulary.** No `'dm'` / `'group'` /
`'reaction'` / `'emoji'` / `'mention'` literals in kernel or messaging *logic*. If a reviewer
asked *"is this a chat backend now?"* the answer must stay **no**.
Domain meaning lives in **three** places, never the kernel:
1. **OPA policy** (the policy plane — `DevOpaPort` now, real OPA later). The DM-cap,
group-admin, governed-join, media-limit, and notification-trigger rules live here.
2. **Opaque thread/interaction attributes** the kernel stores but never interprets:
`thread.metadata.membership` (`'dm'|'group'`), interaction annotations (opaque
`annotationType` + `value` → the app writes `reaction`/`pin`/`save`), `mentions[]` (an
opaque userId notify-list the kernel fans out; it never parses `@`).
3. **The app** (chat-web) — rendering + product semantics.
Reading an opaque attribute inside a **policy/notification gate** (e.g. `membership === 'dm'`
in `DevOpaPort` or `notification.projector.ts`) is allowed — that file *is* the policy plane,
not the kernel. Everywhere else, keep it generic. Verify with a grep before committing:
`grep -rniE "'dm'|'group'|reaction|emoji" packages/iios-service/src | grep -v spec` — hits
should only be in the policy/notification/app-facing layers or comments.
`pnpm boundary` enforces the layer dependency law (specializations import the kernel, never
the reverse). Run it; don't break it.
## Architecture
- **Kernel primitives** (generic): `IiosScope` (six-vector: org/app/tenant/bu/…), `IiosSourceHandle`
(externalId = userId; stays `UNVERIFIED` until MDM resolves → `canonicalEntityId`), `IiosActorRef`,
`IiosThread` (subject/metadata), `IiosThreadParticipant`, `IiosInteraction` (+ `parentInteractionId`
reply link), `IiosMessagePart` (media as `contentRef`), `IiosInteractionAnnotation` (generic).
- **Platform ports** (`IiosPlatformPorts`, DI token `PLATFORM_PORTS`; dev = `LocalDevPorts`):
session, opa, cmp (consent), mdm, sas, capability — plus a `StoragePort` (media) and
`NotificationPort` (push). **Dev stubs → real adapters with zero consumer changes.** Every
op passes `decideOrThrow(ports, {action,…})` **fail-closed**.
- **Session (auth):** `SessionVerifier` verifies (a) real OIDC tokens (Supabase/`AUTH_ISSUERS`)
against the issuer JWKS (ES256, no secret), routed by `iss` → per-issuer `appId` scope; or
(b) legacy dev HS256 app tokens (`APP_SECRETS`, keyed by `appId`). `userId = email` for OIDC.
- **Events:** transactional outbox → `OutboxBus`**projectors** (inbox, notifications).
Projectors are **idempotent** (`claim()` on `IiosProcessedEvent` + projection cursor).
Delivery is at-least-once → clients dedupe by message `id`.
- **Scope isolation:** every row is tagged by `scopeId` (org+app+tenant). By-id ops call
`assertOwns` (tenant fence → 403). Always `select`/scope Prisma queries.
## Tech stack
NestJS 11 · Prisma 6 / PostgreSQL 16 (docker `iios-db` on **:5434**, db `iios`) · Redis
(socket.io adapter, multi-replica) · socket.io (`/message` namespace) · Vitest · pnpm
monorepo (`packages/*`). `iios-service` is a **modular monolith** (HTTP + WS + relay +
projectors in one process).
## Running & testing
```bash
docker start iios-db # Postgres :5434 (OrbStack; `open -a OrbStack` if down)
pnpm --filter @insignia/iios-service exec nest build
# run (dev auth via Supabase; media + notifications enabled):
SUPABASE_URL=https://<ref>.supabase.co REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 PORT=3200 \
APP_SECRETS='{"portal-demo":"dev-secret"}' MEDIA_DIR=/tmp/iios-media \
VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY=VAPID_SUBJECT=mailto:dev@insignia \
node packages/iios-service/dist/main.js # → :3200 ; GET /health
```
- **`pnpm test`** — Vitest. Runs against an **isolated `iios_test` DB** (globalSetup creates +
migrates it; `DATABASE_URL` overridden). **It never wipes the dev `iios` DB.** ~205 tests.
- **TDD**: write the failing spec first (see `*.spec.ts` next to the code). DB specs use
`resetDb()` + real Postgres.
- **Flaky `outbox/replay.spec`**: it's clock/ordering-sensitive and pre-existing. If it fails
in a full run, `docker exec iios-db psql -U iios -d postgres -c "DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS iios_test WITH (FORCE)"`
then re-run — it's stale test-DB state, not a regression.
- **`pnpm boundary`** — import-boundary check (must stay OK).
- Smokes: `packages/iios-service/scripts/smoke-*.mjs` (run against a live service).
## Conventions
- **Commits:** conventional (`feat:`/`fix:`/`docs:`/`chore:`), git email
**`maaz@insigniaconsultancy.com`**, and co-author every commit with Claude. Branch off `main`
before committing if asked; otherwise the session has committed directly to `main`.
- **⚠️ `IIOS_DEV_TOKENS` MUST be `0`/unset in production** — it exposes `/v1/dev/*` (unauth token
minting). Single most important prod flag.
- New kernel capability = a **generic primitive** only (see the #1 rule). Add domain meaning in
policy + app.
- Prisma: always `select` to avoid leaking `passwordHash`/PII; org/tenant scope every `where`.
## What's built (state)
P0P8: kernel → messaging → inbox → support → adapters → routing → AI → calendar/meetings.
Recent (the "P9 real-providers" era, mostly driven by the chat app):
- **Real Supabase auth** — multi-issuer JWKS verification (`SessionVerifier`); first stubbed
port turned real.
- **Reactions / pins / saves** — one generic `IiosInteractionAnnotation` primitive
(opaque type/value), `annotate` socket event, `GET /v1/threads/my-annotations`.
- **@mentions → Inbox** — `mentions[]` on send → `MENTION` inbox item (projector).
- **Media** — `StoragePort` (dev local disk → prod S3/Supabase), presigned upload/download,
attachment on `MessageDto`.
- **Notifications** — presence-gated Web Push: `NotificationProjector` (policy/presence/mute
gates) + swappable `NotificationPort`, `focus_thread` presence signal, per-thread mute.
- `senderId` (stable externalId) on messages for reliable "is this mine?".
## Docs (as-built)
- `docs/IIOS_API_AND_SDK_GUIDE.md` — the **as-built REST/socket/SDK reference** (endpoints,
shapes, env, vocab). Keep it current when adding endpoints.
- `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` — deploy/topology/env/scaling.
- `docs/IIOS_OVERVIEW_FOR_CEO.md` — plain-language capability tour.
+53
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# Publishing the IIOS SDKs (Gitea package registry)
The `@insignia/iios-*` **frontend SDKs** publish to our self-hosted Gitea npm registry:
```
https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/
```
**Published (public in the registry):** `iios-contracts`, `iios-kernel-client`, `iios-adapter-sdk`,
and the React hook packages `iios-message-web`, `iios-inbox-web`, `iios-support-web`,
`iios-ai-web`, `iios-community-web`, `iios-meeting-web`.
**Kept private (never published):** `iios-service` (the deployed backend) and `iios-testkit` (dev fakes).
> be-crm does **not** consume these — it talks to IIOS over REST. The SDKs are a **frontend** concern
> (chat-web, the CRM support UI, mobile).
## One-time: get a token
Gitea → **Settings → Applications → Generate Token**:
- to **publish**: scope `write:package`
- to **install** (private packages): scope `read:package`
Export it (never commit it):
```bash
export GITEA_TOKEN=<your-gitea-token>
```
The repo `.npmrc` already routes the `@insignia` scope to Gitea and reads `${GITEA_TOKEN}`.
## Publish
```bash
pnpm release:dry # build all + pack (no upload) — verify the 9 packages pack cleanly
pnpm release # build all + publish the non-private packages to Gitea
```
`pnpm -r publish` automatically **skips** `private` packages, so only the 9 SDKs go out.
Versions are **immutable** — bump before re-publishing (edit `version`, or adopt `changesets`).
Or push a tag and let CI do it (see `.gitea/workflows/publish-sdks.yml`; needs Gitea Actions +
a runner + the `GITEA_PUBLISH_TOKEN` secret):
```bash
git tag v0.1.0 && git push origin v0.1.0
```
## Consume (in chat-web / the CRM front-end)
Add an `.npmrc` to the consuming repo:
```ini
@insignia:registry=https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/
//git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/:_authToken=${GITEA_TOKEN}
```
Then:
```bash
export GITEA_TOKEN=<read-token>
pnpm add @insignia/iios-kernel-client @insignia/iios-contracts
```
This replaces the **vendored** client that chat-web copies today — one source of truth for all frontends.
+18 -2
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,18 @@ Every knob is an environment variable — see [`packages/iios-service/.env.examp
for the full, commented list. Highlights:
- **Secrets** (inject from a vault, never bake into the image): `DATABASE_URL`,
`APP_SECRETS` (per-app JWT signing keys), `ADAPTER_SECRETS` (webhook HMAC keys).
`APP_SECRETS` (per-app HS256 JWT keys), `ADAPTER_SECRETS` (webhook HMAC keys),
`MEDIA_SECRET` (signs presigned media upload/download URLs).
- **Auth (real IdP):** set `SUPABASE_URL` or `AUTH_ISSUERS` to trust real OIDC access
tokens, verified against the issuer's public **JWKS** (ES256) — **no secret to store**.
`AUTH_ISSUERS` is a JSON registry `[{url, appId, orgId?}]` routing many issuers → isolated
app scopes. The dev HS256 path (`APP_SECRETS`) stays for local/tests.
- **Media storage:** `MEDIA_DIR` + `PUBLIC_URL` configure the **dev** local-disk store; for
prod, bind the `StoragePort` to object storage (see topology) — the API/SDK don't change.
- **Notifications (Web Push):** set `VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY` / `VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY` / `VAPID_SUBJECT`
to enable push (unset → the engine no-ops). ⚠️ Presence (the "are you viewing this thread?"
gate) is **in-memory / single-instance** today — with N>1 replicas, back `PresenceService`
with Redis so the projector on one replica sees focus from another.
- **⚠️ `IIOS_DEV_TOKENS` MUST be `0`/unset in production.** It exposes `/v1/dev/*`
(unauthenticated token minting, webhook injection, chaos, retention sweep). This is the
single most important prod-hardening flag.
@@ -76,7 +87,12 @@ for the full, commented list. Highlights:
> by message `id`** (the payload always carries one).
- **Platform ports** (OPA policy, CMP consent, MDM, CRRE, SAS) — today in-process permissive
stubs (`LocalDevPorts`). For production, point these at real external services; the service
already calls them **fail-closed**.
already calls them **fail-closed**. The **session** port already verifies real OIDC tokens
(Supabase/JWKS) when configured.
- **Media storage** (`StoragePort`) — dev = **local disk** (`MEDIA_DIR`). ⚠️ Local disk is
**single-instance and non-durable**; with N>1 replicas or for persistence, bind it to shared
**object storage** (S3/R2/Supabase Storage). Bytes always flow **client ↔ storage directly**
via presigned URLs — they never transit the service — so this scales independently.
## Scaling & release strategy
+128 -8
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ Use it on every call: `-H "authorization: Bearer <token>"`.
- **Different `orgId` = different tenant.** Mint two tokens with `org_A` / `org_B` to test isolation.
- Token TTL: 2h.
**Real IdP tokens (production path).** Beyond the dev HS256 tokens, `SessionVerifier` also verifies **real OIDC access tokens** (ES256) against a trusted issuer's public **JWKS** — set `SUPABASE_URL` (single issuer) or `AUTH_ISSUERS` (a registry mapping many issuers → app scopes). The verifier routes a token by its `iss` claim, so two projects/IdPs map to two isolated `appId` scopes on one service, and app A's tokens can't reach app B. No shared secret needed. The dev token path stays for tests/local.
### Error responses (what QA will see)
| Status | When |
|---|---|
@@ -101,12 +103,24 @@ Grouped by domain. All paths are relative to the base URL. **Auth = Bearer token
### 5.3 Threads & Messaging (native chat)
| Method | Path | Body / Headers | Returns |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/v1/threads` | — | `ThreadSummary[]` — your threads (members, unread, last message, `membership`) |
| POST | `/v1/threads` | `{membership?, creatorRole?, subject?}` | `{threadId, status, history}` (201) — `membership`/`creatorRole`/`subject` are **opaque app attributes** the kernel stores but never interprets |
| POST | `/v1/threads/:id/participants` | `{userId, role?}` | `{threadId, participantCount}` (201) — **governed** (DM cap / group-admin via OPA) |
| GET | `/v1/threads/:id/messages` | — | `{threadId, messages[]}` |
| POST | `/v1/threads/:id/messages` | `{content, contentRef?}` + `idempotency-key?` header | `Message` (201) |
| POST | `/v1/threads/:id/messages` | `{content, contentRef?, mimeType?, sizeBytes?, checksumSha256?, parentInteractionId?}` + `idempotency-key?` header | `Message` (201) |
| GET | `/v1/threads/my-annotations` | `?type=save` | `{message, threadId, threadSubject}[]` — messages you annotated (e.g. saved) |
**Realtime (Socket.IO, namespace `/message`):** connect, then emit client→server events:
- `open_thread` `{threadId?|otherUserId}`, `send_message` `{threadId, content, idempotencyKey?}`, `read` `{threadId}`, `delivered` `{threadId}`.
- Server emits to the thread room: `message` (a Message) and `receipt` `{interactionId, actorId, kind: READ|DELIVERED}`.
A **`Message`** carries `{id, threadId, senderId, senderName, content, attachment?, parentInteractionId?, annotations[], traceId, createdAt}`. `senderId` is the sender's stable externalId (email/username) — the reliable "is this mine?" check. `attachment` = `{contentRef, mimeType, sizeBytes, kind}` (§5.10). `annotations` = `[{type, value, users[]}]` — the reaction/pin/save aggregate.
**Realtime (Socket.IO, namespace `/message`).** Token verified on connect (`auth.token`), then emit client→server:
- `open_thread` `{threadId?, membership?, creatorRole?, subject?}` — opens, or **creates** when no id; a **governed join** for membership threads. Returns `{threadId, status, history}` or `{error}` (acked, never a throw — clients don't hang).
- `send_message` `{threadId, content, contentRef?, mimeType?, sizeBytes?, parentInteractionId?, mentions?}``mentions` is an **opaque userId notify-list** (the app parses `@`; the kernel never does).
- `add_participant` `{threadId, userId, role?}` · `read` `{threadId, interactionId}` · `delivered` `{…}` · `typing` `{threadId}`.
- `annotate` `{threadId, interactionId, type, value}` — toggle a **generic annotation** (chat app uses `type: reaction|pin|save`; `value` = emoji, or empty).
Server → thread room: `message` (a Message), `receipt` `{interactionId, actorId, kind: READ|DELIVERED}`, `typing` `{threadId, userId}`, `annotation` `{interactionId, type, value, op: add|remove, users[], userId}`.
**Governance & primitives (all fail-closed via OPA).** Membership (`iios.thread.participant.add`, `iios.thread.join`), annotating (`iios.interaction.annotate` — participant-only), and send all gate on policy. **Reactions/pins/saves are one generic primitive** — an *interaction annotation* the kernel stores + aggregates as opaque `(type, value)` but never interprets (the same primitive backs pins/saves/flags/tags). **Mentions → Inbox:** `mentions[]` flows into the message event; the inbox projector fans out a `MENTION` inbox item to each mentioned participant (never the sender); reading the thread resolves it.
### 5.4 Inbox (work queue)
| Method | Path | Query / Body | Returns |
@@ -114,6 +128,8 @@ Grouped by domain. All paths are relative to the base URL. **Auth = Bearer token
| GET | `/v1/inbox/items` | `?state=OPEN|SNOOZED|DONE|ARCHIVED|CANCELLED|STALE` | `InboxItem[]` |
| PATCH | `/v1/inbox/items/:id` | `{state, reason?}` | `InboxItem` |
Item **kinds** include `NEEDS_REPLY` (unreplied thread activity, one per owner+thread) and `MENTION` (someone @-mentioned you; `priority: HIGH`, one per source message). Reading the thread resolves both to `DONE`.
### 5.5 Support (tickets, escalation, callbacks, queues, agents)
| Method | Path | Body / Query | Returns |
|---|---|---|---|
@@ -179,6 +195,100 @@ Grouped by domain. All paths are relative to the base URL. **Auth = Bearer token
`ScheduleMeetingDto`: `{meetingType, title, startAt, endAt?, timezone?, attendees?:[{userId, displayName?, role?, visibility?}], requestId?}`. `meetingType ∈ {ZOOM, PHONE, IN_PERSON, CALLBACK, INTERNAL}`; consent `status ∈ {UNKNOWN, GRANTED, DENIED, REVOKED}`. **Transcript/summary is `BLOCKED` until every attendee has `GRANTED` consent.**
### 5.10 Media (attachments)
The DB stores a **reference**; the bytes live behind a **storage port** (dev = local disk `MEDIA_DIR`; prod = swap to S3/R2/Supabase). Bytes go **client ↔ storage directly** via short-lived signed URLs — they never pass through the kernel.
| Method | Path | Auth | Body | Returns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| POST | `/v1/media/presign-upload` | Bearer | `{mime, sizeBytes}` | `{objectKey, uploadUrl}`**OPA-gated** (size/type) |
| PUT | `/v1/media/upload/:token` | token in URL | raw bytes | `{objectKey, sizeBytes, checksumSha256}` |
| POST | `/v1/media/presign-download` | Bearer | `{contentRef, mime?}` | `{url}`**tenant-fenced**, signed 1h |
| GET | `/v1/media/blob/:token` | token in URL | — | streams the bytes with their `Content-Type` |
**Attaching to a message:** `send`/`send_message` accept `{contentRef, mimeType, sizeBytes, checksumSha256?}`. The stored `Message` then carries `attachment: { contentRef, mimeType, sizeBytes, kind }` where `kind ∈ {image, video, audio, file}` (a friendly view of the generic `MEDIA_REF`/`VOICE_REF`/`FILE_REF` part the kernel writes).
**Governance (fail-closed, built in):**
- **Upload policy** `iios.media.upload`**≤ 25 MB** and an allowlist (`image/*`, `video/*`, `audio/*`, `application/pdf`, common Office/text/zip). A violation → **403** *before* any bytes are sent.
- **Signed tokens** (HS256, `MEDIA_SECRET`) — upload URL lives **5 min**, download URL **1 h**; a tampered/expired token → 403.
- **Tenant fence** — object keys are prefixed with the caller's `scopeId`; a download for an object outside your scope → 403.
**The flow (with governance):**
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant C as Client (SDK uploadMedia)
participant API as IIOS Media API
participant OPA as OPA policy
participant ST as StoragePort (disk → S3)
participant K as Message kernel
C->>API: POST /v1/media/presign-upload {mime, sizeBytes}
API->>OPA: decide iios.media.upload (≤25MB? type allowed?)
alt denied
OPA-->>C: 403 (too large / type not allowed)
else allowed
API-->>C: { objectKey, uploadUrl } (signed, 5-min)
C->>ST: PUT bytes → uploadUrl (direct, not via kernel)
ST-->>C: { sizeBytes, checksumSha256 }
C->>K: send_message { contentRef, mime, size }
K-->>C: Message { attachment }
C->>API: POST /v1/media/presign-download { contentRef }
API->>API: tenant-fence (objectKey in my scope?)
API-->>C: { url } (signed, 1-hour)
C->>ST: GET url → bytes (stream, inline render / download)
end
```
---
### 5.11 Notifications (push, presence-gated)
The engine reacts to `message.sent` and pushes to **absent** recipients through a swappable
**NotificationPort** (Web Push/VAPID now; email/FCM later). The DB holds only push
subscriptions + a per-thread mute flag; the reusable "who has an unread" feed stays `IiosInboxItem`.
| Method | Path | Body | Returns |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/v1/notifications/vapid-public-key` | — | `{key}` — the public VAPID key the client needs to subscribe |
| POST | `/v1/notifications/subscribe` | `{kind?, endpoint, keys:{p256dh, auth}, userAgent?}` | `{ok:true}` — store/refresh the caller's push subscription |
| DELETE | `/v1/notifications/subscribe` | `{endpoint}` | `{ok:true}` |
| POST | `/v1/threads/:id/mute` · `/unmute` | — | `{threadId, muted}` — per-thread notification mute for the caller |
**Presence (socket):** the app emits `focus_thread` `{threadId | null}` on the `/message`
namespace whenever the foreground conversation changes (or the tab blurs). This is how the
engine knows you're *viewing* a thread — **room membership ≠ viewing**, because the sidebar
joins every thread room for live updates. `GET /v1/threads` returns each thread's `muted`.
**The three gates (fail-closed, in the notification policy — not the kernel):**
1. **Policy** — DM always; a group message only if you were `@`-mentioned **or** it's a reply to you.
2. **Presence** — skip if you're currently focused on that thread (you saw it live).
3. **Mute** — skip if you muted the thread.
A dead subscription (Web Push `404/410`) is pruned. DM-vs-group is read from the opaque
`membership` thread attribute here in the *notification policy*; the kernel never branches on it.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
SENT["message.sent (outbox → bus)"] --> PROJ["NotificationProjector"]
PROJ --> LOOP{{"for each recipient (never the sender)"}}
LOOP --> G1{"POLICY: DM? · @mention? · reply-to-you?"}
G1 -->|no| X1["skip"]
G1 -->|yes| G2{"PRESENCE: focused on this thread?"}
G2 -->|yes| X2["skip — seen live"]
G2 -->|no| G3{"MUTE: thread muted?"}
G3 -->|yes| X3["skip"]
G3 -->|no| SUBS["load subscriptions"] --> PORT["NotificationPort.deliver()"]
PORT --> WP["Web Push (VAPID)"]
WP -->|sent| OUT["→ browser push service → service worker → OS notification"]
WP -->|"gone (404/410)"| PRUNE["prune dead subscription"]
```
**Client (SDK layer, `lib/notifications.ts` → belongs in `@insignia/iios-kernel-client`):**
`registerPush()` (permission → register service worker → `PushManager.subscribe` with the
VAPID key → POST the subscription), `muteThread(threadId, muted)`, and `MessageSocket.focus(threadId)`.
A service worker renders the OS notification on `push` and deep-links to the thread on click.
---
## 6. SDK reference
@@ -191,7 +301,10 @@ import { RestClient } from '@insignia/iios-kernel-client';
const client = new RestClient({ serviceUrl: 'http://localhost:3200', token });
```
Methods (all return typed promises):
- **Messaging:** `getThreadMessages(threadId)`, `sendMessage(threadId, content, {contentRef?, idempotencyKey?})`
- **Messaging:** `listThreads()`, `createThread({membership?, creatorRole?, subject?})`, `addParticipant(threadId, userId, role?)`, `getThreadMessages(threadId)`, `sendMessage(threadId, content, {attachment?, parentInteractionId?, mentions?, idempotencyKey?})`
- **Reactions / pins / saves (annotations):** `MessageSocket.react(threadId, interactionId, emoji)` · `pin(...)` · `save(...)` (generic `annotate` under the hood); `listMyAnnotated('save')` for a cross-thread saved list. Subscribe to the `annotation` event for live updates.
- **Media:** `uploadMedia(file, {onProgress?}) → {contentRef, mimeType, sizeBytes, checksumSha256, kind}` (presign → PUT-with-progress → normalized ref); `mediaUrl(contentRef) → signed view URL` (cached, short-lived). *This plumbing is identical for every app, so it lives in the SDK; the app only renders by `kind`.*
- **Notifications:** `registerPush()` (service worker + `PushManager.subscribe` + POST subscription), `muteThread(threadId, muted)`, `MessageSocket.focus(threadId)` (presence signal). The engine (projector + Web Push port) is server-side; the SDK/app own registration + rendering.
- **Inbox:** `listInboxItems(state?)`, `patchInboxItem(id, {state, reason?})`
- **Support:** `createTicket({subject, priority?, threadId?})`, `escalate(threadId, subject?)`, `listTickets('mine'|'assigned')`, `patchTicket(id, state)`, `requestCallback({...})`, `createQueue(name)`, `joinQueue(id)`, `joinDefaultQueue()`, `setAvailability(state)`
- **Routing:** `createBinding(input)`, `listBindings()`, `simulateRoute({interactionId, originChannelType, originRef?})`, `listRouteDecisions(state?)`, `approveDecision(id)`, `denyDecision(id)`
@@ -269,7 +382,7 @@ Run against a live service (from `packages/iios-service`, `node scripts/<name>`)
| `smoke-capability.mjs` | governed egress + real HTTP provider (needs `IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL`) |
| `smoke-tenant.mjs` | cross-tenant 403 + list isolation |
Automated unit/integration suite: `pnpm test` (114 tests). Import-boundary check: `pnpm boundary`.
Automated unit/integration suite: `pnpm test` (205 tests). Import-boundary check: `pnpm boundary`.
---
@@ -289,7 +402,12 @@ Automated unit/integration suite: `pnpm test` (114 tests). Import-boundary check
|---|---|---|
| `PORT` | `3200` | HTTP port |
| `DATABASE_URL` | `postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios?schema=public` | Postgres |
| `APP_SECRETS` | `{"portal-demo":"dev-secret"}` | per-app JWT secrets (`{appId: secret}`) |
| `APP_SECRETS` | `{"portal-demo":"dev-secret"}` | per-app HS256 JWT secrets (`{appId: secret}`) |
| `SUPABASE_URL` / `AUTH_ISSUERS` | — | trusted OIDC issuer(s) — verify real IdP tokens (ES256) via JWKS. `AUTH_ISSUERS` is a JSON array `[{url, appId, orgId?}]` mapping issuers → app scopes; `SUPABASE_URL` is the single-issuer shorthand |
| `MEDIA_DIR` | `<tmp>/iios-media` | local media storage dir (dev `StoragePort`) |
| `MEDIA_SECRET` | `dev-media-secret` | signs media upload/download URLs |
| `PUBLIC_URL` | `http://localhost:$PORT` | base used to build presigned media URLs |
| `VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY` / `VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY` / `VAPID_SUBJECT` | — | Web Push (notifications). Unset → push disabled (engine no-ops). Generate once: `node -e "console.log(require('web-push').generateVAPIDKeys())"` |
| `IIOS_DEV_TOKENS` | `0` | set `1` to enable `/v1/dev/*` |
| `ADAPTER_SECRETS` | `{}` | per-channel HMAC secrets (default `dev-adapter-secret`) |
| `IIOS_OUTBOUND_LIMIT` / `_WINDOW_MS` | `5` / `60000` | per-(channel,target) rate limit |
@@ -305,7 +423,9 @@ Automated unit/integration suite: `pnpm test` (114 tests). Import-boundary check
- **Interaction kind:** MESSAGE, EMAIL, SYSTEM_NOTICE, INBOX_WORK, SUPPORT_CASE, MEETING_REQUEST, DIGEST, SUMMARY, NOTIFICATION
- **Channel types:** WEBHOOK, EMAIL, WHATSAPP, PORTAL
- **Inbox state:** OPEN, SNOOZED, DONE, ARCHIVED, CANCELLED, STALE · **Inbox kind:** NEEDS_REPLY, NEEDS_REVIEW, NEEDS_APPROVAL, SUPPORT_UPDATE, MEETING_FOLLOWUP, DIGEST, SYSTEM_ALERT, CRM_OWNER_INTEREST
- **Inbox state:** OPEN, SNOOZED, DONE, ARCHIVED, CANCELLED, STALE · **Inbox kind:** NEEDS_REPLY, NEEDS_REVIEW, NEEDS_APPROVAL, **MENTION**, SUPPORT_UPDATE, MEETING_FOLLOWUP, DIGEST, SYSTEM_ALERT, CRM_OWNER_INTEREST
- **Message part kind:** TEXT, HTML, MARKDOWN, MEDIA_REF, FILE_REF, VOICE_REF, LOCATION, STRUCTURED_JSON · **Attachment kind (DTO):** image, video, audio, file
- **Interaction annotation (app-level, opaque to the kernel):** `type` = reaction | pin | save … ; `value` = emoji (reactions) or empty
- **Ticket state:** NEW, OPEN, PENDING, RESOLVED, CLOSED · **priority:** LOW, NORMAL, HIGH, URGENT
- **Route mode:** MANUAL, AUTOMATIC, HYBRID, SIMULATION_ONLY · **output format:** FORWARD, THREADED, DIGEST, SUMMARY, TRANSCRIPT · **decision:** ALLOW, DENY, REVIEW, SUPPRESS, SIMULATED
- **AI job:** CLASSIFY, SUMMARIZE, EXTRACT · **artifact:** CLASSIFICATION, SUMMARY, TRANSCRIPT, DIGEST, EXTRACTION · **artifact status:** PROPOSED, ACCEPTED, REJECTED, SUPERSEDED
+5 -3
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@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Today the external world (real WhatsApp, real AI models, real calendars, the rea
| **P8** | **Calendar & meetings** — schedule, attendee consent, transcript, summary, action items | `iios-meeting-web` | Support/scheduling; callback→meeting | meeting-studio (5178) |
| **P9** | *(next)* **Production hardening** — real providers, real policy/consent, scale, retention | — | Ops / platform | — |
All of it runs on **one NestJS service** (`iios-service`) with **one Postgres database** (46 tables across 9 migrations), fronted by **one low-level client** (`iios-kernel-client`) that every React SDK is built on.
All of it runs on **one NestJS service** (`iios-service`) with **one Postgres database** (53 tables across 19 migrations), fronted by **one low-level client** (`iios-kernel-client`) that every React SDK is built on.
---
@@ -159,7 +159,9 @@ Each product SDK is a handful of React hooks — a front-end dev wires the UI, t
| Calendar/Zoom providers | Simulated sync | P9 |
| Multi-tenant scale, retention, SLOs | Not yet | P9 |
**Proof it works:** 95 automated tests pass; every capability has a runnable demo and an end-to-end smoke script; the layer-boundary check enforces the architecture.
**Proof it works:** 205 automated tests pass; every capability has a runnable demo and an end-to-end smoke script; the layer-boundary check enforces the architecture.
**P9 has begun (real providers).** A production chat app (`chat-web`) now runs on IIOS with **real Supabase login** (the session port verifies real OIDC tokens via JWKS — the first stubbed port turned real), plus richer chat built generically on the kernel: **emoji reactions, pinned & saved messages, @mentions → inbox, media sharing** (images/video/audio/docs on a swappable storage port), and **presence-gated push notifications** (Web Push via a swappable notification port). Each was a thin, generic addition — no chat-specific logic in the kernel — which is the reuse thesis paying off.
---
@@ -175,4 +177,4 @@ Narrative arc for the CEO: **one engine → chat → inbox → support → chann
---
*Appendix — repo facts: 11 packages, 6 demo apps, one NestJS service, 46 Postgres tables across 9 migrations (kernel → messaging → inbox → support → adapters → routing → ai → calendar). Boundary-enforced dependency law; 95 passing tests; 7 end-to-end smoke scripts.*
*Appendix — repo facts: 11 packages, 6 demo apps, one NestJS service, 54 Postgres tables across 20 migrations (kernel → messaging → inbox → support → adapters → routing → ai → calendar → annotations/mentions → media → notifications). Boundary-enforced dependency law; 205 passing tests; 8+ end-to-end smoke scripts. First real-provider swaps live: Supabase auth (JWKS-verified), a media storage port, and Web Push notifications.*
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
# Email Attachments — Implementation Plan
**Owner:** Maaz · **Repo:** `iios` (`packages/iios-service`) · Extends the SMTP provider + mail plumbing.
## Goal
Let an external email carry attachments (e.g. an invoice PDF). The kernel already STORES attachments
as message parts (`contentRef` + mime + size); the media `StoragePort` holds the bytes. The one gap is
the **email envelope**`SmtpProvider` (and the payload) don't carry attachments. Close that.
## Design (locked)
- **Payload carries REFS, not bytes:** the EMAIL payload gains
`attachments?: [{ filename, contentRef, mimeType? }]`. Refs keep the outbound-command ledger small
(and keep T8's PII redaction cheap) — bytes are fetched at send time.
- **Resolver seam:** `AttachmentResolver = (contentRef) => Promise<{ filename?; content: Buffer; contentType? } | null>`.
`SmtpProvider` takes an optional resolver; on send it resolves each ref and attaches
(nodemailer `attachments: [{ filename, content, contentType }]`).
- **Fail closed on a missing attachment:** if a declared attachment can't be resolved, the send is
`FAILED` (so it retries) — NOT sent without it. A receipt/invoice missing its file is worse than a
retry. (No resolver wired at all + attachments present → also FAILED, same reasoning.)
- **Wiring:** `MediaModule` exports `STORAGE_PORT`; `CapabilityModule` imports `MediaModule`;
`CapabilityProviderRegistry` `@Optional() @Inject(STORAGE_PORT)` → builds the resolver from
`storage.get(contentRef)` → passes it to `SmtpProvider`. `@Optional` so contexts without storage
still boot (attachments simply can't resolve → FAILED if any are declared).
- **Scope:** SMTP path only. The HTTP relay `EmailProvider` attachment support is a separate follow-up
(it would base64 the bytes into the relay POST). INTERNAL/mirror attachments already work via message
parts and are not this plan.
## Files
```
src/capability/smtp.provider.ts # attachments in EmailPayload + resolve+attach in send()
src/capability/smtp.provider.spec.ts # attach resolved bytes; missing → FAILED
src/capability/capability.registry.ts # inject STORAGE_PORT → resolver → SmtpProvider
src/capability/capability.module.ts # import MediaModule
src/media/media.module.ts # export STORAGE_PORT
src/templates/templated-sender.ts # accept + pass `attachments`
src/mail/mail.service.ts # accept + pass `attachments` (external send)
```
## Tasks (TDD)
**T1 — SmtpProvider attaches / fails closed**
- Inject a stub resolver. Tests: two refs → nodemailer `attachments` has both (filename + content +
contentType); a ref the resolver returns `null` for → outcome `FAILED`, nothing sent; no attachments
in payload → unchanged (plain send still SENT).
**T2 — registry wires the resolver from STORAGE_PORT**
- `MediaModule` exports `STORAGE_PORT`; `CapabilityModule` imports `MediaModule`; registry injects it
`@Optional`. Test: with a fake storage bound, `forChannel('EMAIL')` SMTP resolves an attachment;
without storage, the registry still constructs (attachments would FAIL, but boot is fine).
**T3 — pass-through: TemplatedSender + MailService**
- `sendTemplated`/`sendExternalWithMirror` accept `attachments` and place them in the EMAIL payload.
Tests: the outbound command's payload carries the attachment refs.
**T4 — gate + real send**
- Full suite + boundary + build. Manual: a real Ethereal send with a small attachment → SENT, and the
Ethereal message shows the attachment.
## Risks
- **Fail-closed is deliberate** — don't silently send an invoice email without the invoice.
- **Payload holds refs, not bytes** — so the ledger and T8 redaction stay small; the resolver reads
bytes only at send time.
- **`@Optional` storage** — a context without `STORAGE_PORT` boots fine but can't send attachments;
that's correct (fail-closed), not a silent drop.
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@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
# Email / Message Template Module — Implementation Plan
**Owner:** Maaz · **Repo:** `iios` (`packages/iios-service`) · **Target:** first templates sending by Friday go-live.
## Goal
A reusable template module so **any** message the system sends — welcome, payment receipt,
onboarding reminders, drip — is produced from a stored (or ad-hoc) template with variables filled
in, then handed to the **existing** outbound pipeline. One render path, one send path, provenance
recorded for every send.
From the July 16 meeting: *"template का एक पूरा module बनाना है… template में value भरोगे, और वो
outbound क्यू में डाल दोगे।"*
## What already exists (the substrate — do NOT rebuild)
- `OutboundService.send(channelType, target, payload, idempotencyKey?, scopeId?, purpose?)`
idempotency + per-target/per-tenant rate limits + delivery ledger (`IiosOutboundCommand`).
- `CapabilityBroker` — policy gate + obligations + provider selection for egress.
- `EMAIL` is a registered channel; `EmailProvider` exists (**HTTP**, not SMTP — see Out of Scope).
- `EMAIL` is a first-class `IiosInteractionKind`; `IiosMessagePartKind` has `HTML`/`TEXT`.
- `IiosActorKind` includes `SERVICE`/`BOT` (system sender is first-class).
- `InboxModule` uses `OnModuleInit` — copy that pattern for the template seeder.
The module adds **content/rendering** in front of this. It never talks to a provider directly.
## Design decisions (locked)
| # | Decision | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Channel-generic**: one template per `(key, channel)`; channels `EMAIL` / `SMS` / `INTERNAL` | Vivek wants the same confirmation on email *and* SMS; INTERNAL = app-to-app, no SMTP |
| 2 | **Seed-from-files, DB-is-truth**: templates are files in the repo, seeded into the DB on boot if absent | Copy is version-controlled + code-reviewed; a later admin UI can edit the DB with no deploy; Friday needs no UI |
| 3 | **Handlebars** rendering | Auto-escapes HTML (customer names go into email → XSS risk), logic-less, no code execution, one dep |
| 4 | **Global default + scope override**: `scopeId` nullable — `NULL` = platform default, set = tenant override; resolve scoped-first-else-global | Seeds cleanly at boot (IIOS scopes are created lazily, so a boot seeder has no scope to seed into); leaves room for white-label |
| 5 | **Provenance on `IiosOutboundCommand`** (4 columns), not a new `template_snapshot` table | Rendered content is already in `payload`; only provenance is missing. Honours the SOT's intent at 4 columns |
| 6 | **`TemplateSource` = stored `{key,version?}` OR `{inline:{subject,html,text}}`** | Marketing hands over finished HTML (*"Maaz, HTML भेज सकते हैं"*); inline still renders vars + records provenance |
| 7 | **Integration pattern B**: pure `render()` + thin `sendTemplated()` composer | Single entry point for callers; provenance guaranteed by construction; `OutboundService` stays content-agnostic |
| 8 | **Caller = a service** (be-crm's system token); **recipient = a `target` address, never a login** | System mail has no user on the sending side; the recipient may have no account yet |
## Caller & auth model
Every send is authenticated as the **calling app/service** (e.g. be-crm via its `APP_SECRETS`
entry), verified by `SessionVerifier` like every other IIOS endpoint. The recipient is a plain
`target` string — **not** an IIOS principal and **not** required to be logged in or registered.
Sending a welcome email to an anonymous payer is the normal case: the app is the sender, the
address is data. `scopeId` for the send is derived from the caller's principal (`org/app/tenant`).
## Data model
### New table — `IiosMessageTemplate`
```prisma
enum IiosTemplateChannel {
EMAIL
SMS
INTERNAL
}
/// The template SOURCE. DB is runtime truth; platform defaults are seeded from repo files on boot.
/// Versions are immutable: a change writes a new (higher) version, never edits in place.
model IiosMessageTemplate {
id String @id @default(cuid())
/// NULL = platform default (seeded). Set = a tenant scope's override of the same key.
scopeId String?
scope IiosScope? @relation(fields: [scopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
key String // "welcome", "payment.receipt", "onboarding.reminder"
channel IiosTemplateChannel
locale String @default("en")
version Int @default(1)
subject String? // EMAIL only
bodyHtml String? // EMAIL / INTERNAL
bodyText String? // SMS, and EMAIL plaintext fallback
/// Declared variable names — render throws if a declared var is missing (fail loud).
variables Json?
active Boolean @default(true)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
@@unique([scopeId, key, channel, locale, version])
@@index([key, channel, locale, active])
}
```
`IiosScope` needs the back-relation `messageTemplates IiosMessageTemplate[]`.
**Resolution:** `resolve(key, channel, locale, scopeId?)` returns the highest-`version` `active`
row, preferring `scopeId = <caller scope>` and falling back to `scopeId IS NULL`. No match → 404.
### Provenance columns on `IiosOutboundCommand`
```prisma
templateKey String?
templateVersion Int?
templateLocale String?
renderedHash String? // sha256 of the rendered content — replay/audit
```
All nullable: non-templated sends (if any) leave them null.
**How provenance is written (review finding):** `OutboundService.send` **creates the command row
itself** (both the RATE_LIMITED and PENDING paths), so a caller cannot stamp provenance after the
fact without a racy update. Therefore `send()` gains one optional trailing arg —
`provenance?: { templateKey; templateVersion; templateLocale; renderedHash }` — written into the
same `create()` in both paths. `OutboundService` stays content-agnostic: it does not render or
resolve templates, it only persists four opaque strings it is handed. This is what makes
decision 7's "provenance guaranteed by construction" true. **This is a change to an existing file**
(`adapters/outbound.service.ts`) and its spec — call it out in the PR.
### Migrations (hand-written, non-destructive)
1. `add_message_template` — the enum + table + `IiosScope` back-relation. **Plus a partial unique
index for global rows (review finding):** the `@@unique([scopeId, key, channel, locale, version])`
does **not** prevent duplicate *platform-default* rows, because Postgres treats `NULL` scopeId as
distinct (`NULL != NULL`) — the same footgun handled in the inbox idempotency migration. Add:
`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "IiosMessageTemplate_global_key" ON "IiosMessageTemplate"("key","channel","locale","version") WHERE "scopeId" IS NULL;`
so a double-seed or race cannot create two defaults for the same key.
2. `add_outbound_template_provenance` — the 4 nullable columns on `IiosOutboundCommand`.
## Module structure
```
packages/iios-service/src/templates/
template.channel.ts // IiosTemplateChannel re-export/helpers if needed
template.model.ts // TemplateSource, RenderedContent, CreateSendInput types
template.repository.ts // resolve(): scoped ?? global, highest active version
template.renderer.ts // Handlebars compile+render; escaping; missing-var throw
template.service.ts // render(source, vars) — pure; resolve + renderer
templated-sender.ts // sendTemplated(): render -> OutboundService.send -> stamp provenance
template.seeder.ts // OnModuleInit: seed file defaults into DB if (key,channel,locale,version) absent
template.controller.ts // POST /v1/templates/send, POST /v1/templates/preview
template.dto.ts // SendTemplateDto, PreviewTemplateDto (class-validator)
template.module.ts
seeds/
welcome.email.ts // { key, channel, locale, version, subject, html, text, variables }
payment-receipt.email.ts
payment-receipt.sms.ts
onboarding-reminder.email.ts
templates.spec.ts // TDD, real Postgres (localhost:5434), mirrors inbox.spec.ts
```
**Scope boundary:** `render()` is channel-generic (it can render an `INTERNAL` template to
`{subject,html,text}`). `sendTemplated()` covers **external** channels (`EMAIL`/`SMS`) via
`OutboundService`. `INTERNAL` *delivery* (render → create an in-app `Interaction`, no SMTP) reuses
`render()` but is wired by the messaging/mirror spec — this module never imports the messaging layer.
## Contract
```ts
type TemplateSource =
| { key: string; version?: number }
| { inline: { subject?: string; html?: string; text?: string } };
interface RenderedContent { subject?: string; html?: string; text?: string }
// template.renderer.ts — PURE (no I/O): given a template's raw strings + vars, produce content.
// template.service.ts render() — resolves the template from the DB (I/O), then calls the pure renderer.
// For an inline source there is no DB row, so declared-variable validation is skipped — inline
// content is the caller's responsibility; only stored templates enforce their declared `variables`.
render(source: TemplateSource, vars: Record<string, unknown>, opts: { channel: IiosTemplateChannel; locale?: string; scopeId?: string }): Promise<RenderedContent>
// templated-sender.ts — external egress
sendTemplated(input: {
source: TemplateSource;
channel: 'EMAIL' | 'SMS';
target: string; // email address / phone
vars: Record<string, unknown>;
scopeId?: string;
idempotencyKey: string; // REQUIRED — e.g. "receipt:<stripe_session_id>"
purpose?: string;
}): Promise<IiosOutboundCommand>
```
**HTTP** (`SessionVerifier`-auth'd; `scopeId` from the caller's principal):
- `POST /v1/templates/send``sendTemplated`. OPA action `iios.template.send`;
inline source additionally gated on `iios.template.send.inline` (arbitrary HTML to customers).
- `POST /v1/templates/preview``render` only, returns `RenderedContent`. No send. For marketing/QA.
## Task-by-task (TDD)
Each task: write the failing test → run it (confirm red) → implement → run (green) → commit.
**T1 — Renderer (`template.renderer.ts`)**
- Tests: substitutes `{{firstName}}`; **escapes `<script>` in a name**; `{{#if}}`/`{{#each}}`;
a declared-but-missing variable throws; renders `bodyHtml` and `bodyText` independently.
- Impl: Handlebars, `noEscape:false`; validate declared `variables` present.
**T2 — Migrations + repository (`template.repository.ts`)**
- Migration 1 (table+enum). Regenerate client.
- Tests: `resolve` returns highest active version; **scoped overrides global**; unknown key → NotFound;
inactive versions ignored.
**T3 — `render()` service tying resolve+renderer, incl. inline source**
- Tests: stored `{key}` resolves+renders; `{inline}` renders without a DB row; wrong channel → 404.
**T4 — Provenance: `OutboundService.send` param + migration + `sendTemplated()`**
- Migration 2 (4 columns).
- Modify `OutboundService.send` to accept the optional `provenance` arg and write it into the command
`create()` on both the RATE_LIMITED and PENDING paths. Extend `outbound.service.spec.ts`: a send
with provenance persists all four fields; a send without leaves them null (no regression).
- Then `sendTemplated()`. Tests: composes render→`OutboundService.send`; **stamps
`templateKey/version/locale/renderedHash`** on the command; **idempotent per key** (replay → one
`IiosOutboundCommand`); inline → `templateKey` null, `renderedHash` set.
**T5 — Seeder (`template.seeder.ts`, `seeds/*`)**
- Tests: boot seeds the file defaults as `scopeId NULL`; **re-seed is idempotent** (no dupes);
a bumped file version inserts a new row, leaves the old.
**T6 — Controller + DTOs**
- Tests (HTTP, boot against sandbox provider so no real mail): `POST /send` renders+queues;
unknown key → 404; bad body → 400; missing auth → 400/401; `POST /preview` returns content, sends nothing.
**T7 — Whole-suite gate**
- `vitest run` (all packages), `npm run boundary`, `npm run build` all green.
- Manual: boot locally, `POST /v1/templates/send` with the `welcome` seed via sandbox, inspect the
`IiosOutboundCommand` row for payload + provenance.
**T8 — PII redaction of outbound commands (fast-follow; lever #2)**
- Extend `RetentionService` so its sweep also redacts aged `IiosOutboundCommand` rows: raw `target`
and rendered `payload` → redacted, while `templateKey/version/renderedHash` + `scopeId` are kept
for audit. Reuse the existing redact-in-place pattern (currently applied to `iiosMessagePart`).
- Tests: a command past its window has `target`/`payload` redacted but provenance intact; a command
under compliance hold is skipped; audit row `retention.redacted` written.
- Independent of T1T7 — can land immediately after the module without blocking Friday.
## Error handling
- Unknown key/channel/locale → `NotFoundException` (404).
- Declared variable missing → throw (400) — never send a half-rendered receipt.
- Transport failure → surfaced as `FAILED` on the command by `OutboundService`, never thrown to caller.
- Idempotent replay (same key) → returns the existing command; never double-sends.
## Out of scope (separate specs — this module unblocks them)
1. **`SmtpProvider`** (nodemailer, `accounts@`/`ceo@lynkeduppro.com`) in IIOS's capability registry.
Today's `EmailProvider` is HTTP; SMTP is a new provider flipped on by env. Without it, sends land
in the sandbox.
2. **`POST /webhooks/stripe` in be-crm** — verify Stripe signature → mint a **service token**
call `POST /v1/templates/send` (welcome + receipt), keyed on the Stripe object id. This is the
"backend" the frontend-only payment site lacks.
3. **Inbox mirror** (post-registration): render an email → also create an `Interaction(kind=EMAIL)`
so it appears in the customer's in-app inbox. `INTERNAL` delivery lives here. Mirror only *after*
registration (no inbox exists before).
## PII minimization
Sending email means IIOS must *touch* the recipient's address (you can't mail without it) and the
rendered body holds their name — so `IiosOutboundCommand.target`/`payload` become PII. You cannot
avoid IIOS touching it; you avoid it **accumulating** and being **cheaply reachable**. Three levers,
by impact:
1. **Rotate the `Qwerty@a2` signing secret — precondition for prod, highest impact, not code.**
The stored PII is only dangerous because any leaked token can be brute-forced back to the secret,
letting an attacker forge a token and read the outbound table. A strong random secret leaves the
PII in place but **unreachable by forgery** — 90% of the risk closed by one env change. **Gate:
do not point the real SMTP provider at production until this is rotated.**
2. **Redact the raw address + body after delivery (fast-follow task — see T8).**
IIOS keeps `templateKey/version/renderedHash` + the opaque `scopeId` for audit, but the raw
`target` and rendered `payload` are redacted-in-place once past their retention window. The
`RetentionService` already does exactly this for interaction message parts (`bodyText →
'[redacted]'`); it just doesn't cover `IiosOutboundCommand` yet. Reuse the same sweep.
3. **Tokenized recipient (future, when MDM ships).** The clean model is: callers pass a `userId`,
IIOS resolves the address from MDM *at send time* and never persists it. Not available today
(MDM isn't deployed; `externalId` is a UUID with no email). **Design accommodation now:** keep
`target: string` for Friday, but treat it as an opaque "where to send" so it can later become
`{ userId }` resolved via MDM without changing the `sendTemplated` contract shape.
**Rejected shortcut:** having be-crm send SMTP directly so IIOS never sees the address. It "avoids"
the PII but breaks the inbox mirror and the single-send-path (IIOS would have no record to copy into
the inbox) — trading a solvable security problem for a broken feature.
## Other risks
- **Friday, no test env:** first real sends go to paying customers from an unproven path. Insist on a
sandbox target / 100%-off test coupon before wiring the real SMTP provider (compounds with lever #1
above — don't send real mail from prod until the secret is rotated *and* a safe test target exists).
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# Inbox Mirror + INTERNAL Delivery — Implementation Plan
**Owner:** Maaz · **Repo:** `iios` (`packages/iios-service`) · **Purpose:** every message the app
sends appears in the customer's in-app inbox; and users can send app-to-app "mail" with no SMTP.
## Goal
Two capabilities on one mechanism:
1. **Mirror** — when an external EMAIL is sent, also record it as an in-app interaction so the
customer sees a copy in their CRM inbox. Vivek: *"जो भी communication…उसकी एक copy inbox में चाहिए ही चाहिए."*
2. **INTERNAL delivery** — a user sends a mail-style message (subject + body) to another user with
**no SMTP**; it lands only in the recipient's in-app inbox. Vivek: *"app-to-app…without smtp."*
Both reduce to the same primitive: **render a template → create an `Interaction(kind=EMAIL)` with
subject + HTML + TEXT parts on a thread.** External additionally does the SMTP send (already built).
## Architectural guardrail (carried from the earlier inbox work)
This is the **mail-style inbox (a projection over `Interaction`s)** — NOT the `InboxItem` work-surface.
- An email/message becomes an `Interaction(kind=EMAIL)` on a thread. The inbox view lists interactions.
- An `InboxItem` is created ONLY when the projector decides action is needed (NEEDS_REPLY/MENTION) —
that's the existing projector, unchanged. **We do not write InboxItems here.** Mixing them is the
KG-15 "inbox fatigue" failure.
## What already exists (reuse, do NOT rebuild)
- `IngestService.ingest(req, idempotencyKey)` — the generic create-an-interaction entry: resolves
source handle → actor → channel → thread, writes `Interaction` (kind from `req.kind`) + parts +
outbox event, idempotent per (scope, idempotencyKey). Inbound email already uses it to make
`EMAIL` interactions with HTML/TEXT parts — **the exact model for the outbound mirror.**
- `TemplateService.render()` (exported) → `{subject, html, text}`.
- `TemplatedSender.sendTemplated()` → SMTP egress (built).
- `IiosMessagePartKind` has `HTML` + `TEXT`; `IiosInteractionKind` has `EMAIL`.
## Design (locked)
- **New `MailService`** (new `src/mail/` module) orchestrates `TemplateService` + `IngestService` +
`TemplatedSender` + `ActorResolver`. Templates/outbound stay unaware of each other.
- `postInternal(...)` — render → `ingest()` an `EMAIL` interaction on a per-email thread. No SMTP.
- `sendExternalWithMirror(...)` — render → `TemplatedSender.sendTemplated()` (SMTP) → **and** mirror
via `ingest()` **iff the recipient is a registered user** (timing rule below).
- **Visibility (resolved review finding):** `ingest()` creates the interaction + thread but adds NO
participants, and `listThreads` shows only threads where the caller is a participant. So after each
ingest the MailService `ensureParticipant`s **both** the sender's actor and the recipient's actor
(`ActorResolver.resolveActor``ensureParticipant`). Without this the mirror is invisible.
- **`ingest()` returns `threadId`** — used directly to add the two participants.
- **Rendered content → parts:** part 0 `HTML` (bodyHtml), part 1 `TEXT` (bodyText); `subject` → the
thread subject (email threads share a subject). Attachments are the separate attachments plan.
- **Idempotency:** the ingest idempotencyKey = the send's key (e.g. `mirror:<stripe_session>`), so a
retried send never doubles the inbox copy.
- **Reply/threading:** `parentInteractionId` for in-thread replies (already modeled); a mirrored
email's `inReplyTo` maps to the parent interaction.
## The timing rule (locked, from the meeting)
**Mirror only AFTER the recipient is registered.** The welcome/receipt go out *before* registration —
there is no in-app inbox to mirror into yet. So `sendExternalWithMirror` mirrors only when the target
resolves to a registered actor; pre-registration sends are email-only. Vivek: *"just time app pe
register kar liya, uske baad se jitna communication…uske inbox mein chahiye."*
## Thread model (DECIDED: one thread per email)
**Each send is its own thread / inbox entry; a reply threads onto it.** Matches email semantics and
pairs with the reply (`parentInteractionId`) feature. Implementation: the ingest `externalThreadId`
is **derived from the send's idempotency key**, so a retried send reuses the same thread (no dupe)
while distinct emails get distinct threads. A reply posts onto the parent's thread.
## Files
```
src/mail/mail.service.ts # new — postInternal, sendExternalWithMirror
src/mail/mail.service.spec.ts # new — DB-backed
src/mail/mail.module.ts # new — imports TemplateModule + AdaptersModule + interactions
src/mail/mail.controller.ts # new? — OR extend template.controller with a `deliverInternal` route
```
(Whether INTERNAL gets its own HTTP route or rides the template controller is a small call made at build time.)
## Task-by-task (TDD) — pending the thread-model decision
**T1 — `renderToParts()` helper**: `{subject,html,text}``IngestInteractionRequest.parts` +
thread subject. Test: HTML+TEXT parts produced; empty parts omitted.
**T2 — `postInternal()`**: render an INTERNAL template → `ingest()` an `EMAIL` interaction on the
thread between sender + recipient (thread model per the decision). Test: interaction created with
kind EMAIL + parts; idempotent per key; lands on the recipient's thread.
**T3 — `sendExternalWithMirror()`**: render → `sendTemplated` (SMTP/sandbox) → mirror `ingest()`
**only if** the recipient resolves to a registered actor. Test: registered → one outbound command +
one mirror interaction; unregistered → outbound only, no mirror; idempotent (replay → no dupes).
**T4 — controller/module wiring + HTTP verify** (route for INTERNAL send; mirror invoked from the
external send path). Boot + drive over HTTP against the sandbox.
**T5 — gate**: full suite + boundary + build; manual: send external → confirm a mirror interaction
appears on the recipient's thread.
## Out of scope (follow-ons)
- **Frontend mail-inbox view** — surfacing `EMAIL` interactions as a mail-style inbox in the CRM
(the current CRM inbox is the InboxItem work-surface; the mail view is separate UI).
- **Attachments** (separate plan). **Stripe webhook** (be-crm) — the trigger.
## Risks
- **Don't write InboxItems here** (KG-15). Interactions only; the projector owns InboxItems.
- **Idempotency must cover BOTH** the SMTP send and the mirror ingest, or a retried webhook doubles
the inbox copy. Same key threaded through both.
- **Unregistered recipients:** resolving "is this a registered user?" must be cheap and correct, or a
pre-registration send could either error or wrongly mirror into a non-existent inbox.
- **Review finding — recipient participation:** `ingest()` resolves and attaches the *source* actor.
For the interaction to appear in the *recipient's* inbox, the **recipient must be a thread
participant.** T2/T3 must ensure this — either by making the thread's participant set include the
recipient at create time, or an explicit `ensureParticipant` after ingest. A mirror the recipient
isn't a participant of is invisible — silent failure. Cover it with an assertion in the tests
("recipient can list the thread / the interaction shows in their inbox query").
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# Insignia Platform — Live State (from the mesh-verify probe, 2026-07-10)
> Distilled from the authenticated `mesh-verify.lynkedup.cloud` dashboard (`/api/results` +
> `/api/journey`). This is the **real** platform IIOS is meant to plug into — service inventory,
> the identity/session/governance flow, and the exact contracts to wire IIOS's platform ports.
> Tokens redacted (the raw JSON dumps contain live SAT/PAT/refresh tokens — do not commit them).
## Cluster / mesh
- **Cluster:** `lynkedup-tech` (NYC2 / DigitalOcean). **Istio** (istio-envoy) + **SPIFFE/SPIRE**,
trust domain **`spiffe://insignia.tech`** (SVIDs like `spiffe://insignia.tech/ns/sre/sa/default`,
`.../sa/realmdm-sas`). mTLS **PERMISSIVE**. Reached by ClusterIP DNS.
- **Namespaces:** `sre` (MDM, OPA, misc), `cmp` (consent platform), `insignia` (identity/session/
app-facing services), `istio-system`.
- Public edges: `*.lynkedup.cloud` (behind oauth2-proxy → Keycloak).
## The identity/session/governance flow (7 steps — the doctrine)
> **Separate authorities:** Session Broker *authenticates*, OPA *authorizes*, CMP decides *purpose*,
> RealMDM *resolves identity*. Purpose-proof ≠ authorization. The PAT carries the external `sub`
> only as a **SHA-256 hash**, never raw; `canonical_person_id` is null until MDM VERIFIES (MDM never
> blocks login).
1. **Anonymous consent (CMP Edge)** — browser CMP SDK → `POST /edge/v1/cache-policy` → EdDSA-signed
cache-category manifest; a ConsentReceipt goes to CMP over gRPC. Purpose proof only.
2. **External login (Supabase)****SAT** (ES256 JWT). Claims: `iss` (project `/auth/v1`), opaque
UUID `sub`, `aud=authenticated`, `email`, `user_metadata` (full_name, avatar_url), `aal`, `amr`.
Proves the *session*, not the person/permission. Verified via Supabase **JWKS** (kid-selected).
3. **Session Broker exchange SAT → PAT**`POST /v1/sessions/exchange` (Bearer SAT +
`X-Client-Authorization` = BFF Keycloak client-creds, aud=session-broker). Broker verifies the
SAT, calls the MDM bridge, resolves scope from **memberships**, mints the **PAT** (~5 min).
3b. **Workload identity (SPIFFE/mTLS)** — each meshed pod gets an X.509-SVID; OPA receives **both**
the user (`principal`) and the caller (`caller.spiffe_id`) — different layers, never merged.
4. **MDM Auth-Subject Bridge**`POST /v1/auth-subjects/resolve {issuer, subject}` → `{platform_
principal_id, canonical_person_id (null until VERIFIED), link_state (PENDING/VERIFIED),
link_version, match_method}`. Keyed on **iss+sub** (never email). Idempotent.
5. **OPA decision** — `POST /v1/decisions` → `{decision_id, allow, reason_codes, obligations,
policy_version}`. Obligations = masks / row-filters / denied fields / audit level / ttl. A
decision, not a 50-line entitlement JWT — the PEP MUST enforce every obligation.
6. **AppShell assembles the ACE** — combines PAT + OPA obligations + CMP consent into an App
Context Envelope (HttpOnly cookie): `capabilities[]` (policy-derived), `ui_obligations`
(hide/mask/step_up), `consent`. **No tokens, no raw PII in the browser.**
7. **CRM renders** — applies OPA `row_filter` (SQL WHERE) + `mask_fields` + `deny_fields`
server-side; rows reference `canonical_person_id`, not email.
## Service inventory + real endpoints
**Identity / session (`insignia` ns):**
- **Session Broker** `session-broker.insignia:80` — `POST /v1/sessions/exchange` (SAT→PAT).
- **Memberships** `memberships.insignia` (public `insignia-memberships.lynkedup.cloud`) —
`POST /v1/internal/resolve`, `GET /v1/memberships` (Bearer PAT) → scope tuple + `allowed[]`.
- **AppShell BFF** `appshell-bff.insignia:80` (public `insignia-appshell.lynkedup.cloud`) —
`GET /apps/crm-web/bootstrap` (Bearer PAT) → ACE.
- **Profile** `profile.insignia:80` — `GET /v1/profile`, `GET /v1/stats`. Backed by **sqlite3**
(`/data/profiles.db`, PVC `insignia-profile-data`, WAL, persistent, single-replica RWO).
- **CRM** `crm.insignia:80` — `GET /v1/leads?view=list` (applies obligations).
- **Policy Gateway** `policy-gateway.insignia:80` — `POST /v1/decisions`, `POST /v1/decisions/batch`.
**MDM (`sre` ns):** `mdm-kernel.sre:80` (`/v1/auth-subjects/resolve`, `/healthz`, `/readyz`; auth =
Keycloak service token **aud=realmdm**) · `mdm-ai.sre:80` · `mdm-sas.sre:9090` (**gRPC** — tokenization/SAS).
**OPA / policy (`sre` ns):** `opa.sre:8181` (`/health`, `GET /v1/data` = live policy tree;
default-deny) · `realmdm-opa.sre:8181` · `opal-server.sre:7002` (OPAL policy distribution).
**CMP (`cmp` ns), backed by Postgres + NATS + Redis:** `cmp-core:8080` (real `CheckConsent` gRPC;
service token aud=cmp) · `cmp-admin:8086` · `cmp-evidence:8081` · `cmp-sync:8085` ·
`cmp-tollgate:8082` (NATS JetStream gating) · `cmp-media:8083` · `cmp-worker:8084`. Plus
`insignia-consent-edge.insignia` (`POST /edge/v1/cache-policy`) and `insignia-consent-adapter.insignia`
(`POST /v1/consent/evaluate {purpose}` → `{permitted, legal_basis, state, consent_epoch}`).
**Other (`sre` ns):** `poi-api:5000` · `roof:8002` (YOLO segmentation) · `commit:8081` ·
`presign:8080` · `egs:8090` · `artifact-retrieval:8082` (was 503 on probe day) · `cmp-docs`.
## The two contracts IIOS must match
### PAT (Platform Access Token) — what IIOS should verify
`iss = https://identity.insignia.internal` · **ES256** (EC P-256), verify via the broker **JWKS**
(`.../.well-known/jwks.json`, kid-selected — **no shared secret**) · `aud` includes the app (e.g.
`crm-web`) · `lifetime ~300s`. Claims:
```
sub = platform_principal_id app_id tenant_id org_id bu_id
region environment role aal amr auth_source
external_subject_hash = sha256:… (NOT the raw external sub)
canonical_person_id (null until VERIFIED)
session_epoch · policy_epoch · consent_epoch (stale-detection)
sid (platform_session_id) · typ = platform-access+jwt
```
### OPA decision — `POST http://policy-gateway.insignia.svc.cluster.local/v1/decisions`
Request `{ input: { principal{platform_principal_id, canonical_person_id, auth_source, aal, roles,
memberships[]}, caller{spiffe_id}, resource{type, id, tenant_id, classification[]}, action,
context{purpose, device_trust, consent_receipt_ids[], network_zone, time} } }`
Response `{ decision_id, allow, reason_codes[], obligations{ row_filter, allow_fields[], mask_fields{},
deny_fields[], audit, decision_ttl_seconds }, policy_version }`.
## What this means for wiring IIOS's ports
1. **Auth — verify the PAT, not the Supabase SAT.** IIOS today verifies the Supabase SAT directly
(a dev shortcut). In the real platform the **Session Broker** does SAT→PAT; a platform workload
verifies the **PAT**. The PAT already carries the full scope tuple + `platform_principal_id`, so
`MessagePrincipal` maps ~1:1: `userId = platform_principal_id` (→ `canonical_person_id` once
VERIFIED), `appId = app_id`, `orgId = org_id`, `tenantId = tenant_id`, `+ buId`. Wire it by adding
the broker as an `AUTH_ISSUERS` entry (iss `https://identity.insignia.internal`, ES256, its JWKS).
2. **OPA — point `OpaPort` at the Policy Gateway** (`POST /v1/decisions`). Build `{principal, caller.
spiffe_id, resource, action, context}` from the PAT + the op; `decideOrThrow` maps `allow` → proceed
and **must enforce the obligations** (masks/row-filter/deny). The gateway's input is richer than
IIOS's current `{action,…}` — that's the adapter's job to assemble.
3. **MDM — usually don't call it.** The PAT already carries `platform_principal_id`/`canonical_person_id`
(the broker resolved at login). Only call `/v1/auth-subjects/resolve` if IIOS is the identity-exchange
edge (it isn't — the Broker is).
4. **CMP — consent gate** via `insignia-consent-adapter /v1/consent/evaluate {purpose}` when processing
content for AI/analytics/marketing.
5. **SAS — tokenization/masking** is `mdm-sas` (gRPC) — the "tokenize sensitive parts before storage"
requirement.
*Source: two API payloads captured 2026-07-10 (`result.json` = probes, `journey.json` = the CRM
first-vertical-slice journey). Re-capture from the authenticated dashboard to refresh.*
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# SMTP Provider — Implementation Plan
**Owner:** Maaz · **Repo:** `iios` (`packages/iios-service`) · **Purpose:** make external email *actually leave the building* (welcome / receipt), the critical path for Friday.
## Goal
Add an `SmtpProvider` so the `EMAIL` channel delivers via real SMTP (`accounts@lynkeduppro.com`,
fallback `ceo@lynkeduppro.com`) instead of the sandbox. The template module already renders and
queues to the `EMAIL` channel; this is the one piece between "queued (SENT via sandbox)" and "the
customer receives it." From the meeting: *"जो पहला जा रहा है, वो SMTP से जा रहा है, क्योंकि हमें तुरंत चाहिए."*
## What already exists (do NOT rebuild)
- `CapabilityProvider { name, channelTypes, capabilities, send(req) }` — the seam.
- `CapabilityProviderRegistry` binds a provider per channel: **sandbox by default**; `EmailProvider`
(HTTP) when `IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL` is set. Unknown channels fail closed.
- `OutboundService.send``CapabilityBroker` (policy + obligations) → the bound provider. Idempotency,
rate limits, ledger, provenance all upstream — untouched.
- `req.payload` for EMAIL is `{ subject, text, html, inReplyTo }` (from `TemplatedSender`).
## Design decisions (locked)
| # | Decision | Why |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | New `SmtpProvider implements CapabilityProvider`, `channelTypes=['EMAIL']`, via **nodemailer** | The established provider pattern; nodemailer is the standard SMTP client |
| 2 | **Env-driven activation**, like `IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL` | Off by default (sandbox); flip on by setting SMTP env — no code change to enable |
| 3 | **Registry precedence for EMAIL: SMTP > HTTP > sandbox** | SMTP is the intended prod path; HTTP relay stays available; sandbox is the safe default |
| 4 | **Transporter is injected** (constructor takes a `Transporter` or a factory) | SMTP is untestable against a live server in CI; inject a stub/`jsonTransport` to assert the envelope |
| 5 | **Optional fallback sender** (`accounts@` primary → `ceo@` on failure) | The meeting's fallback: if the primary mailbox send fails, retry once via the fallback identity |
| 6 | **Never throw** — a transport error returns `{ outcome: 'FAILED', errorCode }` | Adapter doctrine; the command is marked FAILED, the caller isn't broken |
## Config (env)
```
IIOS_SMTP_HOST=smtp.<mail-host> # e.g. smtp.gmail.com (Google Workspace)
IIOS_SMTP_PORT=587
IIOS_SMTP_SECURE=false # true for 465, false for 587/STARTTLS
IIOS_SMTP_USER=accounts@lynkeduppro.com
IIOS_SMTP_PASS=<app password> # Workspace App Password, NOT the account password
IIOS_SMTP_FROM="LynkedUp Pro <accounts@lynkeduppro.com>" # defaults to USER
# optional fallback identity used only if the primary send FAILS
IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_USER=ceo@lynkeduppro.com
IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_PASS=<app password>
IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_FROM="Justin Johnson <ceo@lynkeduppro.com>"
```
Activation rule: `SmtpProvider` is bound for `EMAIL` iff `IIOS_SMTP_HOST` + `IIOS_SMTP_USER` +
`IIOS_SMTP_PASS` are all set. Fallback transporter built only if the `_FALLBACK_*` trio is set.
## Files
```
src/capability/smtp.provider.ts # new — the provider
src/capability/smtp.provider.spec.ts # new — injected-transport tests
src/capability/capability.registry.ts # modify — bind SMTP for EMAIL when configured (precedence)
package.json # add nodemailer + @types/nodemailer
```
## Contract
```ts
interface SmtpIdentity { host: string; port: number; secure: boolean; user: string; pass: string; from: string }
class SmtpProvider implements CapabilityProvider {
readonly name = 'smtp';
readonly channelTypes = ['EMAIL'];
readonly capabilities = { canSend: true };
// `makeTransport` is injectable so tests pass a stub / nodemailer jsonTransport.
constructor(primary: SmtpIdentity, fallback?: SmtpIdentity, makeTransport?: (id: SmtpIdentity) => Transporter) {}
async send(req: CapabilityRequest): Promise<ProviderResult>;
}
```
`send()` builds the mail from `req.target` (recipient) + `req.payload`:
```
{ from, to: req.target, subject, text, html,
inReplyTo?, references?, // threading, from payload.inReplyTo
messageId } // generated; returned as providerRef so replies can thread
```
Primary transporter sends; on throw, if a fallback identity exists, retry once via it; still failing
`FAILED`. Success → `{ outcome: 'SENT', providerRef: messageId, latencyMs }`.
**Review findings folded in:**
- **`providerRef` = nodemailer's returned `info.messageId`**, not a hand-generated id — nodemailer
stamps the real `Message-ID` it sent, which is what a reply's `In-Reply-To` will actually match.
- **Fallback only on PRE-acceptance failures** (connection refused, auth failure, timeout) — NOT on
an error raised after the SMTP server already accepted the message. Retrying a post-acceptance
failure via the fallback identity would **double-deliver**. `send()` inspects the error (nodemailer
`err.responseCode` / code) and falls back only when the server never accepted.
- **Registry precedence is registration ORDER:** `register()` does `byChannel.set(ch, provider)`, so
the LAST registration for `EMAIL` wins. Bind sandbox first (all channels), then HTTP `EmailProvider`
if its URL is set, then `SmtpProvider` **last** if SMTP env is set → SMTP > HTTP > sandbox falls out.
## Task-by-task (TDD)
Each: failing test → red → implement → green → commit. Tests inject a stub transporter (no network).
**T1 — provider skeleton + config parse**
- `smtpIdentityFromEnv()` reads the env trio; returns null if incomplete.
- Test: full env → identity; missing pass → null; fallback trio → fallback identity.
**T2 — `send()` builds the correct envelope**
- Inject a recording stub transporter. Test: `from`/`to`/`subject`/`html`/`text` map from target+payload;
`inReplyTo` → header set when present; `messageId` generated and returned as `providerRef`; outcome `SENT`.
**T3 — failure handling + fallback**
- Stub throws on primary. Test: with a fallback identity → retries via fallback, `SENT` via fallback
transporter; without fallback → `FAILED` with `errorCode`, **never throws**.
**T4 — registry precedence**
- `capability.registry.spec` (or extend): with SMTP env set, `forChannel('EMAIL')` returns the SMTP
provider (not sandbox/HTTP); with only `IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL` → HTTP; with neither → sandbox.
- The registry reads env in its constructor, so each case sets env, constructs a fresh
`CapabilityProviderRegistry`, asserts, then restores env (mirror the env save/restore other specs use).
**T5 — gate + manual real send**
- `vitest run` (all), `boundary`, `build` green.
- **Manual (ops):** point env at a real mailbox (or nodemailer **Ethereal** test SMTP for a no-mailbox
end-to-end), boot, `POST /v1/templates/send` the `welcome` seed to your own address, confirm receipt
and that From = `accounts@lynkeduppro.com`.
## Error handling
- Incomplete SMTP env → provider not bound → EMAIL falls back to sandbox (no accidental silent prod send).
- Transport failure → `FAILED` on the command (+ delivery attempt), never thrown.
- Fallback used → `providerRef` notes the fallback identity for audit.
## Risks / prerequisites
- 🔴 **Rotate `Qwerty@a2` BEFORE enabling.** This is the switch that turns queued sends into real
emails to real addresses — a forgeable IIOS token now reaches customer inboxes under your brand.
- **Workspace App Password, not the account password** (2FA accounts reject the raw password over SMTP).
- **Deliverability:** SPF + DKIM + DMARC on `lynkeduppro.com` or mail lands in spam. Ops task, before real customers.
- **Sending limits:** Google Workspace SMTP ≈ 2000/day. Fine — instant welcome/receipt is low volume; the
drip goes via Mailchimp, not SMTP.
- **Test safety:** never point CI/test env at a real mailbox; tests use an injected stub, the manual step
uses Ethereal or a throwaway inbox.
## Out of scope (separate plans)
Attachments over SMTP (extends `EmailPayload` + this provider); the inbox mirror / INTERNAL delivery
(no SMTP dependency).
+3 -1
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@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
"build": "pnpm -r build",
"typecheck": "pnpm -r typecheck",
"test": "vitest run",
"boundary": "node scripts/check-import-boundary.mjs"
"boundary": "node scripts/check-import-boundary.mjs",
"release:dry": "pnpm -r build && pnpm -r publish --dry-run --no-git-checks",
"release": "pnpm -r build && pnpm -r publish --no-git-checks"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^26.0.1",
+7 -3
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-adapter-sdk",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"files": ["dist"],
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit"
},
"dependencies": {
"@insignia/iios-contracts": "workspace:*"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-ai-web",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -23,5 +29,8 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-community-web",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -23,5 +29,8 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+7 -3
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-contracts",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"files": ["dist"],
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ export interface IngestInteractionRequest {
bodyText?: string;
contentRef?: string;
mimeType?: string;
sizeBytes?: number;
}>;
occurredAt: string;
providerEventId?: string;
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-inbox-web",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -23,5 +29,8 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-kernel-client",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.4",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -19,5 +25,8 @@
"devDependencies": {
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ export interface MessageSocketConfig {
}
/**
* Framework-agnostic facade over the `/message` Socket.io namespace (ports the
* support-sdk MessageClient). No socket.io types leak out; RPCs use emitWithAck.
* On reconnect it re-opens the current thread so subscriptions resume with no
* lost messages (the docs' disconnect/reconnect requirement).
* Framework-agnostic facade over the `/message` Socket.io namespace. No socket.io
* types leak out; RPCs use emitWithAck. It tracks EVERY joined thread and re-opens
* all of them on reconnect (the docs' disconnect/reconnect requirement), so a UI
* that watches multiple conversations keeps receiving live messages after a drop.
*/
export class MessageSocket {
private readonly socket: SocketLike;
private currentThreadId: string | null = null;
private readonly joined = new Set<string>();
constructor(config: MessageSocketConfig, socket?: SocketLike) {
this.socket =
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ export class MessageSocket {
autoConnect: config.autoConnect ?? true,
}) as unknown as SocketLike);
// Re-open the active thread after a reconnect.
// Re-subscribe to every joined thread after a reconnect.
this.socket.on('connect', () => {
if (this.currentThreadId) void this.socket.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId: this.currentThreadId });
for (const id of this.joined) void this.socket.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId: id });
});
}
@@ -40,27 +40,70 @@ export class MessageSocket {
this.socket.disconnect();
}
/** Run `handler` on every (re)connect, and immediately if already connected. */
onConnected(handler: () => void): () => void {
this.socket.on('connect', handler);
if (this.socket.connected) handler();
return () => this.socket.off('connect', handler);
}
/** Subscribe to a server event; returns an unsubscribe fn. */
on<E extends keyof MessageEvents>(event: E, handler: MessageEvents[E]): () => void {
const fn = handler as (...args: unknown[]) => void;
this.socket.on(event, fn);
return () => this.socket.off(event, fn);
this.socket.on(event as string, fn);
return () => this.socket.off(event as string, fn);
}
async openThread(threadId?: string): Promise<OpenThreadResult> {
const result = (await this.socket.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId })) as OpenThreadResult;
this.currentThreadId = result.threadId;
async openThread(
threadId?: string,
opts?: { membership?: string; creatorRole?: string; subject?: string },
): Promise<OpenThreadResult> {
// Timeout (when the transport supports it) so a server error that never acks
// can't hang the caller forever.
const ack = this.socket.timeout ? this.socket.timeout(8000) : this.socket;
const result = (await ack.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId, ...opts })) as OpenThreadResult & { error?: string };
if (result?.error) throw new Error(result.error);
this.joined.add(result.threadId);
return result;
}
async sendMessage(threadId: string, content: string, opts?: { contentRef?: string }): Promise<Message> {
async sendMessage(
threadId: string,
content: string,
opts?: {
contentRef?: string;
parentInteractionId?: string;
mentions?: string[];
attachment?: { contentRef: string; mimeType: string; sizeBytes: number; checksumSha256?: string };
},
): Promise<Message> {
return (await this.socket.emitWithAck('send_message', {
threadId,
content,
contentRef: opts?.contentRef,
contentRef: opts?.attachment?.contentRef ?? opts?.contentRef,
mimeType: opts?.attachment?.mimeType,
sizeBytes: opts?.attachment?.sizeBytes,
checksumSha256: opts?.attachment?.checksumSha256,
parentInteractionId: opts?.parentInteractionId,
mentions: opts?.mentions, // opaque userId notify-list; the app parses "@", not the kernel
})) as Message;
}
/** Pin a message in the thread (shared, generic annotation type "pin"). */
async pin(threadId: string, interactionId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.socket.emitWithAck('annotate', { threadId, interactionId, type: 'pin', value: '' });
}
/** Save a message for myself (personal, generic annotation type "save"). */
async save(threadId: string, interactionId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.socket.emitWithAck('annotate', { threadId, interactionId, type: 'save', value: '' });
}
/** Toggle an emoji reaction on a message (a generic annotation of type "reaction"). */
async react(threadId: string, interactionId: string, value: string): Promise<void> {
await this.socket.emitWithAck('annotate', { threadId, interactionId, type: 'reaction', value });
}
async markRead(threadId: string, interactionId: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> {
return (await this.socket.emitWithAck('read', { threadId, interactionId })) as { ok: boolean };
}
@@ -68,4 +111,9 @@ export class MessageSocket {
typing(threadId: string): void {
this.socket.emit('typing', { threadId });
}
/** Tell the server which thread is in the foreground (or null when blurred) — drives presence. */
focus(threadId: string | null): void {
this.socket.emit('focus_thread', { threadId });
}
}
+74 -5
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,16 @@
import type { IngestInteractionRequest } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import type { Message, InboxItem, InboxState, Ticket, TicketState, CallbackRequest, RouteBinding, RouteDecision, AiArtifact, AiJobResult, Meeting, MeetingActionItem } from './types';
import type { Message, InboxItem, InboxState, Ticket, TicketState, CallbackRequest, RouteBinding, RouteDecision, AiArtifact, AiJobResult, Meeting, MeetingActionItem, ThreadSummary, SavedItem, LoginResult } from './types';
export interface RestConfig {
serviceUrl: string;
token?: string;
/**
* Extra headers for every request — e.g. `x-context-attestation` (the July 12 trust proof).
* Pass a FUNCTION to mint fresh headers per request: a context attestation carries a single-use
* nonce, so a static header would be replay-rejected on the 2nd call. The function is invoked
* once per request.
*/
headers?: Record<string, string> | (() => Record<string, string>);
}
/** REST/polling client for kernel reads and the native-send fallback. */
@@ -15,7 +22,8 @@ export class RestClient {
}
private headers(extra: Record<string, string> = {}): Record<string, string> {
const h: Record<string, string> = { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...extra };
const custom = typeof this.config.headers === 'function' ? this.config.headers() : this.config.headers;
const h: Record<string, string> = { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...custom, ...extra };
if (this.config.token) h.authorization = `Bearer ${this.config.token}`;
return h;
}
@@ -57,12 +65,73 @@ export class RestClient {
return (await r.json()) as InboxItem;
}
// ─── auth + threads (app surface) ─────────────────────────────
/** Dev IdP login (POST /v1/dev/login). A real IdP issues the same JWT — this is the swap point. */
async login(username: string, password: string): Promise<LoginResult> {
const r = await fetch(this.url('/v1/dev/login'), {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
if (r.status === 401) throw new Error('invalid username or password');
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`login failed (${r.status}) — is the service running with IIOS_DEV_TOKENS=1?`);
return (await r.json()) as LoginResult;
}
/** Dev directory: known usernames. A real app validates against its user store / MDM. */
async listUsers(): Promise<string[]> {
const r = await fetch(this.url('/v1/dev/users'), { headers: this.headers() });
if (!r.ok) return [];
return ((await r.json()) as { users: string[] }).users;
}
/**
* Server-authoritative conversation list (works cross-device, shows unread + members).
* `filter.metadata` narrows to threads whose opaque attribute bag matches every key/value.
*/
async listThreads(filter?: { metadata?: Record<string, string> }): Promise<ThreadSummary[]> {
const qs = filter?.metadata
? '?' + Object.entries(filter.metadata).map(([k, v]) => `metadata[${encodeURIComponent(k)}]=${encodeURIComponent(v)}`).join('&')
: '';
const r = await fetch(this.url(`/v1/threads${qs}`), { headers: this.headers() });
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`listThreads ${r.status}`);
return (await r.json()) as ThreadSummary[];
}
/** Create a thread with generic app attributes (membership/creator role/subject + an opaque metadata bag). */
async createThread(opts: { membership?: string; creatorRole?: string; subject?: string; metadata?: Record<string, unknown> }): Promise<{ threadId: string }> {
return this.post<{ threadId: string }>('/v1/threads', opts);
}
/** My saved messages (personal bookmarks), newest first, with thread context. */
async listSaved(): Promise<SavedItem[]> {
const r = await fetch(this.url('/v1/threads/my-annotations?type=save'), { headers: this.headers() });
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`listSaved ${r.status}`);
return (await r.json()) as SavedItem[];
}
/** Governed add-participant. A policy 403 (e.g. DM cap) surfaces its reason. */
async addParticipant(threadId: string, userId: string): Promise<void> {
const r = await fetch(this.url(`/v1/threads/${threadId}/participants`), {
method: 'POST',
headers: this.headers(),
body: JSON.stringify({ userId }),
});
if (r.ok) return;
const body = (await r.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { message?: string };
throw new Error(body.message ?? `could not add member (${r.status})`);
}
// ─── support ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
async createTicket(body: { subject: string; priority?: string; threadId?: string }): Promise<Ticket> {
async createTicket(body: { subject: string; priority?: string; threadId?: string; metadata?: Record<string, unknown> }): Promise<Ticket> {
return this.post<Ticket>('/v1/support/tickets', body);
}
async escalate(threadId: string, subject?: string): Promise<Ticket> {
return this.post<Ticket>('/v1/support/escalate', { threadId, subject });
async escalate(threadId: string, subject?: string, metadata?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Ticket> {
return this.post<Ticket>('/v1/support/escalate', { threadId, subject, metadata });
}
/** Manually assign a ticket to a specific user (generic assignment override). */
async assignTicket(id: string, userId: string): Promise<Ticket> {
return this.post<Ticket>(`/v1/support/tickets/${id}/assignee`, { userId });
}
async listTickets(scope: 'mine' | 'assigned' = 'mine'): Promise<Ticket[]> {
const r = await fetch(this.url(`/v1/support/tickets?scope=${scope}`), { headers: this.headers() });
+66
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,30 @@
/** A media/file part attached to a message (contentRef points at object storage). */
export interface Attachment {
contentRef: string;
mimeType: string;
sizeBytes: number;
kind: 'image' | 'video' | 'audio' | 'file';
}
/** A generic annotation aggregate on a message (e.g. type "reaction", value = emoji). */
export interface AnnotationGroup {
type: string;
value: string;
users: string[]; // usernames who applied it
}
/** Wire shapes the kernel emits over socket / returns over REST (align with service). */
export interface Message {
id: string;
threadId: string;
senderActorId: string;
senderId: string; // sender's email/username — reliable "is this mine?" check
senderName: string;
content: string;
contentRef?: string;
attachment?: Attachment;
parentInteractionId?: string;
annotations?: AnnotationGroup[];
traceId?: string;
createdAt: string;
}
@@ -26,10 +46,50 @@ export interface TypingEvent {
userId: string;
}
/** Broadcast when someone toggles an annotation — carries the refreshed user list. */
export interface AnnotationEvent {
threadId: string;
interactionId: string;
type: string;
value: string;
op: 'add' | 'remove';
users: string[];
userId: string;
}
export interface MessageEvents {
message: (m: Message) => void;
receipt: (e: ReceiptEvent) => void;
typing: (e: TypingEvent) => void;
annotation: (e: AnnotationEvent) => void;
}
/** A "my threads" entry from GET /v1/threads (server-authoritative). */
export interface ThreadSummary {
threadId: string;
subject: string | null;
membership?: string; // 'dm' | 'group' (opaque app attribute)
/** The thread's opaque, app-supplied attribute bag — echoed verbatim; the kernel never interprets it. */
metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
participants: string[]; // member usernames
participantCount: number;
unread: number;
muted?: boolean;
lastMessage?: string;
lastAt?: string;
}
/** A personally-saved message with its thread context (GET /v1/threads/my-annotations?type=save). */
export interface SavedItem {
message: Message;
threadId: string;
threadSubject: string | null;
}
/** Result of the dev IdP login (POST /v1/dev/login). A real IdP issues the same claims. */
export interface LoginResult {
token: string;
userId: string;
}
export type InboxState = 'OPEN' | 'SNOOZED' | 'DONE' | 'ARCHIVED' | 'CANCELLED' | 'STALE';
@@ -68,6 +128,8 @@ export interface Ticket {
assignedActorId?: string | null;
createdAt: string;
updatedAt: string;
/** Opaque, app-supplied attribute bag on the ticket — echoed verbatim; the kernel never interprets it. */
metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
threadLinks?: Array<{ threadId: string; relationKind: string }>;
}
@@ -188,4 +250,8 @@ export interface SocketLike {
emitWithAck(event: string, ...args: unknown[]): Promise<unknown>;
connect(): unknown;
disconnect(): unknown;
/** True while the underlying transport is connected (socket.io exposes this). */
connected?: boolean;
/** Per-call ack timeout (socket.io). Optional so fakes can omit it. */
timeout?(ms: number): { emitWithAck(event: string, ...args: unknown[]): Promise<unknown> };
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-meeting-web",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -23,5 +29,8 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+13 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
{
"name": "@insignia/iios-message-web",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"version": "0.1.0",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"module": "dist/index.js",
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
"exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
"files": ["dist"],
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
"import": "./dist/index.js"
}
},
"files": [
"dist"
],
"scripts": {
"build": "tsup",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
@@ -23,5 +29,8 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"tsup": "^8.3.5",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
},
"publishConfig": {
"registry": "https://git.lynkedup.cloud/api/packages/insignia/npm/"
}
}
+19
View File
@@ -49,3 +49,22 @@ IIOS_AI_BUDGET_UNITS=100000 # per-scope AI cost-unit budget (KG-12)
# ── Capability providers (governed egress targets) ───────────────────────────
# Per-channel provider endpoint the CapabilityBroker calls, e.g.:
# IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL=https://provider.internal/email
# ── Context attestation (July 12 trust layer) ──
# Audience IIOS requires on attestations addressed to it.
IIOS_ATTESTATION_AUDIENCE=iios-core
# Dev only: shared HS256 secret AppShell's stand-in signs attestations with (seeds the
# appshell-crm client into the registry when IIOS_DEV_TOKENS=1).
# IIOS_ATTESTATION_DEV_SECRET=appshell-dev-signing-key
# When '1', every guarded request MUST carry a valid X-Context-Attestation (else 403).
# Leave OFF until callers (AppShell/be-crm) forward attestations. Verified-if-present regardless.
IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION=0
# ─── Object storage (media + email attachments) ───────────────────
# Unset → local disk (MEDIA_DIR). Set these → S3-compatible (AWS S3 / MinIO / R2 / Supabase).
# IIOS_S3_ENDPOINT=https://minio.your-server:9000 # omit for AWS S3
# IIOS_S3_BUCKET=iios-media
# IIOS_S3_ACCESS_KEY=...
# IIOS_S3_SECRET_KEY=...
# IIOS_S3_REGION=us-east-1 # any value for MinIO
# IIOS_S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=true # true for MinIO/self-hosted
+8 -1
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
"prisma:studio": "prisma studio"
},
"dependencies": {
"@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.1090.0",
"@insignia/iios-adapter-sdk": "workspace:*",
"@insignia/iios-contracts": "workspace:*",
"@nestjs/common": "^11.1.27",
@@ -24,12 +25,16 @@
"class-transformer": "^0.5.1",
"class-validator": "^0.15.1",
"dotenv": "^16.4.7",
"handlebars": "^4.7.9",
"ioredis": "^5.11.1",
"jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3",
"jwks-rsa": "^4.1.0",
"nodemailer": "^9.0.3",
"prisma": "^6.2.1",
"reflect-metadata": "^0.2.2",
"rxjs": "^7.8.2",
"socket.io": "^4.8.3"
"socket.io": "^4.8.3",
"web-push": "^3.6.7"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@insignia/iios-testkit": "workspace:*",
@@ -38,6 +43,8 @@
"@types/express": "^5.0.6",
"@types/jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.10",
"@types/node": "^26.0.1",
"@types/nodemailer": "^8.0.1",
"@types/web-push": "^3.6.4",
"socket.io-client": "^4.8.3",
"typescript": "^5.7.3"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "IiosInteractionAnnotation" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"scopeId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"targetInteractionId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"actorId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"annotationType" TEXT NOT NULL,
"value" TEXT NOT NULL,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "IiosInteractionAnnotation_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "IiosInteractionAnnotation_targetInteractionId_idx" ON "IiosInteractionAnnotation"("targetInteractionId");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "IiosInteractionAnnotation_scopeId_targetInteractionId_actor_key" ON "IiosInteractionAnnotation"("scopeId", "targetInteractionId", "actorId", "annotationType", "value");
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "IiosInteractionAnnotation" ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosInteractionAnnotation_scopeId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("scopeId") REFERENCES "IiosScope"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "IiosInteractionAnnotation" ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosInteractionAnnotation_targetInteractionId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("targetInteractionId") REFERENCES "IiosInteraction"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "IiosInteractionAnnotation" ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosInteractionAnnotation_actorId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("actorId") REFERENCES "IiosActorRef"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
-- AlterEnum
ALTER TYPE "IiosInboxItemKind" ADD VALUE 'MENTION';
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
-- AlterTable
ALTER TABLE "IiosThreadParticipant" ADD COLUMN "muted" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "IiosNotificationSubscription" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"scopeId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"actorId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"kind" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'webpush',
"endpoint" TEXT NOT NULL,
"p256dh" TEXT NOT NULL,
"auth" TEXT NOT NULL,
"userAgent" TEXT,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
"lastSeenAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "IiosNotificationSubscription_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
-- CreateIndex
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "IiosNotificationSubscription_endpoint_key" ON "IiosNotificationSubscription"("endpoint");
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "IiosNotificationSubscription_actorId_idx" ON "IiosNotificationSubscription"("actorId");
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "IiosNotificationSubscription" ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosNotificationSubscription_scopeId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("scopeId") REFERENCES "IiosScope"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- AddForeignKey
ALTER TABLE "IiosNotificationSubscription" ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosNotificationSubscription_actorId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("actorId") REFERENCES "IiosActorRef"("id") ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE;
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-- Trust plane (July 12): context attestation client registry + nonce replay ledger.
CREATE TABLE "IiosClientRegistry" (
"clientId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"clientType" TEXT NOT NULL,
"ownerService" TEXT,
"allowedAppIds" TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::TEXT[],
"attestSecret" TEXT,
"jwksUri" TEXT,
"spiffeId" TEXT,
"status" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ACTIVE',
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
"updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "IiosClientRegistry_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("clientId")
);
CREATE TABLE "IiosAttestationNonce" (
"nonce" TEXT NOT NULL,
"clientId" TEXT NOT NULL,
"expiresAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
"firstSeenAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "IiosAttestationNonce_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("nonce")
);
CREATE INDEX "IiosAttestationNonce_expiresAt_idx" ON "IiosAttestationNonce"("expiresAt");
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-- Reusable message templates (email/SMS/in-app). DB is runtime truth; platform defaults seeded
-- from repo files on boot. Versions are immutable (a change = a new higher version).
CREATE TYPE "IiosTemplateChannel" AS ENUM ('EMAIL', 'SMS', 'INTERNAL');
CREATE TABLE "IiosMessageTemplate" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"scopeId" TEXT,
"key" TEXT NOT NULL,
"channel" "IiosTemplateChannel" NOT NULL,
"locale" TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'en',
"version" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
"subject" TEXT,
"bodyHtml" TEXT,
"bodyText" TEXT,
"variables" JSONB,
"active" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
"updatedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "IiosMessageTemplate_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
ALTER TABLE "IiosMessageTemplate"
ADD CONSTRAINT "IiosMessageTemplate_scopeId_fkey"
FOREIGN KEY ("scopeId") REFERENCES "IiosScope"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- Uniqueness for SCOPED rows (scopeId NOT NULL).
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "IiosMessageTemplate_scopeId_key_channel_locale_version_key"
ON "IiosMessageTemplate" ("scopeId", "key", "channel", "locale", "version");
-- Uniqueness for GLOBAL rows (scopeId IS NULL). Postgres treats NULL as distinct under a normal
-- UNIQUE, so the constraint above does NOT stop two platform defaults for the same key — this
-- partial index does. (Same footgun handled in the inbox idempotency migration.)
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "IiosMessageTemplate_global_key"
ON "IiosMessageTemplate" ("key", "channel", "locale", "version")
WHERE "scopeId" IS NULL;
-- Resolution lookup: by key/channel/locale among active rows.
CREATE INDEX "IiosMessageTemplate_key_channel_locale_active_idx"
ON "IiosMessageTemplate" ("key", "channel", "locale", "active");
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-- Template provenance on the outbound command: which template (key/version/locale) produced this
-- send, plus a hash of the rendered content. The rendered content itself already lives in `payload`;
-- these columns answer "which template version produced this send?" for replay/audit. All nullable —
-- non-templated sends leave them null.
ALTER TABLE "IiosOutboundCommand"
ADD COLUMN "templateKey" TEXT,
ADD COLUMN "templateVersion" INTEGER,
ADD COLUMN "templateLocale" TEXT,
ADD COLUMN "renderedHash" TEXT;
+113
View File
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum IiosInboxItemKind {
NEEDS_REPLY
NEEDS_REVIEW
NEEDS_APPROVAL
MENTION
SUPPORT_UPDATE
MEETING_FOLLOWUP
DIGEST
@@ -95,6 +96,12 @@ enum IiosInboxState {
STALE
}
enum IiosTemplateChannel {
EMAIL
SMS
INTERNAL
}
enum IiosTicketState {
NEW
OPEN
@@ -303,10 +310,13 @@ model IiosScope {
channels IiosChannel[]
threads IiosThread[]
interactions IiosInteraction[]
annotations IiosInteractionAnnotation[]
inboxItems IiosInboxItem[]
supportQueues IiosSupportQueue[]
tickets IiosTicket[]
callbacks IiosCallbackRequest[]
notificationSubscriptions IiosNotificationSubscription[]
messageTemplates IiosMessageTemplate[]
@@index([orgId, appId, tenantId])
}
@@ -348,6 +358,7 @@ model IiosActorRef {
threadsCreated IiosThread[] @relation("ThreadCreatedBy")
participations IiosThreadParticipant[]
interactions IiosInteraction[]
annotations IiosInteractionAnnotation[]
receipts IiosMessageReceipt[]
unreadCounters IiosUnreadCounter[]
inboxItemsOwned IiosInboxItem[]
@@ -355,6 +366,7 @@ model IiosActorRef {
ticketsRequested IiosTicket[] @relation("TicketRequester")
ticketsAssigned IiosTicket[] @relation("TicketAssignee")
callbacksRequested IiosCallbackRequest[]
notificationSubscriptions IiosNotificationSubscription[]
}
/// A configured channel surface (PORTAL in P1).
@@ -409,12 +421,32 @@ model IiosThreadParticipant {
actorId String
actor IiosActorRef @relation(fields: [actorId], references: [id])
participantRole String @default("MEMBER")
muted Boolean @default(false)
joinedAt DateTime @default(now())
leftAt DateTime?
@@id([threadId, actorId])
}
/// A device/browser push subscription for an actor (Web Push endpoint + keys).
/// The notification engine delivers to these when the actor is absent.
model IiosNotificationSubscription {
id String @id @default(cuid())
scopeId String
scope IiosScope @relation(fields: [scopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
actorId String
actor IiosActorRef @relation(fields: [actorId], references: [id])
kind String @default("webpush")
endpoint String @unique
p256dh String
auth String
userAgent String?
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
lastSeenAt DateTime @default(now())
@@index([actorId])
}
/// The semantic envelope. Idempotent per (scope, idempotencyKey).
model IiosInteraction {
id String @id @default(cuid())
@@ -444,6 +476,7 @@ model IiosInteraction {
parts IiosMessagePart[]
receipts IiosMessageReceipt[]
annotations IiosInteractionAnnotation[]
inboxItems IiosInboxItem[]
ticketsCreatedFrom IiosTicket[]
@@ -451,6 +484,26 @@ model IiosInteraction {
@@index([threadId, occurredAt])
}
/// A generic annotation an actor attaches to an interaction. Both `annotationType`
/// and `value` are OPAQUE, app-supplied strings the kernel stores and aggregates
/// but never interprets — e.g. the chat app writes type "reaction" / value "👍".
/// The same primitive backs pins, saves, flags, tags later. No chat vocabulary here.
model IiosInteractionAnnotation {
id String @id @default(cuid())
scopeId String
scope IiosScope @relation(fields: [scopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
targetInteractionId String
target IiosInteraction @relation(fields: [targetInteractionId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
actorId String
actor IiosActorRef @relation(fields: [actorId], references: [id])
annotationType String
value String
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@unique([scopeId, targetInteractionId, actorId, annotationType, value])
@@index([targetInteractionId])
}
model IiosMessagePart {
id String @id @default(cuid())
interactionId String
@@ -631,6 +684,33 @@ model IiosInboxItem {
@@index([ownerActorId, state, priority])
}
/// A reusable message template (email/SMS/in-app). DB is runtime truth; platform defaults are
/// seeded from repo files on boot. Versions are immutable — a change writes a new (higher) version,
/// never edits in place, so a rendered send can always be traced to the exact source it used.
/// scopeId NULL = a platform default; set = a tenant scope's override of the same key. Resolution
/// prefers the scoped row, else the global default. (The global-uniqueness of NULL-scope rows is
/// enforced by a partial unique index added in the migration — Postgres treats NULL as distinct.)
model IiosMessageTemplate {
id String @id @default(cuid())
scopeId String?
scope IiosScope? @relation(fields: [scopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
key String
channel IiosTemplateChannel
locale String @default("en")
version Int @default(1)
subject String?
bodyHtml String?
bodyText String?
/// Declared variable names — render throws if a declared var is missing (fail loud).
variables Json?
active Boolean @default(true)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
@@unique([scopeId, key, channel, locale, version])
@@index([key, channel, locale, active])
}
/// Audit trail of inbox-item state transitions.
model IiosInboxItemStateHistory {
id String @id @default(cuid())
@@ -788,6 +868,11 @@ model IiosOutboundCommand {
idempotencyKey String @unique
providerRef String?
consentReceiptRef String? // CMP consent receipt this send went out under (P9)
// Template provenance (which source produced this send) — null for non-templated sends.
templateKey String?
templateVersion Int?
templateLocale String?
renderedHash String? // sha256 of the rendered content, for replay/audit
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
attempts IiosDeliveryAttempt[]
@@ -1275,3 +1360,31 @@ model IiosDlqItem {
@@unique([consumerName, sourceId])
@@index([scopeId, status])
}
// ─── Trust plane (July 12) — context attestation ──────────────────
// Registered clients/BFFs/adapters allowed to call IIOS and attest context on
// behalf of an app. A valid actor token is NOT enough; the caller must present a
// context attestation signed by one of these registered clients.
model IiosClientRegistry {
clientId String @id
clientType String // APPSHELL | SUPPORT_BFF | ADAPTER | CALENDAR | SERVICE
ownerService String?
allowedAppIds String[] // which app_ids this client may attest for
attestSecret String? // dev: shared HS256 signing key (AppShell's key stand-in)
jwksUri String? // prod: verify the attestation signature via JWKS
spiffeId String? // prod: workload identity for mTLS proof
status String @default("ACTIVE") // ACTIVE | DISABLED
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
}
// Single-use nonce ledger: once a context attestation's nonce is seen it can
// never be replayed. Reserve-if-absent (unique PK) makes the check atomic.
model IiosAttestationNonce {
nonce String @id
clientId String
expiresAt DateTime
firstSeenAt DateTime @default(now())
@@index([expiresAt])
}
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
// v1.1 smoke: dev IdP login, policy-enforced DM cap / group membership, listThreads,
// and threaded replies — all over REST. Requires the service with IIOS_DEV_TOKENS=1.
import 'dotenv/config';
const SERVICE = process.env.SMOKE_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3200';
const assert = (c, m) => { if (!c) { console.error('✗', m); process.exit(1); } console.log('✓', m); };
async function login(username, password) {
const r = await fetch(`${SERVICE}/v1/dev/login`, {
method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ username, password }),
});
return { status: r.status, body: r.ok ? await r.json() : null };
}
function call(token, path, method = 'GET', body) {
return fetch(`${SERVICE}${path}`, {
method,
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
});
}
async function json(token, path, method = 'GET', body) {
const r = await call(token, path, method, body);
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`${method} ${path} ${r.status}: ${await r.text()}`);
return r.json();
}
// 1) dev IdP: correct password issues a token; wrong password is rejected.
const ok = await login('alice', 'alice');
assert(ok.body?.token, 'dev IdP: alice logs in with password');
const bad = await login('alice', 'nope');
assert(bad.status === 401, 'dev IdP: wrong password → 401');
const alice = ok.body.token;
// 2) DM is capped at two (policy).
const dm = await json(alice, '/v1/threads', 'POST', { membership: 'dm' });
assert(dm.threadId, `alice created a DM (${dm.threadId})`);
const add2 = await json(alice, `/v1/threads/${dm.threadId}/participants`, 'POST', { userId: 'bob' });
assert(add2.participantCount === 2, 'added bob → 2 participants');
const add3 = await call(alice, `/v1/threads/${dm.threadId}/participants`, 'POST', { userId: 'carol' });
assert(add3.status === 403, `adding a 3rd to a DM → 403 policy denied (${add3.status})`);
// 3) group: creator (ADMIN) can add several.
const grp = await json(alice, '/v1/threads', 'POST', { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await json(alice, `/v1/threads/${grp.threadId}/participants`, 'POST', { userId: 'bob' });
const g3 = await json(alice, `/v1/threads/${grp.threadId}/participants`, 'POST', { userId: 'carol' });
assert(g3.participantCount === 3, 'group admin added bob + carol → 3 participants');
// 4) threaded reply round-trips.
const first = await json(alice, `/v1/threads/${grp.threadId}/messages`, 'POST', { content: 'question?' });
const reply = await json(alice, `/v1/threads/${grp.threadId}/messages`, 'POST', { content: 'answer', parentInteractionId: first.id });
assert(reply.parentInteractionId === first.id, 'a reply carries parentInteractionId');
// 5) listThreads shows the caller's threads with membership + last message.
const mine = await json(alice, '/v1/threads');
const g = mine.find((t) => t.threadId === grp.threadId);
assert(g && g.membership === 'group' && g.participantCount === 3, 'GET /v1/threads lists the group with membership + count');
assert(g.lastMessage === 'answer', 'thread summary carries the last message');
console.log('\nv1.1 membership + replies smoke: PASS');
process.exit(0);
@@ -29,10 +29,12 @@ try {
await Promise.all([once(alice, 'connect'), once(bob, 'connect')]);
assert(true, `Alice connected to A (${A_URL}), Bob to B (${B_URL})`);
// Alice opens a thread on instance A; Bob joins the SAME thread on instance B.
// Alice opens a thread on instance A; membership is governed so Alice ADDS Bob, who
// then opens the SAME thread on instance B.
const opened = await alice.emitWithAck('open_thread', {});
const threadId = opened.threadId;
assert(!!threadId, `Alice opened thread ${threadId} on instance A`);
await alice.emitWithAck('add_participant', { threadId, userId: 'bob-cluster' });
await bob.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId });
assert(true, 'Bob joined the same thread on instance B');
@@ -44,10 +44,11 @@ const alice = connect('alice');
const bob = connect('bob');
try {
// Alice creates a thread; Bob joins it.
// Alice creates a thread; membership is governed, so Alice ADDS Bob (he can't self-join).
const opened = await alice.emitWithAck('open_thread', {});
const threadId = opened.threadId;
assert(!!threadId, `Alice created thread ${threadId}`);
await alice.emitWithAck('add_participant', { threadId, userId: 'bob' });
await bob.emitWithAck('open_thread', { threadId });
// Alice sends; Bob should receive it live.
@@ -34,8 +34,18 @@ export class OutboundService {
idempotencyKey?: string,
scopeId?: string,
purpose?: string,
/** Opaque template provenance recorded on the command. OutboundService neither renders nor
* resolves templates it only persists the four strings it is handed (guaranteed by the
* templated sender, never by caller convention). */
provenance?: { templateKey?: string | null; templateVersion?: number | null; templateLocale?: string | null; renderedHash?: string | null },
) {
const key = idempotencyKey ?? randomUUID();
const prov = {
templateKey: provenance?.templateKey ?? null,
templateVersion: provenance?.templateVersion ?? null,
templateLocale: provenance?.templateLocale ?? null,
renderedHash: provenance?.renderedHash ?? null,
};
// The actual send. The inner findUnique stays as a backstop so a FAILED-then-retried
// command returns the existing row instead of colliding on idempotencyKey @unique.
@@ -46,14 +56,14 @@ export class OutboundService {
// Per-target rate limit AND per-tenant quota (a noisy tenant can't starve shared egress).
if (!(await this.allow(channelType, target)) || !(await this.allowTenant(scopeId))) {
const cmd = await this.prisma.iiosOutboundCommand.create({
data: { channelType, target, scopeId, payload: payload as Prisma.InputJsonValue, status: 'RATE_LIMITED', idempotencyKey: key },
data: { channelType, target, scopeId, payload: payload as Prisma.InputJsonValue, status: 'RATE_LIMITED', idempotencyKey: key, ...prov },
});
await this.prisma.iiosDeliveryAttempt.create({ data: { commandId: cmd.id, attemptNo: 1, status: 'RATE_LIMITED' } });
return cmd;
}
const cmd = await this.prisma.iiosOutboundCommand.create({
data: { channelType, target, scopeId, payload: payload as Prisma.InputJsonValue, status: 'PENDING', idempotencyKey: key },
data: { channelType, target, scopeId, payload: payload as Prisma.InputJsonValue, status: 'PENDING', idempotencyKey: key, ...prov },
});
let result;
+10
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PrismaModule } from './prisma/prisma.module';
import { PlatformModule } from './platform/platform.module';
import { AttestationModule } from './platform/attestation.module';
import { IdentityModule } from './identity/identity.module';
import { InteractionsModule } from './interactions/interactions.module';
import { IdempotencyModule } from './idempotency/idempotency.module';
@@ -9,6 +10,10 @@ import { OutboxModule } from './outbox/outbox.module';
import { ThreadsModule } from './threads/threads.module';
import { MessageModule } from './messaging/message.module';
import { InboxModule } from './inbox/inbox.module';
import { TemplateModule } from './templates/template.module';
import { MailModule } from './mail/mail.module';
import { MediaModule } from './media/media.module';
import { NotificationModule } from './notifications/notification.module';
import { SupportModule } from './support/support.module';
import { AdaptersModule } from './adapters/adapters.module';
import { RoutingModule } from './routing/routing.module';
@@ -25,6 +30,7 @@ import { DevController } from './dev/dev.controller';
imports: [
PrismaModule,
PlatformModule,
AttestationModule,
IdentityModule,
InteractionsModule,
IdempotencyModule,
@@ -33,6 +39,10 @@ import { DevController } from './dev/dev.controller';
ThreadsModule,
MessageModule,
InboxModule,
TemplateModule,
MailModule,
MediaModule,
NotificationModule,
SupportModule,
AdaptersModule,
RoutingModule,
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { MediaModule } from '../media/media.module';
import { CapabilityProviderRegistry } from './capability.registry';
import { CapabilityBroker } from './capability.broker';
@@ -8,6 +9,7 @@ import { CapabilityBroker } from './capability.broker';
* provider. PLATFORM_PORTS (for the opa gate) comes from the @Global PlatformModule.
*/
@Module({
imports: [MediaModule],
providers: [CapabilityProviderRegistry, CapabilityBroker],
exports: [CapabilityBroker, CapabilityProviderRegistry],
})
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { CapabilityProviderRegistry } from './capability.registry';
// The registry reads env in its constructor, so each case sets env → constructs a fresh registry →
// asserts → restores env.
const SMTP_KEYS = ['IIOS_SMTP_HOST', 'IIOS_SMTP_USER', 'IIOS_SMTP_PASS', 'IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL'];
const saved: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
function set(env: Record<string, string | undefined>) {
for (const k of SMTP_KEYS) { saved[k] = process.env[k]; delete process.env[k]; }
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(env)) if (v != null) process.env[k] = v;
}
afterEach(() => { for (const k of SMTP_KEYS) { if (saved[k] == null) delete process.env[k]; else process.env[k] = saved[k]; } });
describe('CapabilityProviderRegistry — EMAIL precedence (SMTP > HTTP > sandbox)', () => {
it('binds SMTP for EMAIL when the SMTP env trio is set', () => {
set({ IIOS_SMTP_HOST: 'smtp.test', IIOS_SMTP_USER: 'accounts@x', IIOS_SMTP_PASS: 'p' });
expect(new CapabilityProviderRegistry().forChannel('EMAIL').name).toBe('smtp');
});
it('binds the HTTP EmailProvider when only IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL is set', () => {
set({ IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL: 'https://relay.test/send' });
expect(new CapabilityProviderRegistry().forChannel('EMAIL').name).toBe('email-http');
});
it('SMTP wins over the HTTP relay when both are set', () => {
set({ IIOS_SMTP_HOST: 'smtp.test', IIOS_SMTP_USER: 'accounts@x', IIOS_SMTP_PASS: 'p', IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_EMAIL: 'https://relay.test/send' });
expect(new CapabilityProviderRegistry().forChannel('EMAIL').name).toBe('smtp');
});
it('falls back to the sandbox when neither is configured', () => {
set({});
expect(new CapabilityProviderRegistry().forChannel('EMAIL').name).toBe('sandbox');
});
});
@@ -1,22 +1,27 @@
import { Injectable, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Inject, Injectable, NotFoundException, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { CapabilityProvider } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { SandboxProvider } from './sandbox.provider';
import { HttpProvider } from './http.provider';
import { EmailProvider } from './email.provider';
import { SmtpProvider, smtpFallbackFromEnv, smtpIdentityFromEnv, storageResolver } from './smtp.provider';
import { STORAGE_PORT, type StoragePort } from '../media/storage.port';
const DEFAULT_CHANNELS = ['WEBHOOK', 'EMAIL', 'WHATSAPP', 'PORTAL'];
const DEFAULT_CHANNELS = ['WEBHOOK', 'EMAIL', 'SMS', 'WHATSAPP', 'PORTAL'];
/**
* Maps a channelType to the provider that executes egress for it. Sandbox by
* default; if `IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_<CHANNELTYPE>` is set, a real HttpProvider
* overrides the sandbox for that channel (the "flip the binding" swap). Unknown
* channels fail closed no silent egress path.
*
* Precedence is registration ORDER (register() does Map.set last wins). For EMAIL:
* sandbox HTTP EmailProvider (if URL set) SMTP (if SMTP env set), so SMTP > HTTP > sandbox.
*/
@Injectable()
export class CapabilityProviderRegistry {
private readonly byChannel = new Map<string, CapabilityProvider>();
constructor() {
constructor(@Optional() @Inject(STORAGE_PORT) private readonly storage?: StoragePort) {
for (const ch of DEFAULT_CHANNELS) this.register(new SandboxProvider([ch]));
for (const ch of DEFAULT_CHANNELS) {
const url = process.env[`IIOS_PROVIDER_URL_${ch}`];
@@ -24,6 +29,13 @@ export class CapabilityProviderRegistry {
// EMAIL gets an email-shaped envelope provider; other channels use the generic HTTP one.
this.register(ch === 'EMAIL' ? new EmailProvider(url) : new HttpProvider(ch, url));
}
// Real SMTP for EMAIL wins over the HTTP relay when configured (registered last). Attachments
// resolve through the media StoragePort when one is bound (else attachments FAIL closed).
const smtp = smtpIdentityFromEnv();
if (smtp) {
const resolver = this.storage ? storageResolver(this.storage) : undefined;
this.register(new SmtpProvider(smtp, smtpFallbackFromEnv() ?? undefined, undefined, resolver));
}
}
register(provider: CapabilityProvider): void {
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { SmtpProvider, smtpIdentityFromEnv, smtpFallbackFromEnv, storageResolver, type MailTransport, type SmtpIdentity } from './smtp.provider';
import type { CapabilityRequest } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
const ID: SmtpIdentity = { host: 'smtp.test', port: 587, secure: false, user: 'accounts@lynkeduppro.com', pass: 'p', from: 'accounts@lynkeduppro.com' };
const FB: SmtpIdentity = { ...ID, user: 'ceo@lynkeduppro.com', from: 'Justin <ceo@lynkeduppro.com>' };
const req = (payload: Record<string, unknown>): CapabilityRequest => ({
capability: 'channel.send', channelType: 'EMAIL', target: 'dana@acme.com', payload, idempotencyKey: 'k1',
});
/** A recording transport; optionally throws a given error on send. */
function stub(opts: { throwErr?: unknown; messageId?: string } = {}) {
const calls: Array<{ id: SmtpIdentity; mail: Parameters<MailTransport['sendMail']>[0] }> = [];
const make = (id: SmtpIdentity): MailTransport => ({
async sendMail(mail) {
calls.push({ id, mail });
if (opts.throwErr) throw opts.throwErr;
return { messageId: opts.messageId ?? '<generated@smtp.test>' };
},
});
return { make, calls };
}
describe('smtpIdentityFromEnv', () => {
const base = { IIOS_SMTP_HOST: 'smtp.test', IIOS_SMTP_USER: 'accounts@x', IIOS_SMTP_PASS: 'p' };
it('builds the identity from a complete env trio (defaults port 587, secure false)', () => {
const id = smtpIdentityFromEnv({ ...base } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv);
expect(id).toMatchObject({ host: 'smtp.test', port: 587, secure: false, user: 'accounts@x', from: 'accounts@x' });
});
it('returns null when the trio is incomplete', () => {
expect(smtpIdentityFromEnv({ IIOS_SMTP_HOST: 'smtp.test', IIOS_SMTP_USER: 'a@x' } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv)).toBeNull();
});
it('reads the fallback identity, reusing the primary host', () => {
const fb = smtpFallbackFromEnv({ ...base, IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_USER: 'ceo@x', IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_PASS: 'q', IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_FROM: 'CEO <ceo@x>' } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv);
expect(fb).toMatchObject({ host: 'smtp.test', user: 'ceo@x', from: 'CEO <ceo@x>' });
});
it('returns null fallback when not configured', () => {
expect(smtpFallbackFromEnv({ ...base } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('SmtpProvider.send — envelope', () => {
it('maps target + payload into the mail and returns the messageId as providerRef', async () => {
const t = stub({ messageId: '<abc@smtp.test>' });
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make).send(req({ subject: 'Hi Dana', html: '<p>x</p>', text: 'x' }));
expect(res).toMatchObject({ outcome: 'SENT', providerRef: '<abc@smtp.test>' });
expect(t.calls[0].mail).toMatchObject({ from: 'accounts@lynkeduppro.com', to: 'dana@acme.com', subject: 'Hi Dana', html: '<p>x</p>', text: 'x' });
});
it('sets In-Reply-To + References headers for a reply', async () => {
const t = stub();
await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make).send(req({ subject: 're', inReplyTo: '<parent@smtp.test>' }));
expect(t.calls[0].mail).toMatchObject({ inReplyTo: '<parent@smtp.test>', references: '<parent@smtp.test>' });
});
});
describe('SmtpProvider.send — failure + fallback', () => {
it('retries via the fallback identity on a pre-acceptance failure (SENT via fallback)', async () => {
// primary throws ECONNREFUSED (server never accepted) → fallback used.
const primaryThrows = { make: (id: SmtpIdentity): MailTransport => ({
async sendMail(mail) {
if (id.user === ID.user) throw Object.assign(new Error('refused'), { code: 'ECONNREFUSED' });
return { messageId: '<viaFallback@smtp.test>' };
},
}) };
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, FB, primaryThrows.make).send(req({ subject: 'x' }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('SENT');
expect(res.providerRef).toBe('fallback:<viaFallback@smtp.test>');
});
it('does NOT retry a post-acceptance failure (avoids double delivery) → FAILED', async () => {
// responseCode present = the server already spoke; retrying could double-send.
const t = stub({ throwErr: Object.assign(new Error('rejected after data'), { responseCode: 550 }) });
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, FB, t.make).send(req({ subject: 'x' }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('FAILED');
expect(t.calls).toHaveLength(1); // primary only — no fallback attempt
});
it('with no fallback, a failure is FAILED and never throws', async () => {
const t = stub({ throwErr: Object.assign(new Error('boom'), { code: 'ETIMEDOUT' }) });
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make).send(req({ subject: 'x' }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('FAILED');
expect(res.errorCode).toBe('ETIMEDOUT');
});
});
describe('SmtpProvider.send — attachments', () => {
const resolver = (map: Record<string, { content: Buffer; contentType?: string; filename?: string }>) =>
async (ref: string) => map[ref] ?? null;
it('resolves attachment refs to bytes and attaches them', async () => {
const t = stub();
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make, resolver({ 'obj/1': { content: Buffer.from('PDFDATA'), contentType: 'application/pdf' } }))
.send(req({ subject: 'Invoice', attachments: [{ filename: 'invoice.pdf', contentRef: 'obj/1', mimeType: 'application/pdf' }] }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('SENT');
expect(t.calls[0].mail.attachments).toEqual([{ filename: 'invoice.pdf', content: Buffer.from('PDFDATA'), contentType: 'application/pdf' }]);
});
it('FAILS closed when a declared attachment cannot be resolved (never sends without it)', async () => {
const t = stub();
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make, resolver({}))
.send(req({ subject: 'Invoice', attachments: [{ contentRef: 'missing' }] }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('FAILED');
expect(res.errorCode).toBe('ATTACHMENT_UNRESOLVED');
expect(t.calls).toHaveLength(0); // nothing sent
});
it('FAILS when attachments are requested but no resolver is wired', async () => {
const t = stub();
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make) // no resolver
.send(req({ subject: 'x', attachments: [{ contentRef: 'obj/1' }] }));
expect(res).toMatchObject({ outcome: 'FAILED', errorCode: 'NO_ATTACHMENT_RESOLVER' });
});
it('a plain send with no attachments is unaffected', async () => {
const t = stub();
const res = await new SmtpProvider(ID, undefined, t.make, resolver({})).send(req({ subject: 'x', text: 'y' }));
expect(res.outcome).toBe('SENT');
expect(t.calls[0].mail.attachments).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('storageResolver (media StoragePort → AttachmentResolver)', () => {
it('maps storage bytes into an attachment; missing ref → null', async () => {
const storage = { get: async (k: string) => (k === 'obj/1' ? { data: Buffer.from('X'), mime: 'application/pdf' } : null) };
const r = storageResolver(storage);
expect(await r('obj/1')).toEqual({ content: Buffer.from('X'), contentType: 'application/pdf' });
expect(await r('nope')).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { createTransport } from 'nodemailer';
import type { CapabilityProvider, CapabilityRequest, ProviderResult } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
/** One SMTP sending identity (a mailbox + how to reach its server). */
export interface SmtpIdentity {
host: string;
port: number;
secure: boolean;
user: string;
pass: string;
from: string;
}
export interface MailAttachment {
filename: string;
content: Buffer;
contentType?: string;
}
/** Fetch an attachment's bytes by its opaque contentRef (backed by the media StoragePort). */
export type AttachmentResolver = (contentRef: string) => Promise<{ filename?: string; content: Buffer; contentType?: string } | null>;
/** Build an AttachmentResolver over the media StoragePort (contentRef = the storage object key). */
export function storageResolver(storage: { get(key: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mime: string } | null> }): AttachmentResolver {
return async (contentRef) => {
const o = await storage.get(contentRef);
return o ? { content: o.data, contentType: o.mime } : null;
};
}
/** The subset of a mail transport this provider needs — lets tests inject a stub (no live server). */
export interface MailTransport {
sendMail(mail: {
from: string;
to: string;
subject?: string;
text?: string;
html?: string;
inReplyTo?: string;
references?: string;
attachments?: MailAttachment[];
}): Promise<{ messageId: string; accepted?: unknown[] }>;
}
const bool = (v: string | undefined): boolean => v === 'true' || v === '1';
/** Build the primary SMTP identity from env, or null if the required trio is incomplete. */
export function smtpIdentityFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): SmtpIdentity | null {
return identityFrom(env, '');
}
/** Build the optional fallback identity (accounts@ → ceo@), or null if not configured. */
export function smtpFallbackFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): SmtpIdentity | null {
const fb = identityFrom(env, 'FALLBACK_');
if (fb) return fb;
// Fallback may reuse the primary host/port and only override the mailbox identity.
const host = env.IIOS_SMTP_HOST;
const user = env.IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_USER;
const pass = env.IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_PASS;
if (!host || !user || !pass) return null;
return {
host,
port: Number(env.IIOS_SMTP_PORT ?? 587),
secure: bool(env.IIOS_SMTP_SECURE),
user,
pass,
from: env.IIOS_SMTP_FALLBACK_FROM ?? user,
};
}
function identityFrom(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, prefix: string): SmtpIdentity | null {
const host = env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}HOST`] ?? (prefix ? undefined : env.IIOS_SMTP_HOST);
const user = env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}USER`];
const pass = env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}PASS`];
if (!host || !user || !pass) return null;
return {
host,
port: Number(env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}PORT`] ?? env.IIOS_SMTP_PORT ?? 587),
secure: bool(env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}SECURE`] ?? env.IIOS_SMTP_SECURE),
user,
pass,
from: env[`IIOS_SMTP_${prefix}FROM`] ?? user,
};
}
interface EmailPayload {
subject?: string;
text?: string;
html?: string;
inReplyTo?: string;
/** Attachment REFS (not bytes) — resolved to bytes at send time via the injected resolver. */
attachments?: Array<{ filename?: string; contentRef: string; mimeType?: string }>;
}
/**
* SMTP egress provider (nodemailer). Bound for EMAIL when the SMTP env trio is set (else the sandbox
* stays). A transport failure surfaces as FAILED, never thrown. On a PRE-acceptance failure it retries
* once via the fallback identity (accounts@ ceo@); a post-acceptance failure is NOT retried, so a
* message the server already accepted can't be double-delivered.
*/
export class SmtpProvider implements CapabilityProvider {
readonly name = 'smtp';
readonly channelTypes = ['EMAIL'];
readonly capabilities = { canSend: true };
private readonly makeTransport: (id: SmtpIdentity) => MailTransport;
constructor(
private readonly primary: SmtpIdentity,
private readonly fallback?: SmtpIdentity,
makeTransport?: (id: SmtpIdentity) => MailTransport,
private readonly resolveAttachment?: AttachmentResolver,
) {
this.makeTransport = makeTransport ?? defaultTransport;
}
async send(req: CapabilityRequest): Promise<ProviderResult> {
const started = Date.now();
const p = (req.payload ?? {}) as EmailPayload;
// Resolve attachment bytes up front. Fail CLOSED — never send an invoice/receipt email missing
// its file; a FAILED command retries instead. Resolved once so a fallback retry doesn't re-fetch.
let attachments: MailAttachment[] | undefined;
if (p.attachments && p.attachments.length > 0) {
if (!this.resolveAttachment) return this.failed('NO_ATTACHMENT_RESOLVER', started);
const out: MailAttachment[] = [];
for (const a of p.attachments) {
const r = await this.resolveAttachment(a.contentRef).catch(() => null);
if (!r) return this.failed('ATTACHMENT_UNRESOLVED', started);
out.push({ filename: a.filename ?? r.filename ?? 'attachment', content: r.content, ...(a.mimeType ?? r.contentType ? { contentType: a.mimeType ?? r.contentType } : {}) });
}
attachments = out;
}
const attempt = async (id: SmtpIdentity): Promise<{ messageId: string }> =>
this.makeTransport(id).sendMail({
from: id.from,
to: req.target,
subject: p.subject ?? '(no subject)',
text: p.text,
html: p.html,
...(p.inReplyTo ? { inReplyTo: p.inReplyTo, references: p.inReplyTo } : {}),
...(attachments ? { attachments } : {}),
});
try {
const info = await attempt(this.primary);
return { providerRef: info.messageId, outcome: 'SENT', latencyMs: Date.now() - started };
} catch (err) {
// Retry via the fallback identity ONLY if the primary never got the message accepted.
if (this.fallback && isPreAcceptanceFailure(err)) {
try {
const info = await attempt(this.fallback);
return { providerRef: `fallback:${info.messageId}`, outcome: 'SENT', latencyMs: Date.now() - started };
} catch (err2) {
return { providerRef: `smtp-error-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`, outcome: 'FAILED', errorCode: codeOf(err2), latencyMs: Date.now() - started };
}
}
return { providerRef: `smtp-error-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`, outcome: 'FAILED', errorCode: codeOf(err), latencyMs: Date.now() - started };
}
}
private failed(errorCode: string, started: number): ProviderResult {
return { providerRef: `smtp-error-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`, outcome: 'FAILED', errorCode, latencyMs: Date.now() - started };
}
}
/** True for connect/auth/timeout errors (server never accepted); false once the server responded 2xx. */
function isPreAcceptanceFailure(err: unknown): boolean {
const e = err as { code?: string; responseCode?: number };
const preCodes = ['ECONNECTION', 'ETIMEDOUT', 'ECONNREFUSED', 'EDNS', 'EAUTH', 'ESOCKET', 'EENVELOPE'];
if (e.code && preCodes.includes(e.code)) return true;
// A responseCode present means the server spoke — treat 5xx after acceptance as terminal (no retry).
return e.responseCode == null && e.code == null;
}
function codeOf(err: unknown): string {
const e = err as { code?: string; message?: string };
return (e.code ?? e.message ?? 'SMTP_ERROR').slice(0, 60);
}
function defaultTransport(id: SmtpIdentity): MailTransport {
return createTransport({ host: id.host, port: id.port, secure: id.secure, auth: { user: id.user, pass: id.pass } }) as unknown as MailTransport;
}
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { BadRequestException, Body, Controller, ForbiddenException, Headers, Param, Post } from '@nestjs/common';
import { BadRequestException, Body, Controller, ForbiddenException, Get, Headers, Param, Post, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { IIOS_EVENTS } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { hmacSign } from '@insignia/iios-adapter-sdk';
@@ -27,20 +27,58 @@ export class DevController {
@Post('token')
token(@Body() body: { appId: string; userId: string; name?: string; orgId?: string }): { token: string } {
this.assertDev();
return { token: this.signToken(body.appId, body.userId, body.name, body.orgId) };
}
/**
* Dev IdP: a credentialed login that mints the SAME JWT claims a real IdP / Session
* Broker would issue (sub/name/appId/orgId). Credentials come from DEV_USERS (JSON
* `{username: password}`; defaults to a few demo users). SessionVerifier is the stable
* verify seam swapping in a real IdP means issuing these same claims, nothing else.
*/
@Post('login')
login(@Body() body: { username: string; password: string; appId?: string }): { token: string; userId: string } {
this.assertDev();
const appId = body.appId ?? 'portal-demo';
let users: Record<string, string>;
try {
users = JSON.parse(process.env.DEV_USERS ?? '{"alice":"alice","bob":"bob","carol":"carol"}');
} catch {
users = {};
}
const expected = users[body.username];
if (expected === undefined || expected !== body.password) throw new UnauthorizedException('invalid username or password');
return { token: this.signToken(appId, body.username, body.username), userId: body.username };
}
/** Dev directory: the known dev usernames (from DEV_USERS). A real app validates
* add-by-username against its user store / the MDM port; this stands in for it. */
@Get('users')
users(): { users: string[] } {
this.assertDev();
let map: Record<string, string>;
try {
map = JSON.parse(process.env.DEV_USERS ?? '{"alice":"alice","bob":"bob","carol":"carol"}');
} catch {
map = {};
}
return { users: Object.keys(map) };
}
private signToken(appId: string, userId: string, name?: string, orgId?: string): string {
let secrets: Record<string, string>;
try {
secrets = JSON.parse(process.env.APP_SECRETS ?? '{}');
} catch {
secrets = {};
}
const secret = secrets[body.appId];
if (!secret) throw new BadRequestException(`unknown app: ${body.appId}`);
const token = jwt.sign(
{ sub: body.userId, name: body.name ?? body.userId, appId: body.appId, orgId: body.orgId ?? `org_${body.appId}` },
const secret = secrets[appId];
if (!secret) throw new BadRequestException(`unknown app: ${appId}`);
return jwt.sign(
{ sub: userId, name: name ?? userId, appId, orgId: orgId ?? `org_${appId}` },
secret,
{ algorithm: 'HS256', expiresIn: '2h' },
);
return { token };
}
/** Server signs a sample provider payload and feeds it to the inbound pipeline. */
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ export interface MessagePrincipal {
appId: string;
tenantId?: string;
displayName?: string;
/** The token's audience (`aud`). Used to enforce realtime delegation: a socket-scoped
* token (`iios-message`) must not be a full REST/actor token (`iios-core`), and vice-versa. */
audience?: string;
}
/**
@@ -68,10 +71,10 @@ export class ActorResolver {
);
}
async ensureParticipant(threadId: string, actorId: string): Promise<void> {
async ensureParticipant(threadId: string, actorId: string, participantRole = 'MEMBER'): Promise<void> {
await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.upsert({
where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId } },
create: { threadId, actorId },
create: { threadId, actorId, participantRole },
update: {},
});
}
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ interface MessageSentData {
interactionId: string;
threadId: string;
senderActorId: string;
mentions?: string[]; // opaque app notify-list (userIds); the kernel never parses "@"
}
interface MessageReadData {
threadId: string;
@@ -57,6 +58,60 @@ export class InboxProjector implements OnModuleInit {
if (p.actorId === data.senderActorId) continue;
await this.upsertNeedsReply(thread.scopeId, p.actorId, data.threadId, data.interactionId, traceId, thread.subject);
}
// Targeted mention notifications from the app-supplied opaque notify-list.
const mentions = data.mentions ?? [];
if (mentions.length > 0) {
const src = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { id: data.interactionId },
include: { parts: { where: { kind: 'TEXT' }, take: 1 }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
const senderName = src?.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? 'Someone';
const text = src?.parts[0]?.bodyText ?? undefined;
for (const userId of mentions) {
await this.createMention(thread.scopeId, userId, data.threadId, data.interactionId, data.senderActorId, senderName, text, traceId);
}
}
}
/** One MENTION item per (owner, source message) for a mentioned participant (never the sender). */
private async createMention(
scopeId: string,
userId: string,
threadId: string,
sourceInteractionId: string,
senderActorId: string,
senderName: string,
summary: string | undefined,
traceId: string | undefined,
): Promise<void> {
const handle = await this.prisma.iiosSourceHandle.findUnique({
where: { scopeId_kind_externalId: { scopeId, kind: 'PORTAL_USER', externalId: userId } },
});
if (!handle) return;
const actor = await this.prisma.iiosActorRef.findFirst({ where: { sourceHandleId: handle.id } });
if (!actor || actor.id === senderActorId) return; // resolvable, and never notify the sender
const isMember = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: actor.id } } });
if (!isMember) return; // only thread participants get mention items
const existing = await this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.findFirst({ where: { ownerActorId: actor.id, sourceInteractionId, kind: 'MENTION' } });
if (existing) return; // idempotent per source message
const item = await this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.create({
data: {
scopeId,
ownerActorId: actor.id,
kind: 'MENTION',
title: `${senderName} mentioned you`,
summary,
priority: 'HIGH',
threadId,
sourceInteractionId,
traceId,
},
});
await this.prisma.iiosInboxItemStateHistory.create({
data: { inboxItemId: item.id, toState: 'OPEN', reasonCode: 'mentioned' },
});
}
async onMessageRead(event: CloudEvent): Promise<void> {
@@ -67,21 +122,24 @@ export class InboxProjector implements OnModuleInit {
private async applyMessageRead(event: CloudEvent): Promise<void> {
const data = event.data as MessageReadData;
const item = await this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.findFirst({
// Reading the thread clears the reader's activity AND mention items for it.
const items = await this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.findMany({
where: {
threadId: data.threadId,
ownerActorId: data.actorId,
kind: 'NEEDS_REPLY',
kind: { in: ['NEEDS_REPLY', 'MENTION'] },
state: { in: ['OPEN', 'SNOOZED'] },
},
});
if (!item) return;
await this.prisma.$transaction([
this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.update({ where: { id: item.id }, data: { state: 'DONE' } }),
this.prisma.iiosInboxItemStateHistory.create({
data: { inboxItemId: item.id, fromState: item.state, toState: 'DONE', reasonCode: 'message_read' },
}),
]);
if (items.length === 0) return;
await this.prisma.$transaction(
items.flatMap((item) => [
this.prisma.iiosInboxItem.update({ where: { id: item.id }, data: { state: 'DONE' } }),
this.prisma.iiosInboxItemStateHistory.create({
data: { inboxItemId: item.id, fromState: item.state, toState: 'DONE', reasonCode: 'message_read' },
}),
]),
);
}
private async upsertNeedsReply(
@@ -88,6 +88,38 @@ describe('InboxProjector (P3 work surface)', () => {
expect(await itemsFor('bob')).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('message.sent with mentions → a MENTION item for the mentioned participant only', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'carol');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hey @bob look' }, 'k1', undefined, undefined, ['bob']);
await projector().onMessageSent((await eventsOf(IIOS_EVENTS.messageSent))[0]!);
const bobMentions = (await itemsFor('bob')).filter((i) => i.kind === 'MENTION');
expect(bobMentions).toHaveLength(1);
expect(bobMentions[0]?.state).toBe('OPEN');
expect(bobMentions[0]?.sourceInteractionId).toBeTruthy();
expect((await itemsFor('carol')).filter((i) => i.kind === 'MENTION')).toHaveLength(0); // not mentioned
expect((await itemsFor('alice')).filter((i) => i.kind === 'MENTION')).toHaveLength(0); // never the sender
});
it('reading the thread resolves the readers MENTION item to DONE', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
const sent = await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: '@bob ping' }, 'k1', undefined, undefined, ['bob']);
const proj = projector();
await proj.onMessageSent((await eventsOf(IIOS_EVENTS.messageSent))[0]!);
expect((await itemsFor('bob')).filter((i) => i.kind === 'MENTION')[0]?.state).toBe('OPEN');
await m.markRead(threadId, bob, sent.id);
await proj.onMessageRead((await eventsOf(IIOS_EVENTS.messageRead))[0]!);
expect((await itemsFor('bob')).filter((i) => i.kind === 'MENTION')[0]?.state).toBe('DONE');
});
it('message.read → the recipient item goes DONE', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice);
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { Type } from 'class-transformer';
import {
IsArray,
IsInt,
IsISO8601,
IsObject,
IsOptional,
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ class PartDto {
@IsOptional() @IsString() bodyText?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsString() contentRef?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsString() mimeType?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsInt() sizeBytes?: number;
}
/** Validates the POST /v1/interactions/ingest body (conforms to IngestInteractionRequest). */
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ export class IngestService {
bodyText: p.bodyText,
contentRef: p.contentRef,
mimeType: p.mimeType,
sizeBytes: p.sizeBytes != null ? BigInt(p.sizeBytes) : undefined,
})),
});
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
import { BadRequestException, Body, Controller, Headers, Post } from '@nestjs/common';
import { SessionVerifier } from '../platform/session.verifier';
import type { MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { MailService } from './mail.service';
import { MailInternalDto, MailSendDto } from './mail.dto';
import type { TemplateSource } from '../templates/template.model';
@Controller('v1/mail')
export class MailController {
constructor(
private readonly mail: MailService,
private readonly session: SessionVerifier,
) {}
/** App-to-app mail — renders a template and posts it into the recipient's in-app inbox (no SMTP). */
@Post('internal')
async internal(@Body() body: MailInternalDto, @Headers('authorization') authorization?: string) {
const principal = this.principal(authorization);
return this.mail.postInternal(principal, {
source: this.source(body),
recipientUserId: body.recipientUserId,
vars: body.vars ?? {},
...(body.locale ? { locale: body.locale } : {}),
idempotencyKey: body.idempotencyKey,
...(body.attachments && body.attachments.length > 0 ? { attachments: body.attachments } : {}),
});
}
/** External email (SMTP) + an in-app mirror when a registered recipient is named. */
@Post('send')
async send(@Body() body: MailSendDto, @Headers('authorization') authorization?: string) {
const principal = this.principal(authorization);
return this.mail.sendExternalWithMirror(principal, {
source: this.source(body),
target: body.target,
vars: body.vars ?? {},
...(body.locale ? { locale: body.locale } : {}),
idempotencyKey: body.idempotencyKey,
...(body.purpose ? { purpose: body.purpose } : {}),
...(body.attachments && body.attachments.length > 0 ? { attachments: body.attachments } : {}),
...(body.mirrorToUserId ? { mirrorToUserId: body.mirrorToUserId } : {}),
});
}
private source(body: { key?: string; version?: number; inline?: { subject?: string; html?: string; text?: string; variables?: string[] } }): TemplateSource {
if (body.inline && body.key) throw new BadRequestException('provide either "key" or "inline", not both');
if (body.inline) return { inline: body.inline };
if (body.key) return body.version != null ? { key: body.key, version: body.version } : { key: body.key };
throw new BadRequestException('one of "key" or "inline" is required');
}
private principal(authorization?: string): MessagePrincipal {
const token = (authorization ?? '').replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, '');
if (!token) throw new BadRequestException('Authorization bearer token is required');
return this.session.verify(token);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
import { Type } from 'class-transformer';
import { IsArray, IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsObject, IsOptional, IsString, ValidateNested } from 'class-validator';
import { InlineTemplateDto } from '../templates/template.dto';
/** An email attachment reference — bytes live in the media store under `contentRef`. */
export class AttachmentDto {
@IsOptional() @IsString() filename?: string;
@IsString() @IsNotEmpty() contentRef!: string;
@IsOptional() @IsString() mimeType?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsInt() sizeBytes?: number;
}
/** POST /v1/mail/internal — app-to-app mail (no SMTP). Provide EITHER `key` OR `inline`. */
export class MailInternalDto {
@IsOptional() @IsString() @IsNotEmpty() key?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsInt() version?: number;
@IsOptional() @ValidateNested() @Type(() => InlineTemplateDto) inline?: InlineTemplateDto;
@IsString() @IsNotEmpty() recipientUserId!: string;
@IsOptional() @IsObject() vars?: Record<string, unknown>;
@IsOptional() @IsString() locale?: string;
@IsString() @IsNotEmpty() idempotencyKey!: string;
/** In-app attachment refs — stored as message parts so the recipient's inbox can render them. */
@IsOptional() @IsArray() @ValidateNested({ each: true }) @Type(() => AttachmentDto) attachments?: AttachmentDto[];
}
/** POST /v1/mail/send — external email via SMTP + optional in-app mirror for a registered recipient. */
export class MailSendDto {
@IsOptional() @IsString() @IsNotEmpty() key?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsInt() version?: number;
@IsOptional() @ValidateNested() @Type(() => InlineTemplateDto) inline?: InlineTemplateDto;
@IsString() @IsNotEmpty() target!: string;
@IsOptional() @IsObject() vars?: Record<string, unknown>;
@IsOptional() @IsString() locale?: string;
@IsString() @IsNotEmpty() idempotencyKey!: string;
@IsOptional() @IsString() purpose?: string;
@IsOptional() @IsArray() @ValidateNested({ each: true }) @Type(() => AttachmentDto) attachments?: AttachmentDto[];
/** The registered recipient to mirror to; omit for a pre-registration send (email only). */
@IsOptional() @IsString() mirrorToUserId?: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { TemplateModule } from '../templates/template.module';
import { InteractionsModule } from '../interactions/interactions.module';
import { MailService } from './mail.service';
import { MailController } from './mail.controller';
/**
* Mail orchestration: render a template (TemplateModule) deliver it either app-to-app (an EMAIL
* interaction via IngestService) or externally (TemplatedSender/SMTP) with an in-app mirror.
* SessionVerifier + ActorResolver are global.
*/
@Module({
imports: [TemplateModule, InteractionsModule],
controllers: [MailController],
providers: [MailService],
exports: [MailService],
})
export class MailModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { makeFakePorts } from '@insignia/iios-testkit';
import { resetDb } from '../test-utils/reset-db';
import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { IngestService } from '../interactions/ingest.service';
import { MessageService } from '../messaging/message.service';
import { OutboundService } from '../adapters/outbound.service';
import { CapabilityBroker } from '../capability/capability.broker';
import { CapabilityProviderRegistry } from '../capability/capability.registry';
import { IdempotencyService } from '../idempotency/idempotency.service';
import { TemplateRepository } from '../templates/template.repository';
import { TemplateService } from '../templates/template.service';
import { TemplatedSender } from '../templates/templated-sender';
import { MailService, contentToParts } from './mail.service';
import type { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? 'postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios_test?schema=public';
const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url } } });
const asService = prisma as unknown as PrismaService;
const actors = new ActorResolver(asService);
function mail(): MailService {
const templates = new TemplateService(new TemplateRepository(asService));
const ingest = new IngestService(asService, makeFakePorts(), actors);
const outbound = new OutboundService(asService, new CapabilityBroker(makeFakePorts(), new CapabilityProviderRegistry()), new IdempotencyService(asService));
const sender = new TemplatedSender(templates, outbound, makeFakePorts());
return new MailService(templates, ingest, sender, actors, asService);
}
const messages = () => new MessageService(asService, makeFakePorts(), actors);
const alice: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'alice', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Alice' };
const bob: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'bob', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Bob' };
const inline = { inline: { subject: 'Welcome Dana', html: '<p>Hi <b>Dana</b></p>', text: 'Hi Dana', variables: [] } };
beforeAll(async () => { await prisma.$connect(); });
afterAll(async () => { await prisma.$disconnect(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await resetDb(prisma); });
describe('contentToParts (pure)', () => {
it('produces HTML + TEXT parts and the subject', () => {
expect(contentToParts({ subject: 'S', html: '<p>h</p>', text: 't' })).toEqual({ subject: 'S', parts: [{ kind: 'HTML', bodyText: '<p>h</p>' }, { kind: 'TEXT', bodyText: 't' }] });
});
it('never yields zero parts (empty text fallback)', () => {
expect(contentToParts({ subject: 'S' }).parts).toEqual([{ kind: 'TEXT', bodyText: '' }]);
});
});
describe('MailService.postInternal', () => {
it('creates an EMAIL interaction and makes the thread visible to BOTH sender and recipient', async () => {
const res = await mail().postInternal(alice, { source: inline, recipientUserId: 'bob', idempotencyKey: 'int:1' });
const interaction = await prisma.iiosInteraction.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: res.interactionId }, include: { parts: true } });
expect(interaction.kind).toBe('EMAIL');
expect(interaction.parts.map((p) => p.kind).sort()).toEqual(['HTML', 'TEXT']);
const thread = await prisma.iiosThread.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: res.threadId } });
expect(thread.subject).toBe('Welcome Dana');
expect((thread.metadata as { source?: string } | null)?.source).toBe('crm-mail'); // lists separately from chat
// The load-bearing assertion: the RECIPIENT can see the thread in their inbox.
const bobThreads = await messages().listThreads(bob);
expect(bobThreads.map((t) => t.threadId)).toContain(res.threadId);
// ...and so can the sender.
const aliceThreads = await messages().listThreads(alice);
expect(aliceThreads.map((t) => t.threadId)).toContain(res.threadId);
});
it('stores an in-app attachment as a media part alongside the body', async () => {
const res = await mail().postInternal(alice, {
source: inline, recipientUserId: 'bob', idempotencyKey: 'int:att',
attachments: [{ filename: 'roof.png', contentRef: 'scope/roof.png', mimeType: 'image/png', sizeBytes: 2048 }],
});
const interaction = await prisma.iiosInteraction.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: res.interactionId }, include: { parts: true } });
const file = interaction.parts.find((p) => p.contentRef);
expect(file).toBeDefined();
expect(file!.kind).toBe('MEDIA_REF'); // image/* → MEDIA_REF
expect(file!.contentRef).toBe('scope/roof.png');
expect(file!.mimeType).toBe('image/png');
expect(file!.sizeBytes != null ? Number(file!.sizeBytes) : null).toBe(2048);
});
it('is idempotent per key — a replay reuses the same thread, no duplicate interaction', async () => {
const a = await mail().postInternal(alice, { source: inline, recipientUserId: 'bob', idempotencyKey: 'int:dup' });
const b = await mail().postInternal(alice, { source: inline, recipientUserId: 'bob', idempotencyKey: 'int:dup' });
expect(b.threadId).toBe(a.threadId);
expect(await prisma.iiosInteraction.count({ where: { threadId: a.threadId } })).toBe(1);
});
});
describe('MailService.sendExternalWithMirror', () => {
const ext = { source: inline, target: 'dana@acme.com', idempotencyKey: 'recv:1' } as const;
it('sends via the outbound pipeline AND mirrors into a registered recipient inbox', async () => {
const res = await mail().sendExternalWithMirror(alice, { ...ext, mirrorToUserId: 'bob' });
// outbound command exists (SENT via sandbox in tests)
const cmd = await prisma.iiosOutboundCommand.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: res.commandId } });
expect(cmd.channelType).toBe('EMAIL');
expect(cmd.target).toBe('dana@acme.com');
// mirror interaction visible to the recipient
expect(res.mirror).toBeDefined();
const bobThreads = await messages().listThreads(bob);
expect(bobThreads.map((t) => t.threadId)).toContain(res.mirror!.threadId);
});
it('does NOT mirror when there is no registered recipient (pre-registration send)', async () => {
const res = await mail().sendExternalWithMirror(alice, { ...ext, idempotencyKey: 'recv:2' }); // no mirrorToUserId
expect(res.mirror).toBeUndefined();
// an outbound command was created, but no mirror interaction
expect(await prisma.iiosOutboundCommand.count({ where: { id: res.commandId } })).toBe(1);
expect(await prisma.iiosInteraction.count()).toBe(0);
});
it('is idempotent — a replay yields one command and one mirror', async () => {
const a = await mail().sendExternalWithMirror(alice, { ...ext, idempotencyKey: 'recv:dup', mirrorToUserId: 'bob' });
const b = await mail().sendExternalWithMirror(alice, { ...ext, idempotencyKey: 'recv:dup', mirrorToUserId: 'bob' });
expect(b.commandId).toBe(a.commandId);
expect(await prisma.iiosOutboundCommand.count({ where: { idempotencyKey: 'recv:dup' } })).toBe(1);
expect(await prisma.iiosInteraction.count({ where: { threadId: a.mirror!.threadId } })).toBe(1);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import { IngestService } from '../interactions/ingest.service';
import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { TemplateService } from '../templates/template.service';
import { TemplatedSender } from '../templates/templated-sender';
import type { RenderedContent } from '../templates/template.renderer';
import type { TemplateSource } from '../templates/template.model';
export interface MailPart { kind: 'HTML' | 'TEXT'; bodyText: string }
/** Turn rendered content into ingest parts (HTML + TEXT) + the thread subject. Pure. */
export function contentToParts(content: RenderedContent): { subject?: string; parts: MailPart[] } {
const parts: MailPart[] = [];
if (content.html != null) parts.push({ kind: 'HTML', bodyText: content.html });
if (content.text != null) parts.push({ kind: 'TEXT', bodyText: content.text });
// A message must carry at least one part; fall back to an empty text part rather than fail ingest.
if (parts.length === 0) parts.push({ kind: 'TEXT', bodyText: '' });
return { ...(content.subject != null ? { subject: content.subject } : {}), parts };
}
export interface MailAttachment { filename?: string; contentRef: string; mimeType?: string; sizeBytes?: number }
export interface PostInternalInput {
source: TemplateSource;
recipientUserId: string;
vars?: Record<string, unknown>;
locale?: string;
idempotencyKey: string;
/** In-app attachment refs — stored as FILE message parts alongside the body. */
attachments?: MailAttachment[];
}
export interface SendExternalInput {
source: TemplateSource;
target: string; // email address (external)
vars?: Record<string, unknown>;
locale?: string;
idempotencyKey: string;
purpose?: string;
/** Attachment refs (bytes resolved at send time). */
attachments?: Array<{ filename?: string; contentRef: string; mimeType?: string }>;
/** The registered recipient to mirror to; omit for a pre-registration send (email only, no mirror). */
mirrorToUserId?: string;
}
/**
* Mail orchestration: render a template, then deliver it.
* - INTERNAL (app-to-app): create an EMAIL interaction on a per-email thread no SMTP.
* - EXTERNAL: send via SMTP (TemplatedSender) AND mirror a copy into the recipient's in-app inbox,
* but only when they are a registered user (pre-registration sends have no inbox yet).
*
* ingest() writes the interaction + thread but adds no participants, and a thread is only visible to
* its participants so after each ingest we add BOTH the sender and the recipient as participants.
*/
@Injectable()
export class MailService {
constructor(
private readonly templates: TemplateService,
private readonly ingest: IngestService,
private readonly sender: TemplatedSender,
private readonly actors: ActorResolver,
private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
) {}
/** Marks a thread as CRM mail so it lists separately from chat (Messenger uses source=crm-messenger). */
static readonly SOURCE = 'crm-mail';
async postInternal(principal: MessagePrincipal, input: PostInternalInput): Promise<{ threadId: string; interactionId: string }> {
const { content } = await this.templates.render(input.source, input.vars ?? {}, { channel: 'INTERNAL', ...(input.locale ? { locale: input.locale } : {}) });
return this.deposit(principal, input.recipientUserId, content, input.idempotencyKey, 'PORTAL', input.attachments);
}
async sendExternalWithMirror(principal: MessagePrincipal, input: SendExternalInput): Promise<{ commandId: string; mirror?: { threadId: string; interactionId: string } }> {
const command = await this.sender.sendTemplated({
source: input.source, channel: 'EMAIL', target: input.target, vars: input.vars ?? {},
...(input.locale ? { locale: input.locale } : {}), idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey, ...(input.purpose ? { purpose: input.purpose } : {}),
...(input.attachments && input.attachments.length > 0 ? { attachments: input.attachments } : {}),
});
// Mirror only for a registered recipient (timing rule: no inbox exists pre-registration).
if (!input.mirrorToUserId) return { commandId: command.id };
const { content } = await this.templates.render(input.source, input.vars ?? {}, { channel: 'EMAIL', ...(input.locale ? { locale: input.locale } : {}) });
const mirror = await this.deposit(principal, input.mirrorToUserId, content, `mirror:${input.idempotencyKey}`, 'EMAIL', input.attachments);
return { commandId: command.id, mirror };
}
/** A stored media ref → a message part; kind follows the mime (image/video → MEDIA_REF, audio → VOICE_REF, else FILE_REF). */
private attachmentPart(a: MailAttachment): { kind: 'MEDIA_REF' | 'VOICE_REF' | 'FILE_REF'; bodyText?: string; contentRef: string; mimeType?: string; sizeBytes?: number } {
const mime = a.mimeType ?? '';
const kind = /^(image|video)\//.test(mime) ? 'MEDIA_REF' : /^audio\//.test(mime) ? 'VOICE_REF' : 'FILE_REF';
return { kind, ...(a.filename ? { bodyText: a.filename } : {}), contentRef: a.contentRef, ...(a.mimeType ? { mimeType: a.mimeType } : {}), ...(a.sizeBytes != null ? { sizeBytes: a.sizeBytes } : {}) };
}
/** Ingest the rendered content as an EMAIL interaction on a per-email thread, visible to both parties. */
private async deposit(principal: MessagePrincipal, recipientUserId: string, content: RenderedContent, key: string, channelType: string, attachments?: MailAttachment[]): Promise<{ threadId: string; interactionId: string }> {
const { subject, parts } = contentToParts(content);
const allParts = [...parts, ...(attachments ?? []).map((a) => this.attachmentPart(a))];
const res = await this.ingest.ingest(
{
scope: { orgId: principal.orgId, appId: principal.appId, ...(principal.tenantId ? { tenantId: principal.tenantId } : {}) },
channel: { type: channelType, externalChannelId: channelType.toLowerCase() },
source: { handleKind: 'PORTAL_USER', externalId: principal.userId, ...(principal.displayName ? { displayName: principal.displayName } : {}) },
kind: 'EMAIL',
thread: { externalThreadId: key, ...(subject ? { subject } : {}) },
parts: allParts,
occurredAt: new Date().toISOString(),
providerEventId: key,
},
key,
);
// Make the thread visible to both the sender and the recipient (ingest adds no participants).
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
const senderActor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, principal);
const recipientActor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, {
userId: recipientUserId, appId: principal.appId, orgId: principal.orgId, ...(principal.tenantId ? { tenantId: principal.tenantId } : {}),
});
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(res.threadId, senderActor.id);
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(res.threadId, recipientActor.id);
// Tag the thread as CRM mail (thread metadata) so it lists separately from Messenger chat.
// ingest() puts req.metadata on the interaction, not the thread, so we set it here directly.
await this.prisma.iiosThread.update({
where: { id: res.threadId },
data: { metadata: { source: MailService.SOURCE } as Prisma.InputJsonValue },
});
return { threadId: res.threadId, interactionId: res.interactionId };
}
}
+6
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,19 @@ import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AppModule } from './app.module';
import { traceMiddleware } from './observability/trace.middleware';
import { RedisIoAdapter } from './realtime/redis-io.adapter';
import { PolicyDeniedFilter } from './platform/policy-denied.filter';
async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
const app = await NestFactory.create(AppModule, { rawBody: true });
// Express 5 defaults to the 'simple' query parser, which ignores nested params like
// ?metadata[key]=value — so generic metadata filters would be silently dropped. Use the
// qs-based 'extended' parser so those parse into a nested object.
app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().set('query parser', 'extended');
app.use(traceMiddleware); // request-scoped trace context + x-trace-id header (P9)
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, forbidNonWhitelisted: true, transform: true }),
);
app.useGlobalFilters(new PolicyDeniedFilter()); // fail-closed policy denials → 403
app.enableCors({ origin: true, credentials: true });
// Multi-replica realtime: fan socket.io room emits across instances via Redis.
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { promises as fs } from 'node:fs';
import * as os from 'node:os';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { StoragePort } from './storage.port';
/**
* Dev storage: bytes on local disk under MEDIA_DIR, with a sidecar `.meta.json`
* holding the mime/size/checksum. Object keys may contain a scope subdirectory.
* A drop-in for an S3/Supabase adapter in prod.
*/
@Injectable()
export class LocalDiskStorage implements StoragePort {
private readonly root = process.env.MEDIA_DIR?.trim() || path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iios-media');
private full(objectKey: string): string {
// Prevent path traversal: keep everything under root.
const p = path.normalize(path.join(this.root, objectKey));
if (!p.startsWith(path.normalize(this.root))) throw new Error('invalid object key');
return p;
}
async put(objectKey: string, data: Buffer, mime: string): Promise<{ sizeBytes: number; checksumSha256: string }> {
const file = this.full(objectKey);
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
const checksumSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(data).digest('hex');
await fs.writeFile(file, data);
await fs.writeFile(`${file}.meta.json`, JSON.stringify({ mime, sizeBytes: data.length, checksumSha256 }));
return { sizeBytes: data.length, checksumSha256 };
}
async get(objectKey: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mime: string; sizeBytes: number } | null> {
const file = this.full(objectKey);
try {
const data = await fs.readFile(file);
const meta = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(`${file}.meta.json`, 'utf8')) as { mime: string };
return { data, mime: meta.mime || 'application/octet-stream', sizeBytes: data.length };
} catch {
return null;
}
}
async remove(objectKey: string): Promise<void> {
const file = this.full(objectKey);
await fs.rm(file, { force: true });
await fs.rm(`${file}.meta.json`, { force: true });
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
import { BadRequestException, Body, Controller, Get, Headers, Param, Post, Put, Req, Res } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import { MediaService } from './media.service';
import { SessionVerifier } from '../platform/session.verifier';
import { PresignDownloadDto, PresignUploadDto } from './media.dto';
import type { MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
/** Types that can execute script if a browser renders them top-level — served as downloads only. */
const SCRIPTABLE_MIMES = new Set(['text/html', 'application/xhtml+xml', 'image/svg+xml', 'text/xml', 'application/xml']);
@Controller('v1/media')
export class MediaController {
constructor(
private readonly media: MediaService,
private readonly session: SessionVerifier,
) {}
/** Authorize an upload → short-lived signed PUT url + object key. */
@Post('presign-upload')
async presignUpload(@Body() body: PresignUploadDto, @Headers('authorization') auth?: string) {
return this.media.presignUpload(this.principal(auth), { mime: body.mime, sizeBytes: body.sizeBytes });
}
/** Authorize a download → short-lived signed GET url. */
@Post('presign-download')
async presignDownload(@Body() body: PresignDownloadDto, @Headers('authorization') auth?: string) {
return this.media.presignDownload(this.principal(auth), body.contentRef, body.mime);
}
/** The presigned PUT target — token IS the auth. Reads the raw binary body stream. */
@Put('upload/:token')
async upload(@Param('token') token: string, @Req() req: Request) {
const data = await readBody(req);
if (data.length === 0) throw new BadRequestException('empty upload body');
return this.media.put(token, data);
}
/** The presigned GET target — token IS the auth. Streams the bytes with their mime. */
@Get('blob/:token')
async blob(@Param('token') token: string, @Res() res: Response) {
const { data, mime } = await this.media.get(token);
res.setHeader('Content-Type', mime);
// Never let the browser MIME-sniff an upload into something executable.
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
// Script-capable types must not render inline from our origin (stored-XSS) — force a download.
// Images/video/audio/pdf stay inline so the app can preview them. Note <img>/<video> still embed
// fine even with attachment disposition; only top-level navigation to the blob is affected.
if (SCRIPTABLE_MIMES.has(mime)) res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', 'attachment');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'private, max-age=3600');
res.send(data);
}
private principal(auth?: string): MessagePrincipal {
const token = (auth ?? '').replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, '');
if (!token) throw new BadRequestException('Authorization bearer token is required');
return this.session.verify(token);
}
}
/** Collect a request body stream into a Buffer (binary media upload; no body parser touches it). */
function readBody(req: Request): Promise<Buffer> {
const raw = (req as Request & { rawBody?: Buffer }).rawBody;
if (raw && raw.length) return Promise.resolve(raw);
return new Promise<Buffer>((resolve, reject) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
req.on('data', (c: Buffer) => chunks.push(c));
req.on('end', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks)));
req.on('error', reject);
});
}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
import { IsInt, IsOptional, IsString, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class PresignUploadDto {
@IsString() mime!: string;
@IsInt() @Min(1) @Max(26 * 1024 * 1024) sizeBytes!: number;
}
export class PresignDownloadDto {
@IsString() contentRef!: string;
@IsOptional() @IsString() mime?: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
import { Module, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PlatformModule } from '../platform/platform.module';
import { IdentityModule } from '../identity/identity.module';
import { MediaController } from './media.controller';
import { MediaService } from './media.service';
import { LocalDiskStorage } from './local-disk.storage';
import { S3Storage, s3ConfigFromEnv } from './s3.storage';
import { STORAGE_PORT, type StoragePort } from './storage.port';
/** S3/MinIO when its env is set (IIOS_S3_BUCKET + keys), else local disk. Env-driven swap. */
function makeStorage(): StoragePort {
const cfg = s3ConfigFromEnv();
if (cfg) {
new Logger('MediaStorage').log(`using S3 storage (bucket "${cfg.bucket}"${cfg.endpoint ? ` @ ${cfg.endpoint}` : ''})`);
return new S3Storage(cfg);
}
return new LocalDiskStorage();
}
@Module({
imports: [PlatformModule, IdentityModule],
controllers: [MediaController],
providers: [MediaService, { provide: STORAGE_PORT, useFactory: makeStorage }],
// Exported so the capability layer can resolve email attachment bytes at send time.
exports: [STORAGE_PORT],
})
export class MediaModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { PolicyDeniedError, type IiosPlatformPorts } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { makeFakePorts } from '@insignia/iios-testkit';
import { resetDb } from '../test-utils/reset-db';
import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { DevOpaPort } from '../platform/dev-opa.port';
import { LocalDiskStorage } from './local-disk.storage';
import { MediaService } from './media.service';
import type { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? 'postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios?schema=public';
const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url } } });
const asService = prisma as unknown as PrismaService;
const ports = { ...makeFakePorts(), opa: new DevOpaPort() } as IiosPlatformPorts;
const svc = () => new MediaService(new LocalDiskStorage(), ports, new ActorResolver(asService));
const alice: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'alice', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Alice' };
// point storage at an isolated temp dir for the test run
process.env.MEDIA_DIR = process.env.MEDIA_DIR ?? '/tmp/iios-media-test';
beforeAll(async () => { await prisma.$connect(); });
afterAll(async () => { await prisma.$disconnect(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await resetDb(prisma); });
function tokenFrom(url: string): string {
return url.split('/').pop()!;
}
describe('MediaService (presigned local storage)', () => {
it('presign → PUT → presign-download → GET round-trips the bytes with mime + checksum', async () => {
const s = svc();
const bytes = Buffer.from('hello-image-bytes');
const { objectKey, uploadUrl } = await s.presignUpload(alice, { mime: 'image/png', sizeBytes: bytes.length });
expect(objectKey).toContain('/'); // scopeId/uuid
const put = await s.put(tokenFrom(uploadUrl), bytes);
expect(put.sizeBytes).toBe(bytes.length);
expect(put.checksumSha256).toHaveLength(64);
const { url } = await s.presignDownload(alice, objectKey, 'image/png');
const got = await s.get(tokenFrom(url));
expect(got.data.equals(bytes)).toBe(true);
expect(got.mime).toBe('image/png');
});
it('rejects an over-the-cap upload (OPA policy)', async () => {
await expect(svc().presignUpload(alice, { mime: 'image/png', sizeBytes: 26 * 1024 * 1024 })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
});
it('rejects a disallowed file type (OPA policy)', async () => {
await expect(svc().presignUpload(alice, { mime: 'application/x-msdownload', sizeBytes: 1000 })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
});
it('a PUT larger than the presigned size is refused', async () => {
const s = svc();
const { uploadUrl } = await s.presignUpload(alice, { mime: 'image/png', sizeBytes: 4 });
await expect(s.put(tokenFrom(uploadUrl), Buffer.from('way too many bytes'))).rejects.toThrow();
});
it('rejects a tampered / non-media token', async () => {
await expect(svc().get('not-a-real-token')).rejects.toThrow();
// an upload token cannot be used to download
const s = svc();
const { uploadUrl } = await s.presignUpload(alice, { mime: 'image/png', sizeBytes: 4 });
await expect(s.get(tokenFrom(uploadUrl))).rejects.toThrow();
});
it('tenant-fences downloads: an object outside my scope is forbidden', async () => {
await expect(svc().presignDownload(alice, 'some-other-scope/abc', 'image/png')).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { BadRequestException, ForbiddenException, Inject, Injectable, PayloadTooLargeException } from '@nestjs/common';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import type { IiosPlatformPorts } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { PLATFORM_PORTS } from '../platform/platform-ports';
import { decideOrThrow } from '../platform/fail-closed';
import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { STORAGE_PORT, type StoragePort } from './storage.port';
interface UploadToken { op: 'put'; objectKey: string; mime: string; maxBytes: number }
interface DownloadToken { op: 'get'; objectKey: string; mime: string }
/**
* Presigned media. IIOS never trusts the client with storage it authorizes an
* upload (OPA: size/type/scope), then hands back a short-lived signed URL that
* points at its OWN storage endpoints. The bytes live behind the StoragePort; the
* kernel only ever stores the object key (contentRef) on a MessagePart.
*/
@Injectable()
export class MediaService {
private readonly secret = process.env.MEDIA_SECRET?.trim() || 'dev-media-secret';
private readonly publicUrl = (process.env.PUBLIC_URL?.trim() || `http://localhost:${process.env.PORT ?? 3200}`).replace(/\/$/, '');
constructor(
@Inject(STORAGE_PORT) private readonly storage: StoragePort,
@Inject(PLATFORM_PORTS) private readonly ports: IiosPlatformPorts,
private readonly actors: ActorResolver,
) {}
/** Authorize an upload and return a short-lived signed PUT url + the object key. */
async presignUpload(
principal: MessagePrincipal,
input: { mime: string; sizeBytes: number },
): Promise<{ objectKey: string; uploadUrl: string }> {
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.media.upload', scopeId: scope.id, mime: input.mime, sizeBytes: input.sizeBytes });
const objectKey = `${scope.id}/${randomUUID()}`;
const token = jwt.sign({ op: 'put', objectKey, mime: input.mime, maxBytes: input.sizeBytes } satisfies UploadToken, this.secret, { expiresIn: '5m' });
return { objectKey, uploadUrl: `${this.publicUrl}/v1/media/upload/${token}` };
}
/** Store bytes for a valid, unexpired upload token (enforcing the declared size cap). */
async put(token: string, data: Buffer): Promise<{ objectKey: string; sizeBytes: number; checksumSha256: string }> {
const t = this.verify<UploadToken>(token, 'put');
if (data.length > t.maxBytes) throw new PayloadTooLargeException('upload exceeds the presigned size');
const { sizeBytes, checksumSha256 } = await this.storage.put(t.objectKey, data, t.mime);
return { objectKey: t.objectKey, sizeBytes, checksumSha256 };
}
/** Authorize a download and return a short-lived signed GET url (tenant-fenced). */
async presignDownload(principal: MessagePrincipal, contentRef: string, mime = 'application/octet-stream'): Promise<{ url: string }> {
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
if (!contentRef.startsWith(`${scope.id}/`)) throw new ForbiddenException('object not in your scope');
const token = jwt.sign({ op: 'get', objectKey: contentRef, mime } satisfies DownloadToken, this.secret, { expiresIn: '1h' });
return { url: `${this.publicUrl}/v1/media/blob/${token}` };
}
/** Fetch bytes for a valid, unexpired download token. */
async get(token: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mime: string; sizeBytes: number }> {
const t = this.verify<DownloadToken>(token, 'get');
const obj = await this.storage.get(t.objectKey);
if (!obj) throw new BadRequestException('object not found');
return obj;
}
private verify<T extends { op: string }>(token: string, op: T['op']): T {
let payload: T;
try {
payload = jwt.verify(token, this.secret) as T;
} catch {
throw new ForbiddenException('invalid or expired media token');
}
if (payload.op !== op) throw new ForbiddenException('wrong media token');
return payload;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { DeleteObjectCommand, GetObjectCommand, PutObjectCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-s3';
import { S3Storage, s3ConfigFromEnv, type S3Config, type S3Like } from './s3.storage';
const CFG: S3Config = { endpoint: 'https://minio.test', region: 'us-east-1', bucket: 'iios', accessKeyId: 'k', secretAccessKey: 's', forcePathStyle: true };
/** A recording stub S3 client; GetObject returns whatever `store[key]` holds (or a NoSuchKey error). */
function stub(store: Record<string, { body: Buffer; mime: string }> = {}) {
const calls: unknown[] = [];
const client: S3Like = {
async send(command: unknown) {
calls.push(command);
if (command instanceof PutObjectCommand) { store[command.input.Key!] = { body: command.input.Body as Buffer, mime: command.input.ContentType ?? '' }; return {}; }
if (command instanceof DeleteObjectCommand) { delete store[command.input.Key!]; return {}; }
if (command instanceof GetObjectCommand) {
const hit = store[command.input.Key!];
if (!hit) throw Object.assign(new Error('missing'), { name: 'NoSuchKey' });
return { Body: { transformToByteArray: async () => new Uint8Array(hit.body) }, ContentType: hit.mime };
}
return {};
},
};
return { client, calls, store };
}
describe('s3ConfigFromEnv', () => {
it('builds config from env (path-style default true for MinIO)', () => {
const cfg = s3ConfigFromEnv({ IIOS_S3_ENDPOINT: 'https://minio.x', IIOS_S3_BUCKET: 'b', IIOS_S3_ACCESS_KEY: 'k', IIOS_S3_SECRET_KEY: 's' } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv);
expect(cfg).toMatchObject({ endpoint: 'https://minio.x', bucket: 'b', region: 'us-east-1', forcePathStyle: true });
});
it('returns null when bucket/keys are missing', () => {
expect(s3ConfigFromEnv({ IIOS_S3_ENDPOINT: 'https://minio.x' } as NodeJS.ProcessEnv)).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('S3Storage (StoragePort over S3/MinIO)', () => {
it('put stores the object and returns size + sha256', async () => {
const s = stub();
const store = new S3Storage(CFG, s.client);
const res = await store.put('scope/obj1', Buffer.from('hello'), 'text/plain');
expect(res.sizeBytes).toBe(5);
expect(res.checksumSha256).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/);
const put = s.calls[0] as PutObjectCommand;
expect(put.input).toMatchObject({ Bucket: 'iios', Key: 'scope/obj1', ContentType: 'text/plain' });
});
it('get round-trips the bytes + mime', async () => {
const s = stub();
const store = new S3Storage(CFG, s.client);
await store.put('scope/obj2', Buffer.from('PDFDATA'), 'application/pdf');
const got = await store.get('scope/obj2');
expect(got).toEqual({ data: Buffer.from('PDFDATA'), mime: 'application/pdf', sizeBytes: 7 });
});
it('get returns null for a missing key (NoSuchKey → null, not throw)', async () => {
const store = new S3Storage(CFG, stub().client);
expect(await store.get('nope')).toBeNull();
});
it('remove issues a DeleteObject', async () => {
const s = stub({ 'k': { body: Buffer.from('x'), mime: 't' } });
await new S3Storage(CFG, s.client).remove('k');
expect(s.calls.some((c) => c instanceof DeleteObjectCommand)).toBe(true);
expect(s.store['k']).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { DeleteObjectCommand, GetObjectCommand, PutObjectCommand, S3Client } from '@aws-sdk/client-s3';
import type { StoragePort } from './storage.port';
export interface S3Config {
endpoint?: string; // MinIO/self-hosted URL; omit for AWS
region: string;
bucket: string;
accessKeyId: string;
secretAccessKey: string;
forcePathStyle: boolean; // true for MinIO
}
/** The one method this adapter uses — lets tests inject a stub client (no live S3/MinIO). */
export interface S3Like {
send(command: unknown): Promise<unknown>;
}
/** Build an S3Config from env, or null if the required bits are missing (→ fall back to disk). */
export function s3ConfigFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): S3Config | null {
const bucket = env.IIOS_S3_BUCKET;
const accessKeyId = env.IIOS_S3_ACCESS_KEY;
const secretAccessKey = env.IIOS_S3_SECRET_KEY;
if (!bucket || !accessKeyId || !secretAccessKey) return null;
return {
...(env.IIOS_S3_ENDPOINT ? { endpoint: env.IIOS_S3_ENDPOINT } : {}),
region: env.IIOS_S3_REGION ?? 'us-east-1',
bucket,
accessKeyId,
secretAccessKey,
// MinIO/self-hosted needs path-style; default true unless explicitly disabled for AWS.
forcePathStyle: env.IIOS_S3_FORCE_PATH_STYLE !== 'false',
};
}
/**
* S3-compatible object storage (AWS S3, MinIO, R2, Supabase Storage). A drop-in for LocalDiskStorage:
* same StoragePort contract. sha256 is computed locally on put (S3 doesn't return it), matching the
* disk adapter. A missing object reads back as null (not an error).
*/
@Injectable()
export class S3Storage implements StoragePort {
private readonly client: S3Like;
private readonly bucket: string;
constructor(config: S3Config, client?: S3Like) {
this.bucket = config.bucket;
this.client = client ?? new S3Client({
region: config.region,
...(config.endpoint ? { endpoint: config.endpoint } : {}),
forcePathStyle: config.forcePathStyle,
credentials: { accessKeyId: config.accessKeyId, secretAccessKey: config.secretAccessKey },
});
}
async put(objectKey: string, data: Buffer, mime: string): Promise<{ sizeBytes: number; checksumSha256: string }> {
const checksumSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(data).digest('hex');
await this.client.send(new PutObjectCommand({ Bucket: this.bucket, Key: objectKey, Body: data, ContentType: mime }));
return { sizeBytes: data.length, checksumSha256 };
}
async get(objectKey: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mime: string; sizeBytes: number } | null> {
try {
const res = (await this.client.send(new GetObjectCommand({ Bucket: this.bucket, Key: objectKey }))) as {
Body?: { transformToByteArray(): Promise<Uint8Array> };
ContentType?: string;
};
if (!res.Body) return null;
const bytes = await res.Body.transformToByteArray();
const data = Buffer.from(bytes);
return { data, mime: res.ContentType ?? 'application/octet-stream', sizeBytes: data.length };
} catch (err) {
if (isNotFound(err)) return null;
throw err;
}
}
async remove(objectKey: string): Promise<void> {
await this.client.send(new DeleteObjectCommand({ Bucket: this.bucket, Key: objectKey }));
}
}
function isNotFound(err: unknown): boolean {
const e = err as { name?: string; $metadata?: { httpStatusCode?: number } };
return e.name === 'NoSuchKey' || e.name === 'NotFound' || e.$metadata?.httpStatusCode === 404;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
/**
* Byte storage seam. The kernel stores a `contentRef` (an opaque object key) on a
* MessagePart; the actual bytes live behind this port. Dev binds LocalDiskStorage;
* prod swaps to S3/R2/Supabase Storage with zero changes to the media service or app.
*/
export interface StoragePort {
put(objectKey: string, data: Buffer, mime: string): Promise<{ sizeBytes: number; checksumSha256: string }>;
get(objectKey: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mime: string; sizeBytes: number } | null>;
remove(objectKey: string): Promise<void>;
}
export const STORAGE_PORT = Symbol('STORAGE_PORT');
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import type { Socket } from 'socket.io';
import { MessageGateway } from './message.gateway';
import type { MessageService, MessagePrincipal } from './message.service';
import { SessionVerifier } from '../platform/session.verifier';
import type { OutboxBus } from '../outbox/outbox.bus';
import type { PresenceService } from '../notifications/presence.service';
// Realtime delegation: the browser opens the socket with a short-lived token minted for the
// realtime audience (iios-message). When IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE is set, the gateway accepts ONLY
// that audience — a full REST/actor token (iios-core) or an un-scoped token can't open the stream.
const APP = 'crm-web';
const SECRET = 'dev-crm-secret';
// ─── the real SessionVerifier must expose `aud` so the gateway can enforce it ───
describe('SessionVerifier — app-token audience surfacing', () => {
let v: SessionVerifier;
beforeAll(async () => {
delete process.env.AUTH_ISSUERS;
delete process.env.SUPABASE_URL;
process.env.APP_SECRETS = JSON.stringify({ [APP]: SECRET });
v = new SessionVerifier();
await v.onModuleInit();
});
afterAll(() => { delete process.env.APP_SECRETS; });
it('surfaces the aud claim of a realtime-scoped token', () => {
const tok = jwt.sign({ appId: APP, aud: 'iios-message' }, SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256', subject: 'pp_1', expiresIn: '5m' });
expect(v.verify(tok).audience).toBe('iios-message');
});
it('leaves audience undefined for an un-scoped token (a REST/actor token)', () => {
const tok = jwt.sign({ appId: APP }, SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256', subject: 'pp_1', expiresIn: '5m' });
expect(v.verify(tok).audience).toBeUndefined();
});
});
// ─── the gateway enforces the realtime audience on connect ───
function fakeSocket(): { sock: Socket; disconnected: () => boolean } {
let disconnected = false;
const sock = {
handshake: { auth: { token: 'tok' } },
disconnect: () => { disconnected = true; },
data: undefined as unknown,
} as unknown as Socket;
return { sock, disconnected: () => disconnected };
}
function gatewayReturning(principal: MessagePrincipal): MessageGateway {
const session = { verify: () => principal } as unknown as SessionVerifier;
return new MessageGateway(
undefined as unknown as MessageService,
session,
undefined as unknown as OutboxBus,
undefined as unknown as PresenceService,
);
}
const principal = (audience?: string): MessagePrincipal => ({ userId: 'u', appId: APP, orgId: 'org', audience });
describe('MessageGateway — realtime audience enforcement', () => {
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE; });
it('accepts any valid token when enforcement is OFF (env unset)', () => {
const { sock, disconnected } = fakeSocket();
gatewayReturning(principal(undefined)).handleConnection(sock);
expect(disconnected()).toBe(false);
expect((sock.data as { principal: MessagePrincipal }).principal.userId).toBe('u');
});
it('accepts a token whose aud matches the required realtime audience', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
const { sock, disconnected } = fakeSocket();
gatewayReturning(principal('iios-message')).handleConnection(sock);
expect(disconnected()).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects a full REST/actor token (aud=iios-core) on the socket', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
const { sock, disconnected } = fakeSocket();
gatewayReturning(principal('iios-core')).handleConnection(sock);
expect(disconnected()).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects an un-scoped token (no aud) when enforcement is on', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
const { sock, disconnected } = fakeSocket();
gatewayReturning(principal(undefined)).handleConnection(sock);
expect(disconnected()).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import {
ConnectedSocket,
MessageBody,
OnGatewayConnection,
OnGatewayDisconnect,
OnGatewayInit,
SubscribeMessage,
WebSocketGateway,
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import { logJson } from '../observability/logger';
import { MessageService, type MessagePrincipal } from './message.service';
import { SessionVerifier } from '../platform/session.verifier';
import { OutboxBus } from '../outbox/outbox.bus';
import { PresenceService } from '../notifications/presence.service';
interface SocketState {
principal: MessagePrincipal;
@@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ interface SocketState {
* propagates messages persisted elsewhere (REST/ingest) to connected clients.
*/
@WebSocketGateway({ namespace: '/message', cors: { origin: true } })
export class MessageGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection {
export class MessageGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewayDisconnect {
private readonly logger = new Logger(MessageGateway.name);
private readonly emittedLocally = new Set<string>();
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ export class MessageGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection {
private readonly messages: MessageService,
private readonly session: SessionVerifier,
private readonly bus: OutboxBus,
private readonly presence: PresenceService,
) {}
afterInit(): void {
@@ -58,6 +61,14 @@ export class MessageGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection {
try {
const token = String(client.handshake.auth?.token ?? '');
const principal = this.session.verify(token);
// Realtime delegation (least privilege): when IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE is set, the socket
// accepts ONLY a token minted for that audience (a short-lived `iios-message` delegate) —
// a full REST/actor token (`iios-core`) or an un-scoped token cannot open the stream. So a
// leaked socket token can't drive privileged REST, and vice-versa. Unset → no enforcement.
const required = process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE?.trim();
if (required && principal.audience !== required) {
throw new Error(`realtime audience "${principal.audience ?? '(none)'}" != required "${required}"`);
}
client.data = { principal } satisfies SocketState;
} catch (err) {
this.logger.warn(`rejecting socket: ${(err as Error).message}`);
@@ -65,31 +76,82 @@ export class MessageGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection {
}
}
handleDisconnect(client: Socket): void {
this.presence.clearSocket(client.id);
}
/** The app reports which thread is in the foreground (or null when blurred) — presence. */
@SubscribeMessage('focus_thread')
focusThread(@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket, @MessageBody() body: { threadId: string | null }): void {
const state = client.data as SocketState | undefined;
if (!state?.principal) return;
this.presence.setFocus(client.id, state.principal.userId, body?.threadId ?? null);
}
@SubscribeMessage('open_thread')
async openThread(@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket, @MessageBody() body: { threadId?: string }) {
async openThread(@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket, @MessageBody() body: { threadId?: string; membership?: string; creatorRole?: string; subject?: string }) {
const { principal } = client.data as SocketState;
const result = await this.messages.openThread(body?.threadId ?? null, principal);
await client.join(result.threadId);
return result;
try {
const result = await this.messages.openThread(body?.threadId ?? null, principal, {
membership: body?.membership,
creatorRole: body?.creatorRole,
subject: body?.subject,
});
await client.join(result.threadId);
return result;
} catch (err) {
// Fail to an ACK'd error instead of throwing (which never acks → client hangs on "loading").
return { error: (err as Error).message ?? 'could not open the conversation' };
}
}
@SubscribeMessage('add_participant')
async addParticipant(@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket, @MessageBody() body: { threadId: string; userId: string; role?: string }) {
const { principal } = client.data as SocketState;
return this.messages.addParticipant(body.threadId, principal, body.userId, body.role);
}
@SubscribeMessage('send_message')
async sendMessage(
@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
@MessageBody() body: { threadId: string; content: string; contentRef?: string },
@MessageBody()
body: { threadId: string; content: string; contentRef?: string; mimeType?: string; sizeBytes?: number; checksumSha256?: string; parentInteractionId?: string; mentions?: string[] },
) {
const { principal } = client.data as SocketState;
const msg = await this.messages.send(
body.threadId,
principal,
{ content: body.content, contentRef: body.contentRef },
{ content: body.content, contentRef: body.contentRef, mimeType: body.mimeType, sizeBytes: body.sizeBytes, checksumSha256: body.checksumSha256 },
randomUUID(),
undefined,
body.parentInteractionId,
body.mentions,
);
this.emittedLocally.add(msg.id);
this.server.to(body.threadId).emit('message', msg);
return msg;
}
@SubscribeMessage('annotate')
async annotate(
@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
@MessageBody() body: { threadId: string; interactionId: string; type: string; value: string },
) {
const { principal } = client.data as SocketState;
const r = await this.messages.toggleAnnotation(body.interactionId, principal, body.type, body.value);
// Broadcast the refreshed user list for this (interaction,type,value) so every client re-renders.
this.server.to(r.threadId).emit('annotation', {
threadId: r.threadId,
interactionId: r.interactionId,
type: r.type,
value: r.value,
op: r.op,
users: r.users,
userId: principal.userId,
});
return r;
}
@SubscribeMessage('read')
async read(@ConnectedSocket() client: Socket, @MessageBody() body: { threadId: string; interactionId: string }) {
const { principal } = client.data as SocketState;
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { MessageService } from './message.service';
import { MessageGateway } from './message.gateway';
import { OutboxModule } from '../outbox/outbox.module';
import { PresenceService } from '../notifications/presence.service';
@Module({
imports: [OutboxModule],
providers: [MessageService, MessageGateway],
exports: [MessageService],
providers: [MessageService, MessageGateway, PresenceService],
exports: [MessageService, PresenceService],
})
export class MessageModule {}
@@ -9,16 +9,57 @@ import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver
export type { MessagePrincipal };
/** A generic annotation aggregate on a message (opaque type/value + who applied it). */
export interface AnnotationDto {
type: string;
value: string;
users: string[];
}
/** A media attachment on a message (the app renders it by `kind`). */
export interface AttachmentDto {
contentRef: string;
mimeType: string;
sizeBytes: number;
kind: 'image' | 'video' | 'audio' | 'file';
}
function mediaKind(mime: string): AttachmentDto['kind'] {
if (mime.startsWith('image/')) return 'image';
if (mime.startsWith('video/')) return 'video';
if (mime.startsWith('audio/')) return 'audio';
return 'file';
}
export interface MessageDto {
id: string;
threadId: string;
senderActorId: string;
senderId: string; // the sender's stable externalId (email/username) — reliable "is this mine?"
senderName: string;
content: string;
contentRef?: string;
attachment?: AttachmentDto;
parentInteractionId?: string;
annotations: AnnotationDto[];
traceId: string;
createdAt: Date;
}
export interface ThreadSummary {
threadId: string;
subject: string | null;
membership?: string;
/** The thread's opaque, app-supplied attribute bag — echoed back verbatim; the kernel never interprets it. */
metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
participants: string[];
participantCount: number;
unread: number;
muted?: boolean;
lastMessage?: string;
lastAt?: Date;
}
export interface OpenThreadResult {
threadId: string;
status: string;
@@ -39,16 +80,31 @@ export class MessageService {
private readonly actors: ActorResolver,
) {}
/** Open an existing thread, or create one when no id is given. Joins as participant. */
async openThread(threadId: string | null, principal: MessagePrincipal): Promise<OpenThreadResult> {
/**
* Open an existing thread, or create one when no id is given. On create, an optional
* generic `membership` attribute is stamped on the thread's metadata (the app's DM/group
* hint the kernel never branches on it; policy does), and the creator joins as ADMIN
* for a group. Opening an existing thread is a GOVERNED join: only an existing member may
* re-open it (policy `iios.thread.join`) new members enter via addParticipant.
*/
async openThread(threadId: string | null, principal: MessagePrincipal, opts?: { membership?: string; creatorRole?: string; subject?: string; metadata?: Record<string, unknown> }): Promise<OpenThreadResult> {
if (!threadId) {
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.thread.create', scope: principal });
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, principal);
// `membership`/`creatorRole`/`subject`/`metadata` are generic, app-supplied thread attributes —
// the kernel stores/echoes them as an opaque bag but never branches on their meaning (that lives
// in policy + the app). `membership` is folded into the same bag for back-compat.
const merged = { ...(opts?.metadata ?? {}), ...(opts?.membership ? { membership: opts.membership } : {}) };
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.create({
data: { scopeId: scope.id, createdByActorId: actor.id },
data: {
scopeId: scope.id,
createdByActorId: actor.id,
subject: opts?.subject?.trim() || undefined,
metadata: Object.keys(merged).length > 0 ? (merged as Prisma.InputJsonValue) : undefined,
},
});
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(thread.id, actor.id);
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(thread.id, actor.id, opts?.creatorRole ?? 'MEMBER');
return { threadId: thread.id, status: thread.status, history: [] };
}
@@ -56,16 +112,217 @@ export class MessageService {
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.thread.read', threadId, scopeId: thread.scopeId });
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
const alreadyMember =
(await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: actor.id } } })) !== null;
// Join is governed ONLY for threads that opted into a membership model (chat dm/group);
// support/inbox/generic threads (no membership attr) keep open-join, unchanged.
const membership = (thread.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership;
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.thread.join', threadId, scopeId: thread.scopeId, membership, alreadyMember });
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(threadId, actor.id);
return { threadId, status: thread.status, history: await this.history(threadId) };
}
/**
* Governed thread membership (a member adds another user by userId). Fail-closed via
* policy: the DM cap / group-admin rule is enforced by OPA (dev stub now, real later);
* the kernel only supplies generic context and adds the participant. The target's actor
* is resolved-or-created so you can add someone who hasn't logged in yet.
*/
async addParticipant(threadId: string, principal: MessagePrincipal, targetUserId: string, role = 'MEMBER'): Promise<{ threadId: string; participantCount: number }> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
const caller = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
const callerP = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: caller.id } } });
const participantCount = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.count({ where: { threadId } });
const membership = (thread.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership;
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, {
action: 'iios.thread.participant.add',
threadId,
scopeId: thread.scopeId,
membership,
participantCount,
callerRole: callerP?.participantRole,
targetUserId,
role,
});
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
const target = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, {
userId: targetUserId,
appId: principal.appId,
orgId: principal.orgId,
tenantId: principal.tenantId,
displayName: targetUserId,
});
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(threadId, target.id, role);
return { threadId, participantCount: participantCount + 1 };
}
/**
* Governed thread rename (a generic subject update). Policy decides who may rename for a
* membership thread the dev OPA requires the caller be a group ADMIN. The kernel only writes
* the subject; "group settings" meaning lives in the app + policy, not here.
*/
async renameThread(threadId: string, principal: MessagePrincipal, subject: string): Promise<{ threadId: string; subject: string }> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
const caller = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
const callerP = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: caller.id } } });
const membership = (thread.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership;
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, {
action: 'iios.thread.update',
threadId,
scopeId: thread.scopeId,
membership,
callerRole: callerP?.participantRole,
});
await this.prisma.iiosThread.update({ where: { id: threadId }, data: { subject } });
return { threadId, subject };
}
/**
* Governed participant removal. Policy decides who may remove for a membership thread the dev
* OPA requires the caller be a group ADMIN. Removing a non-participant is a no-op success.
*/
async removeParticipant(threadId: string, principal: MessagePrincipal, targetUserId: string): Promise<{ threadId: string; participantCount: number }> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
const caller = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
const callerP = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: caller.id } } });
const membership = (thread.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership;
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, {
action: 'iios.thread.participant.remove',
threadId,
scopeId: thread.scopeId,
membership,
callerRole: callerP?.participantRole,
targetUserId,
});
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
const target = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, {
userId: targetUserId, appId: principal.appId, orgId: principal.orgId, tenantId: principal.tenantId, displayName: targetUserId,
});
await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.deleteMany({ where: { threadId, actorId: target.id } });
const participantCount = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.count({ where: { threadId } });
return { threadId, participantCount };
}
/** Members of a thread with their role — drives the group settings member list. Read is policy-scoped. */
async listParticipants(threadId: string, principal: MessagePrincipal): Promise<Array<{ userId: string; displayName: string; role: string }>> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.thread.read', threadId, scopeId: thread.scopeId });
const parts = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findMany({
where: { threadId },
include: { actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
return parts.map((p) => ({
userId: p.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? '',
displayName: p.actor?.displayName ?? p.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? 'unknown',
role: p.participantRole ?? 'MEMBER',
}));
}
/** Toggle the caller's per-thread notification mute flag. */
async muteThread(threadId: string, principal: MessagePrincipal, muted: boolean): Promise<{ threadId: string; muted: boolean }> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.update({
where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: actor.id } },
data: { muted },
});
return { threadId, muted };
}
/**
* Generic "my threads": every thread the caller participates in, with last message + unread.
* An optional `filter.metadata` narrows to threads whose opaque attribute bag matches ALL of the
* given key/values (an equality match on the JSON bag the kernel does not interpret the keys).
*/
async listThreads(principal: MessagePrincipal, filter?: { metadata?: Record<string, string> }): Promise<ThreadSummary[]> {
const scope = await this.actors.findScope(principal);
if (!scope) return [];
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, principal);
const memberships = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findMany({ where: { actorId: actor.id }, select: { threadId: true, muted: true } });
const threadIds = memberships.map((m) => m.threadId);
if (threadIds.length === 0) return [];
const mutedBy = new Map(memberships.map((m) => [m.threadId, m.muted]));
const [allThreads, unreads, allParts] = await Promise.all([
this.prisma.iiosThread.findMany({ where: { id: { in: threadIds } } }),
this.prisma.iiosUnreadCounter.findMany({ where: { threadId: { in: threadIds }, actorId: actor.id } }),
this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findMany({
where: { threadId: { in: threadIds } },
include: { actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
}),
]);
// Opaque equality filter on the metadata bag (every requested key must match).
const metaFilter = filter?.metadata;
const threads = metaFilter
? allThreads.filter((t) => {
const bag = (t.metadata as Record<string, unknown> | null) ?? {};
return Object.entries(metaFilter).every(([k, v]) => bag[k] === v);
})
: allThreads;
const unreadBy = new Map(unreads.map((u) => [u.threadId, u.unreadCount]));
const membersBy = new Map<string, string[]>();
for (const p of allParts) {
const name = p.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? p.actor?.displayName ?? p.actorId;
membersBy.set(p.threadId, [...(membersBy.get(p.threadId) ?? []), name]);
}
// Latest message per thread in ONE query (Postgres DISTINCT ON) instead of one findFirst
// per thread — a caller with many threads no longer fans out N parallel queries and
// exhausts the connection pool.
const lastRows =
threads.length === 0
? []
: await this.prisma.$queryRaw<Array<{ threadId: string; occurredAt: Date; lastMessage: string | null }>>(Prisma.sql`
SELECT DISTINCT ON (i."threadId")
i."threadId" AS "threadId",
i."occurredAt" AS "occurredAt",
(SELECT p."bodyText" FROM "IiosMessagePart" p
WHERE p."interactionId" = i.id AND p.kind::text = 'TEXT'
ORDER BY p."partIndex" ASC LIMIT 1) AS "lastMessage"
FROM "IiosInteraction" i
WHERE i."threadId" IN (${Prisma.join(threads.map((t) => t.id))})
ORDER BY i."threadId", i."occurredAt" DESC
`);
const lastBy = new Map(lastRows.map((r) => [r.threadId, r]));
const summaries = threads.map((t) => {
const last = lastBy.get(t.id);
const members = membersBy.get(t.id) ?? [];
return {
threadId: t.id,
subject: t.subject,
membership: (t.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership,
metadata: (t.metadata as Record<string, unknown> | null) ?? null,
participants: members,
participantCount: members.length,
unread: unreadBy.get(t.id) ?? 0,
muted: mutedBy.get(t.id) ?? false,
lastMessage: last?.lastMessage ?? undefined,
lastAt: last?.occurredAt,
};
});
return summaries.sort((a, b) => (b.lastAt?.getTime() ?? 0) - (a.lastAt?.getTime() ?? 0));
}
async send(
threadId: string,
principal: MessagePrincipal,
body: { content: string; contentRef?: string },
body: { content: string; contentRef?: string; mimeType?: string; sizeBytes?: number; checksumSha256?: string },
idempotencyKey: string,
traceId: string = randomUUID(),
parentInteractionId?: string,
mentions?: string[],
): Promise<MessageDto> {
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: threadId } });
if (!thread) throw new NotFoundException('thread not found');
@@ -75,10 +332,15 @@ export class MessageService {
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(thread.scopeId, principal);
await this.actors.ensureParticipant(threadId, actor.id);
// A reply links to its parent — but only if the parent is in the same thread (else ignored).
const parentRef = parentInteractionId
? (await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findFirst({ where: { id: parentInteractionId, threadId }, select: { id: true } }))?.id
: undefined;
// Idempotency: a repeat key returns the existing message (no re-increment).
const existing = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { scopeId_idempotencyKey: { scopeId: thread.scopeId, idempotencyKey } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
if (existing) return this.toDto(existing, threadId);
@@ -93,6 +355,7 @@ export class MessageService {
idempotencyKey,
status: 'NORMALIZED',
traceId,
parentInteractionId: parentRef,
},
});
@@ -100,7 +363,18 @@ export class MessageService {
{ interactionId: created.id, partIndex: 0, kind: 'TEXT', bodyText: body.content },
];
if (body.contentRef) {
parts.push({ interactionId: created.id, partIndex: 1, kind: 'FILE_REF', contentRef: body.contentRef });
const mime = body.mimeType ?? '';
// Generic part kind from mime — the kernel stores media as opaque parts.
const kind = /^(image|video)\//.test(mime) ? 'MEDIA_REF' : /^audio\//.test(mime) ? 'VOICE_REF' : 'FILE_REF';
parts.push({
interactionId: created.id,
partIndex: 1,
kind,
contentRef: body.contentRef,
mimeType: body.mimeType,
sizeBytes: body.sizeBytes != null ? BigInt(body.sizeBytes) : undefined,
checksumSha256: body.checksumSha256,
});
}
await tx.iiosMessagePart.createMany({ data: parts });
@@ -114,7 +388,9 @@ export class MessageService {
datacontenttype: 'application/json',
traceparent: `00-${traceId.replace(/-/g, '')}-0000000000000000-01`,
insignia: { scopeSnapshotId: thread.scopeId, correlationId: traceId, idempotencyKey, dataClass: 'internal' },
data: { interactionId: created.id, threadId, senderActorId: actor.id },
// `mentions` is an OPAQUE app-supplied notify-list (userIds) — the kernel never parses
// "@"; the inbox projector generically fans out a notification to those actors.
data: { interactionId: created.id, threadId, senderActorId: actor.id, mentions: mentions ?? [] },
};
await tx.iiosOutboxEvent.create({
data: {
@@ -139,7 +415,7 @@ export class MessageService {
return tx.iiosInteraction.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: created.id },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
});
@@ -148,7 +424,7 @@ export class MessageService {
if (err instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError && err.code === 'P2002') {
const winner = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { scopeId_idempotencyKey: { scopeId: thread.scopeId, idempotencyKey } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
return this.toDto(winner, threadId);
}
@@ -220,7 +496,7 @@ export class MessageService {
async getMessageById(id: string, principal?: MessagePrincipal): Promise<MessageDto | null> {
const i = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { id },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
if (!i || !i.threadId) return null;
if (principal) await this.actors.assertOwns(principal, i.scopeId); // tenant fence (KG-02) when called on behalf of a caller
@@ -231,25 +507,162 @@ export class MessageService {
const interactions = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findMany({
where: { threadId },
orderBy: { occurredAt: 'asc' },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } } },
include: { parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
return interactions.map((i) => this.toDto(i, threadId));
const annotations = await this.annotationsByInteraction(interactions.map((i) => i.id));
return interactions.map((i) => this.toDto(i, threadId, annotations.get(i.id) ?? []));
}
/**
* Toggle a generic annotation (actor attaches/removes an opaque label on an interaction).
* `annotationType`/`value` are app-supplied and never interpreted here (the chat app uses
* type "reaction" + an emoji value). Governed: only a thread participant may annotate.
* Returns the refreshed user list for that (type,value) so callers can broadcast it.
*/
async toggleAnnotation(
interactionId: string,
principal: MessagePrincipal,
annotationType: string,
value: string,
): Promise<{ interactionId: string; threadId: string; type: string; value: string; op: 'add' | 'remove'; users: string[] }> {
const target = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { id: interactionId },
select: { id: true, threadId: true, scopeId: true },
});
if (!target || !target.threadId) throw new NotFoundException('message not found');
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(target.scopeId, principal);
const isMember =
(await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findUnique({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId: target.threadId, actorId: actor.id } } })) !== null;
await decideOrThrow(this.ports, { action: 'iios.interaction.annotate', threadId: target.threadId, scopeId: target.scopeId, isMember });
const key = {
scopeId_targetInteractionId_actorId_annotationType_value: {
scopeId: target.scopeId,
targetInteractionId: interactionId,
actorId: actor.id,
annotationType,
value,
},
};
const existing = await this.prisma.iiosInteractionAnnotation.findUnique({ where: key });
let op: 'add' | 'remove';
if (existing) {
await this.prisma.iiosInteractionAnnotation.delete({ where: { id: existing.id } });
op = 'remove';
} else {
await this.prisma.iiosInteractionAnnotation.create({
data: { scopeId: target.scopeId, targetInteractionId: interactionId, actorId: actor.id, annotationType, value },
});
op = 'add';
}
const users =
(await this.annotationsByInteraction([interactionId])).get(interactionId)?.find((a) => a.type === annotationType && a.value === value)?.users ?? [];
return { interactionId, threadId: target.threadId, type: annotationType, value, op, users };
}
/**
* Generic "my annotated interactions" every message the caller annotated with a given
* type, newest first, with thread context. The app uses type "save" for a personal
* bookmarks list (and could use "pin" for a cross-thread pinned view). Generic: the kernel
* never interprets the type string.
*/
async listMyAnnotated(
principal: MessagePrincipal,
annotationType: string,
): Promise<Array<{ message: MessageDto; threadId: string; threadSubject: string | null }>> {
const scope = await this.actors.findScope(principal);
if (!scope) return [];
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, principal);
const anns = await this.prisma.iiosInteractionAnnotation.findMany({
where: { actorId: actor.id, annotationType },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
select: { targetInteractionId: true },
});
const ids = anns.map((a) => a.targetInteractionId);
if (ids.length === 0) return [];
const [interactions, agg] = await Promise.all([
this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findMany({
where: { id: { in: ids } },
include: {
parts: { orderBy: { partIndex: 'asc' } },
actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } },
thread: { select: { subject: true } },
},
}),
this.annotationsByInteraction(ids),
]);
const byId = new Map(interactions.map((i) => [i.id, i]));
return ids
.map((id) => byId.get(id))
.filter((i): i is NonNullable<typeof i> => Boolean(i && i.threadId))
.map((i) => ({
message: this.toDto(i, i.threadId as string, agg.get(i.id) ?? []),
threadId: i.threadId as string,
threadSubject: i.thread?.subject ?? null,
}));
}
// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Aggregate annotations for the given interactions into { type, value, users[] } groups. */
private async annotationsByInteraction(interactionIds: string[]): Promise<Map<string, AnnotationDto[]>> {
const map = new Map<string, AnnotationDto[]>();
if (interactionIds.length === 0) return map;
const rows = await this.prisma.iiosInteractionAnnotation.findMany({
where: { targetInteractionId: { in: interactionIds } },
include: { actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' },
});
for (const r of rows) {
const user = r.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? r.actor?.displayName ?? r.actorId;
const list = map.get(r.targetInteractionId) ?? [];
let entry = list.find((e) => e.type === r.annotationType && e.value === r.value);
if (!entry) {
entry = { type: r.annotationType, value: r.value, users: [] };
list.push(entry);
}
entry.users.push(user);
map.set(r.targetInteractionId, list);
}
for (const list of map.values()) for (const e of list) e.users.sort(); // deterministic order
return map;
}
private toDto(
interaction: { id: string; actorId: string | null; traceId: string | null; occurredAt: Date; parts: Array<{ kind: string; bodyText: string | null; contentRef: string | null }> },
interaction: {
id: string;
actorId: string | null;
actor?: { displayName: string | null; sourceHandle: { externalId: string } | null } | null;
parentInteractionId?: string | null;
traceId: string | null;
occurredAt: Date;
parts: Array<{ kind: string; bodyText: string | null; contentRef: string | null; mimeType?: string | null; sizeBytes?: bigint | null }>;
},
threadId: string,
annotations: AnnotationDto[] = [],
): MessageDto {
const text = interaction.parts.find((p) => p.kind === 'TEXT');
const file = interaction.parts.find((p) => p.contentRef);
const attachment: AttachmentDto | undefined = file?.contentRef
? {
contentRef: file.contentRef,
mimeType: file.mimeType ?? 'application/octet-stream',
sizeBytes: file.sizeBytes != null ? Number(file.sizeBytes) : 0,
kind: mediaKind(file.mimeType ?? ''),
}
: undefined;
return {
id: interaction.id,
threadId,
senderActorId: interaction.actorId ?? '',
senderId: interaction.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? '',
senderName: interaction.actor?.displayName ?? interaction.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? 'unknown',
content: text?.bodyText ?? '',
contentRef: file?.contentRef ?? undefined,
attachment,
parentInteractionId: interaction.parentInteractionId ?? undefined,
annotations,
traceId: interaction.traceId ?? '',
createdAt: interaction.occurredAt,
};
@@ -1,15 +1,20 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { PolicyDeniedError, type IiosPlatformPorts } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { resetDb } from '../test-utils/reset-db';
import { makeFakePorts } from '@insignia/iios-testkit';
import { MessageService, type MessagePrincipal } from './message.service';
import { ActorResolver } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { DevOpaPort } from '../platform/dev-opa.port';
import type { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? 'postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios?schema=public';
const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url } } });
const asService = prisma as unknown as PrismaService;
const svc = () => new MessageService(asService, makeFakePorts(), new ActorResolver(asService));
// A service whose OPA actually enforces the membership rules (real dev policy plane).
const gov = () =>
new MessageService(asService, { ...makeFakePorts(), opa: new DevOpaPort() } as IiosPlatformPorts, new ActorResolver(asService));
const alice: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'alice', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Alice' };
const bob: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'bob', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Bob' };
@@ -101,3 +106,163 @@ describe('MessageService (P2 native messaging)', () => {
expect(ce.insignia.correlationId).toBe(msg.traceId);
});
});
describe('Governed membership + replies (v1.1, policy-enforced)', () => {
it('a direct message is capped at two people (OPA policy)', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
expect((await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob')).participantCount).toBe(2);
await expect(s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'carol')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
expect(await prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.count({ where: { threadId } })).toBe(2); // unchanged
});
it('group: the creator is ADMIN and can add; a plain member cannot', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob'); // admin adds a member
expect(await prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.count({ where: { threadId } })).toBe(2);
await expect(s.addParticipant(threadId, bob, 'carol')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError); // bob is MEMBER
});
it('group settings: admin renames + lists members + removes; a plain member cannot rename/remove', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN', subject: 'Design' });
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
// admin renames
expect((await s.renameThread(threadId, alice, 'Design Team')).subject).toBe('Design Team');
// a plain member cannot rename
await expect(s.renameThread(threadId, bob, 'Hacked')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
// member list carries roles
const members = await s.listParticipants(threadId, alice);
expect(members.map((m) => m.userId).sort()).toEqual(['alice', 'bob']);
expect(members.find((m) => m.userId === 'alice')?.role).toBe('ADMIN');
// a plain member cannot remove
await expect(s.removeParticipant(threadId, bob, 'alice')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
// admin removes bob
expect((await s.removeParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob')).participantCount).toBe(1);
expect(await prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.count({ where: { threadId } })).toBe(1);
});
it('self-join is governed: a non-member cannot open a thread by id; after being added, they can', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await expect(s.openThread(threadId, bob)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
expect((await s.openThread(threadId, bob)).threadId).toBe(threadId);
});
it('listThreads returns the callers threads with membership, count, last message + unread', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hello team' }, 'k1');
const mine = await s.listThreads(alice);
expect(mine).toHaveLength(1);
expect(mine[0]).toMatchObject({ membership: 'group', participantCount: 2, lastMessage: 'hello team' });
expect((await s.listThreads(bob))[0]?.unread).toBe(1);
});
it('opaque metadata: stored on create, echoed in listThreads, and a metadata filter narrows the list', async () => {
const s = svc();
// Two threads with different opaque app attributes — the kernel never interprets these values.
await s.openThread(null, alice, { metadata: { source: 'crm-support', crmCustomerId: 'cust_1' } });
await s.openThread(null, alice, { metadata: { source: 'other' } });
const all = await s.listThreads(alice);
expect(all).toHaveLength(2);
const support = all.find((t) => (t.metadata as { source?: string } | null)?.source === 'crm-support');
expect(support?.metadata).toMatchObject({ source: 'crm-support', crmCustomerId: 'cust_1' });
// Equality filter on the opaque bag returns only the matching thread.
const filtered = await s.listThreads(alice, { metadata: { source: 'crm-support' } });
expect(filtered).toHaveLength(1);
expect(filtered[0]?.metadata).toMatchObject({ crmCustomerId: 'cust_1' });
});
it('a reply stores + returns parentInteractionId; a cross-thread parent is ignored', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
const first = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'question?' }, 'k1');
const reply = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'answer' }, 'k2', undefined, first.id);
expect(reply.parentInteractionId).toBe(first.id);
const { threadId: other } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
const cross = await s.send(other, alice, { content: 'x' }, 'k3', undefined, first.id);
expect(cross.parentInteractionId).toBeUndefined(); // parent not in this thread
});
});
describe('Interaction annotations (generic reactions primitive)', () => {
it('toggleAnnotation adds then removes (toggle) and aggregates users into history', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await s.openThread(threadId, bob);
const msg = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'ship it' }, 'k1');
const add = await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, bob, 'reaction', '👍');
expect(add.op).toBe('add');
expect(add.users).toEqual(['bob']);
const add2 = await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, alice, 'reaction', '👍'); // alice also 👍
expect(add2.op).toBe('add');
expect(add2.users).toEqual(['alice', 'bob']); // sorted, deterministic
const rem = await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, bob, 'reaction', '👍'); // bob toggles off
expect(rem.op).toBe('remove');
expect(rem.users).toEqual(['alice']);
const hist = await s.history(threadId);
const m = hist.find((x) => x.id === msg.id)!;
expect(m.annotations).toEqual([{ type: 'reaction', value: '👍', users: ['alice'] }]);
});
it('different values coexist for the same actor (👍 and 🎉 both stick)', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
const msg = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi' }, 'k1');
await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, alice, 'reaction', '👍');
await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, alice, 'reaction', '🎉');
const m = (await s.history(threadId)).find((x) => x.id === msg.id)!;
expect(m.annotations).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
{ type: 'reaction', value: '👍', users: ['alice'] },
{ type: 'reaction', value: '🎉', users: ['alice'] },
]),
);
});
it('a non-member cannot annotate (governed by policy)', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
const msg = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'secret' }, 'k1');
await expect(s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, bob, 'reaction', '👍')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PolicyDeniedError);
});
it('listMyAnnotated returns the callers saved messages with thread context; others see none', async () => {
const s = gov();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN', subject: 'Design' });
await s.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
const msg = await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'save this' }, 'k1');
await s.toggleAnnotation(msg.id, alice, 'save', ''); // save is a personal annotation
const saved = await s.listMyAnnotated(alice, 'save');
expect(saved).toHaveLength(1);
expect(saved[0]).toMatchObject({ threadId, threadSubject: 'Design' });
expect(saved[0]?.message.content).toBe('save this');
expect(await s.listMyAnnotated(bob, 'save')).toHaveLength(0); // bob saved nothing
});
it('send carries an OPAQUE mentions[] into the message event (kernel never parses @)', async () => {
const s = svc();
const { threadId } = await s.openThread(null, alice);
await s.openThread(threadId, bob);
await s.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi @bob' }, 'k1', undefined, undefined, ['bob']);
const ev = await prisma.iiosOutboxEvent.findFirstOrThrow({ where: { eventType: 'com.insignia.iios.message.sent.v1' } });
const ce = ev.cloudEvent as { data: { mentions?: string[] } };
expect(ce.data.mentions).toEqual(['bob']);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
import { BadRequestException, Body, Controller, Delete, Get, Headers, Post } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import { ActorResolver, type MessagePrincipal } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { SessionVerifier } from '../platform/session.verifier';
import { SubscribeDto, UnsubscribeDto } from './notification.dto';
@Controller('v1/notifications')
export class NotificationController {
constructor(
private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
private readonly actors: ActorResolver,
private readonly session: SessionVerifier,
) {}
/** The public VAPID key the client needs to create a push subscription. */
@Get('vapid-public-key')
vapidKey(): { key: string } {
return { key: process.env.VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY ?? '' };
}
/** Store (or refresh) a push subscription for the caller. */
@Post('subscribe')
async subscribe(@Body() body: SubscribeDto, @Headers('authorization') auth?: string): Promise<{ ok: true }> {
const principal = this.principal(auth);
const scope = await this.actors.resolveScope(principal);
const actor = await this.actors.resolveActor(scope.id, principal);
await this.prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.upsert({
where: { endpoint: body.endpoint },
create: { scopeId: scope.id, actorId: actor.id, kind: body.kind ?? 'webpush', endpoint: body.endpoint, p256dh: body.keys.p256dh, auth: body.keys.auth, userAgent: body.userAgent },
update: { actorId: actor.id, p256dh: body.keys.p256dh, auth: body.keys.auth, lastSeenAt: new Date() },
});
return { ok: true };
}
@Delete('subscribe')
async unsubscribe(@Body() body: UnsubscribeDto): Promise<{ ok: true }> {
await this.prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.deleteMany({ where: { endpoint: body.endpoint } });
return { ok: true };
}
private principal(auth?: string): MessagePrincipal {
const token = (auth ?? '').replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, '');
if (!token) throw new BadRequestException('Authorization bearer token is required');
return this.session.verify(token);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
import { IsIn, IsObject, IsOptional, IsString } from 'class-validator';
export class SubscribeDto {
@IsOptional() @IsIn(['webpush']) kind?: string;
@IsString() endpoint!: string;
@IsObject() keys!: { p256dh: string; auth: string };
@IsOptional() @IsString() userAgent?: string;
}
export class UnsubscribeDto {
@IsString() endpoint!: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { OutboxModule } from '../outbox/outbox.module';
import { MessageModule } from '../messaging/message.module';
import { NotificationController } from './notification.controller';
import { NotificationProjector } from './notification.projector';
import { WebPushDelivery } from './web-push.delivery';
import { NOTIFICATION_PORT } from './notification.port';
@Module({
imports: [OutboxModule, MessageModule], // OutboxModule → bus/dlq; MessageModule → PresenceService. Prisma/Projection/Identity are @Global.
controllers: [NotificationController],
providers: [
NotificationProjector,
{
// Dev binds Web Push (VAPID); prod can swap this to an email/FCM adapter.
provide: NOTIFICATION_PORT,
useFactory: () =>
new WebPushDelivery(
process.env.VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY
? { publicKey: process.env.VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY, privateKey: process.env.VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY ?? '', subject: process.env.VAPID_SUBJECT ?? 'mailto:dev@insignia' }
: undefined,
),
},
],
})
export class NotificationModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
/** The delivery seam. Dev = Web Push (VAPID); prod can swap to email/FCM/APNs. */
export interface PushSub {
endpoint: string;
p256dh: string;
auth: string;
}
export interface NotificationPayload {
title: string;
body: string;
data: { threadId: string; interactionId?: string };
}
export interface NotificationPort {
deliver(sub: PushSub, payload: NotificationPayload): Promise<'sent' | 'gone' | 'failed'>;
}
export const NOTIFICATION_PORT = Symbol('NOTIFICATION_PORT');
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import { IIOS_EVENTS, type CloudEvent } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { makeFakePorts } from '@insignia/iios-testkit';
import { resetDb } from '../test-utils/reset-db';
import { MessageService, type MessagePrincipal } from '../messaging/message.service';
import { ActorResolver } from '../identity/actor.resolver';
import { OutboxBus } from '../outbox/outbox.bus';
import { DlqService } from '../outbox/dlq.service';
import { ProjectionCursorService } from '../projection/projection-cursor.service';
import { PresenceService } from './presence.service';
import { NotificationProjector } from './notification.projector';
import type { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? 'postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios?schema=public';
const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url } } });
const asService = prisma as unknown as PrismaService;
const actors = new ActorResolver(asService);
const ms = () => new MessageService(asService, makeFakePorts(), actors);
const alice: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'alice', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Alice' };
async function actorIdFor(userId: string): Promise<string> {
const handle = await prisma.iiosSourceHandle.findFirstOrThrow({ where: { externalId: userId } });
return (await prisma.iiosActorRef.findFirstOrThrow({ where: { sourceHandleId: handle.id } })).id;
}
async function seedSub(userId: string): Promise<string> {
const actorId = await actorIdFor(userId);
const scope = await prisma.iiosScope.findFirstOrThrow();
await prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.create({ data: { scopeId: scope.id, actorId, kind: 'webpush', endpoint: `https://push/${userId}`, p256dh: 'k', auth: 'a' } });
return actorId;
}
async function sentEvents(): Promise<CloudEvent[]> {
const rows = await prisma.iiosOutboxEvent.findMany({ where: { eventType: IIOS_EVENTS.messageSent }, orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' } });
return rows.map((r) => r.cloudEvent as unknown as CloudEvent);
}
function makeProjector(presence = new PresenceService(), deliverResult: 'sent' | 'gone' = 'sent') {
const deliver = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(deliverResult);
const proj = new NotificationProjector(asService, new OutboxBus(), new DlqService(asService), new ProjectionCursorService(asService), presence, { deliver } as never);
return { proj, deliver, presence };
}
beforeAll(async () => { await prisma.$connect(); });
afterAll(async () => { await prisma.$disconnect(); });
beforeEach(async () => { await resetDb(prisma); });
describe('NotificationProjector', () => {
it('DM: notifies the recipient (absent), never the sender', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi bob' }, 'k1');
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector();
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(deliver).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(deliver.mock.calls[0][0].endpoint).toContain('push/bob');
});
it('group without a mention: does NOT notify', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hello all' }, 'k1');
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector();
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(deliver).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('group WITH a mention: notifies the mentioned member', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hey @bob' }, 'k1', undefined, undefined, ['bob']);
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector();
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(deliver).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it('group reply-to-you: notifies the parent author even without a mention', async () => {
const m = ms();
const bob: MessagePrincipal = { userId: 'bob', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', displayName: 'Bob' };
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'group', creatorRole: 'ADMIN' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
const parent = await m.send(threadId, bob, { content: 'question?' }, 'k1'); // bob authors the parent
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'answer' }, 'k2', undefined, parent.id); // alice replies to bob (no mention)
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector();
const evs = await sentEvents();
await proj.onMessageSent(evs[evs.length - 1]!); // project the reply
expect(deliver).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(deliver.mock.calls[0][0].endpoint).toContain('push/bob');
});
it('presence gate: a recipient viewing the thread is NOT notified', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi' }, 'k1');
const presence = new PresenceService();
presence.setFocus('sockB', 'bob', threadId);
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector(presence);
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(deliver).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('mute gate: a muted recipient is NOT notified', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
const bobActorId = await seedSub('bob');
await prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.update({ where: { threadId_actorId: { threadId, actorId: bobActorId } }, data: { muted: true } });
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi' }, 'k1');
const { proj, deliver } = makeProjector();
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(deliver).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('prunes a subscription that returns "gone"', async () => {
const m = ms();
const { threadId } = await m.openThread(null, alice, { membership: 'dm' });
await m.addParticipant(threadId, alice, 'bob');
await seedSub('bob');
await m.send(threadId, alice, { content: 'hi' }, 'k1');
const { proj } = makeProjector(new PresenceService(), 'gone');
await proj.onMessageSent((await sentEvents())[0]!);
expect(await prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.count()).toBe(0);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
import { CloudEvent, IIOS_EVENTS } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import { OutboxBus } from '../outbox/outbox.bus';
import { DlqService } from '../outbox/dlq.service';
import { ProjectionCursorService } from '../projection/projection-cursor.service';
import { PresenceService } from './presence.service';
import { NOTIFICATION_PORT, type NotificationPort } from './notification.port';
interface MsgData {
interactionId: string;
threadId: string;
senderActorId: string;
mentions?: string[];
}
/**
* Turns `message.sent` into push notifications for absent recipients. Three gates:
* 1. policy DM always; group only if @mentioned or a reply to that recipient
* 2. presence skip if the recipient is currently focused on that thread
* 3. mute skip if the recipient muted the thread
* Then dispatches to each of the recipient's subscriptions; a 'gone' result prunes it.
* Idempotent per event id (same pattern as InboxProjector). Generic: DM-vs-group is read
* from the opaque `membership` thread attribute here in the notification *policy*, not the kernel.
*/
@Injectable()
export class NotificationProjector implements OnModuleInit {
private readonly consumer = 'notification-projector';
constructor(
private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
private readonly bus: OutboxBus,
private readonly dlq: DlqService,
private readonly cursor: ProjectionCursorService,
private readonly presence: PresenceService,
@Inject(NOTIFICATION_PORT) private readonly port: NotificationPort,
) {}
onModuleInit(): void {
this.dlq.registerHandler(this.consumer, (e) => this.onMessageSent(e));
this.bus.on(IIOS_EVENTS.messageSent, (p) =>
void this.onMessageSent(p as CloudEvent).catch((err) => this.dlq.onConsumerFailure(this.consumer, p as CloudEvent, err)),
);
}
async onMessageSent(event: CloudEvent): Promise<void> {
if (!(await this.claim(event.id))) return; // duplicate → no apply, no cursor advance
await this.apply(event);
await this.cursor.advance(this.consumer, event);
}
private async apply(event: CloudEvent): Promise<void> {
const data = event.data as MsgData;
const thread = await this.prisma.iiosThread.findUnique({ where: { id: data.threadId } });
if (!thread) return;
const membership = (thread.metadata as { membership?: string } | null)?.membership;
const interaction = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { id: data.interactionId },
include: { parts: { where: { kind: 'TEXT' }, take: 1 }, actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
const senderName = interaction?.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId ?? 'Someone';
const body = interaction?.parts[0]?.bodyText ?? 'sent an attachment';
const mentions = data.mentions ?? [];
// Parent author (for reply-to-you) — one lookup.
let parentAuthorActorId: string | null = null;
if (interaction?.parentInteractionId) {
const parent = await this.prisma.iiosInteraction.findUnique({
where: { id: interaction.parentInteractionId },
select: { actorId: true },
});
parentAuthorActorId = parent?.actorId ?? null;
}
const participants = await this.prisma.iiosThreadParticipant.findMany({
where: { threadId: data.threadId },
include: { actor: { include: { sourceHandle: true } } },
});
for (const p of participants) {
if (p.actorId === data.senderActorId) continue; // never the sender
const userId = p.actor?.sourceHandle?.externalId;
// gate 1 — policy
const mentioned = userId != null && mentions.includes(userId);
const repliedToMe = parentAuthorActorId != null && parentAuthorActorId === p.actorId;
if (!(membership === 'dm' || mentioned || repliedToMe)) continue;
// gate 2 — presence
if (userId && this.presence.isViewing(userId, data.threadId)) continue;
// gate 3 — mute
if (p.muted) continue;
const subs = await this.prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.findMany({ where: { actorId: p.actorId } });
for (const s of subs) {
const result = await this.port.deliver(
{ endpoint: s.endpoint, p256dh: s.p256dh, auth: s.auth },
{ title: senderName, body, data: { threadId: data.threadId, interactionId: data.interactionId } },
);
if (result === 'gone') await this.prisma.iiosNotificationSubscription.delete({ where: { id: s.id } });
}
}
}
private async claim(eventId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const res = await this.prisma.iiosProcessedEvent.createMany({
data: [{ consumerName: this.consumer, eventId }],
skipDuplicates: true,
});
return res.count > 0;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { PresenceService } from './presence.service';
describe('PresenceService', () => {
it('reports viewing only for the focused thread, and clears on disconnect', () => {
const p = new PresenceService();
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T1')).toBe(false);
p.setFocus('sock1', 'alice', 'T1');
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T1')).toBe(true);
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T2')).toBe(false); // joined-elsewhere ≠ viewing
p.setFocus('sock1', 'alice', 'T2'); // moved focus
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T1')).toBe(false);
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T2')).toBe(true);
p.clearSocket('sock1');
expect(p.isViewing('alice', 'T2')).toBe(false);
});
it('any of the actors sockets counts as viewing', () => {
const p = new PresenceService();
p.setFocus('sockA', 'bob', 'T9');
p.setFocus('sockB', 'bob', null); // a second tab, no focus
expect(p.isViewing('bob', 'T9')).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
/**
* In-memory focus tracker (single instance). Keyed on userId (the stable externalId the
* gateway has as principal.userId). NOTE: room membership viewing the sidebar joins
* every thread room for live updates, so presence uses an explicit `focus_thread` signal.
* Prod (multi-replica): back this with Redis.
*/
@Injectable()
export class PresenceService {
private readonly focus = new Map<string, { userId: string; threadId: string | null }>(); // socketId → focus
setFocus(socketId: string, userId: string, threadId: string | null): void {
this.focus.set(socketId, { userId, threadId });
}
clearSocket(socketId: string): void {
this.focus.delete(socketId);
}
isViewing(userId: string, threadId: string): boolean {
for (const f of this.focus.values()) if (f.userId === userId && f.threadId === threadId) return true;
return false;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
import { WebPushDelivery } from './web-push.delivery';
const sub = { endpoint: 'https://push/x', p256dh: 'k', auth: 'a' };
const payload = { title: 'Bob', body: 'hi', data: { threadId: 'T1' } };
const vapid = { publicKey: 'p', privateKey: 'k', subject: 'mailto:x' };
describe('WebPushDelivery', () => {
it('returns "sent" on success', async () => {
const send = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ statusCode: 201 });
const d = new WebPushDelivery(vapid, send as never);
expect(await d.deliver(sub, payload)).toBe('sent');
expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it('returns "gone" on 404/410 so the caller prunes', async () => {
const d410 = new WebPushDelivery(vapid, vi.fn().mockRejectedValue({ statusCode: 410 }) as never);
expect(await d410.deliver(sub, payload)).toBe('gone');
const d404 = new WebPushDelivery(vapid, vi.fn().mockRejectedValue({ statusCode: 404 }) as never);
expect(await d404.deliver(sub, payload)).toBe('gone');
});
it('returns "failed" on other errors', async () => {
const d = new WebPushDelivery(vapid, vi.fn().mockRejectedValue({ statusCode: 500 }) as never);
expect(await d.deliver(sub, payload)).toBe('failed');
});
it('is disabled (returns "failed", never calls send) without VAPID keys', async () => {
const send = vi.fn();
const d = new WebPushDelivery(undefined, send as never);
expect(await d.deliver(sub, payload)).toBe('failed');
expect(send).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import webpush from 'web-push';
import type { NotificationPayload, NotificationPort, PushSub } from './notification.port';
type SendFn = typeof webpush.sendNotification;
export interface Vapid {
publicKey: string;
privateKey: string;
subject: string;
}
/** Web Push (VAPID) delivery. A dead subscription (404/410) → 'gone' so the caller prunes it. */
@Injectable()
export class WebPushDelivery implements NotificationPort {
private readonly vapid?: Vapid;
constructor(
vapid?: Vapid,
private readonly send: SendFn = webpush.sendNotification,
) {
// Store VAPID; pass it per-send (not global setVapidDetails) so construction never
// validates keys — keeps the adapter unit-testable with a mocked transport.
this.vapid = vapid?.publicKey ? vapid : undefined;
}
async deliver(sub: PushSub, payload: NotificationPayload): Promise<'sent' | 'gone' | 'failed'> {
if (!this.vapid) return 'failed'; // push disabled (no VAPID keys)
try {
await this.send(
{ endpoint: sub.endpoint, keys: { p256dh: sub.p256dh, auth: sub.auth } },
JSON.stringify(payload),
{ vapidDetails: this.vapid },
);
return 'sent';
} catch (e) {
const code = (e as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode;
return code === 404 || code === 410 ? 'gone' : 'failed';
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
import { JwksClient } from 'jwks-rsa';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import type {
ClientRegistryEntry,
ClientRegistryPort,
NonceStorePort,
PublicKeyResolverPort,
} from './context-attestation';
/** Client registry backed by Postgres (IiosClientRegistry). */
@Injectable()
export class PrismaClientRegistry implements ClientRegistryPort {
constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
async find(clientId: string): Promise<ClientRegistryEntry | null> {
const r = await this.prisma.iiosClientRegistry.findUnique({ where: { clientId } });
if (!r) return null;
return {
clientId: r.clientId,
clientType: r.clientType,
allowedAppIds: r.allowedAppIds,
attestSecret: r.attestSecret ?? undefined,
jwksUri: r.jwksUri ?? undefined,
status: r.status === 'ACTIVE' ? 'ACTIVE' : 'DISABLED',
};
}
}
/**
* Nonce ledger backed by Postgres (IiosAttestationNonce). Reserve-if-absent is atomic via the
* unique primary key: a duplicate insert (P2002) means the nonce was already used replay.
*/
@Injectable()
export class PrismaNonceStore implements NonceStorePort {
constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
async reserve(input: { nonce: string; clientId: string; expiresAt: Date }): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await this.prisma.iiosAttestationNonce.create({ data: input });
return true;
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError && e.code === 'P2002') return false; // already seen
throw e;
}
}
}
/**
* Resolves a client's public signing key from its JWKS (prod ES256 path). Keeps ONE JwksClient
* per jwksUri the client caches keys and refetches on a cache miss (so key rotation is picked up
* without a restart). Returns null on any failure so the verifier fails closed with NO_KEY.
*/
@Injectable()
export class JwksPublicKeyResolver implements PublicKeyResolverPort {
private readonly clients = new Map<string, JwksClient>();
private clientFor(jwksUri: string): JwksClient {
let c = this.clients.get(jwksUri);
if (!c) {
c = new JwksClient({ jwksUri, cache: true, cacheMaxEntries: 8, cacheMaxAge: 10 * 60_000, rateLimit: true, jwksRequestsPerMinute: 12 });
this.clients.set(jwksUri, c);
}
return c;
}
async resolve(jwksUri: string, kid: string): Promise<string | null> {
try {
const key = await this.clientFor(jwksUri).getSigningKey(kid);
return key.getPublicKey(); // PEM (SPKI) — works for EC (ES256) and RSA keys
} catch {
return null; // unknown kid / unreachable JWKS / malformed key → fail closed
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
import { Global, Module, type OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
import { ContextAttestationVerifier } from './context-attestation';
import { PrismaClientRegistry, PrismaNonceStore, JwksPublicKeyResolver } from './attestation-stores';
import { ContextAttestationGuard } from './context-attestation.guard';
/**
* Wires the context-attestation trust layer into DI and exposes the guard globally so any
* controller can enforce the three-proof gate. Also dev-seeds a registered client so locally
* minted attestations verify (prod registers clients out-of-band).
*/
@Global()
@Module({
providers: [
PrismaClientRegistry,
PrismaNonceStore,
JwksPublicKeyResolver,
{
provide: ContextAttestationVerifier,
useFactory: (reg: PrismaClientRegistry, nonces: PrismaNonceStore, keys: JwksPublicKeyResolver) =>
new ContextAttestationVerifier(reg, nonces, { audience: process.env.IIOS_ATTESTATION_AUDIENCE ?? 'iios-core' }, keys),
inject: [PrismaClientRegistry, PrismaNonceStore, JwksPublicKeyResolver],
},
ContextAttestationGuard,
],
exports: [ContextAttestationVerifier, ContextAttestationGuard],
})
export class AttestationModule implements OnModuleInit {
constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
/** Dev seed: register the CRM support client so an attestation signed with the shared dev
* secret verifies locally. Gated by IIOS_DEV_TOKENS + IIOS_ATTESTATION_DEV_SECRET; best-effort. */
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
if (process.env.IIOS_DEV_TOKENS !== '1') return;
const secret = process.env.IIOS_ATTESTATION_DEV_SECRET;
if (!secret) return;
await this.prisma.iiosClientRegistry
.upsert({
where: { clientId: 'appshell-crm' },
create: { clientId: 'appshell-crm', clientType: 'APPSHELL', allowedAppIds: ['crm-web'], attestSecret: secret, status: 'ACTIVE' },
update: { clientType: 'APPSHELL', attestSecret: secret, allowedAppIds: ['crm-web'], status: 'ACTIVE' },
})
.catch(() => undefined);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { ForbiddenException, type ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ContextAttestationGuard } from './context-attestation.guard';
import {
ContextAttestationVerifier,
signDevAttestation,
type ClientRegistryPort,
type NonceStorePort,
} from './context-attestation';
import type { SessionVerifier } from './session.verifier';
const SECRET = 'appshell-dev-signing-key';
// SessionVerifier stand-in: the token always resolves to app "crm-web".
const fakeSession = {
verify: () => ({ userId: 'agent_1', appId: 'crm-web', orgId: 'org', tenantId: 'tnt', displayName: 'A' }),
} as unknown as SessionVerifier;
const registryFor = (): ClientRegistryPort => ({
find: async (id) =>
id === 'appshell-crm'
? { clientId: 'appshell-crm', clientType: 'APPSHELL', allowedAppIds: ['crm-web'], attestSecret: SECRET, status: 'ACTIVE' }
: null,
});
const freshNonces = (): NonceStorePort => {
const seen = new Set<string>();
return { reserve: async ({ nonce }) => (seen.has(nonce) ? false : (seen.add(nonce), true)) };
};
function makeGuard(): ContextAttestationGuard {
const verifier = new ContextAttestationVerifier(registryFor(), freshNonces(), { audience: 'iios-core' });
return new ContextAttestationGuard(fakeSession, verifier);
}
// A guard whose actor token resolves to `tokenApp` — used to test attestation↔token app binding.
function makeGuardForApp(tokenApp: string): ContextAttestationGuard {
const session = {
verify: () => ({ userId: 'agent_1', appId: tokenApp, orgId: 'org', tenantId: 'tnt', displayName: 'A' }),
} as unknown as SessionVerifier;
const verifier = new ContextAttestationVerifier(registryFor(), freshNonces(), { audience: 'iios-core' });
return new ContextAttestationGuard(session, verifier);
}
function ctxWith(headers: Record<string, string>): ExecutionContext {
return { switchToHttp: () => ({ getRequest: () => ({ headers }) }) } as unknown as ExecutionContext;
}
function att(over: Record<string, unknown> = {}, secret = SECRET): string {
return signDevAttestation(
{ issuer: 'appshell.crm', audience: 'iios-core', clientId: 'appshell-crm', appId: 'crm-web', nonce: `n_${Math.random()}`, ...over },
secret,
);
}
describe('ContextAttestationGuard (three-proof gate on the request path)', () => {
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION; });
it('allows a request with no attestation when NOT required (dev / zero-trust)', async () => {
expect(await makeGuard().canActivate(ctxWith({}))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a request with no attestation when IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION=1', async () => {
process.env.IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION = '1';
await expect(makeGuard().canActivate(ctxWith({}))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
it('allows a valid attestation bound to the token app', async () => {
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer tok', 'x-context-attestation': att() };
expect(await makeGuard().canActivate(ctxWith(headers))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a forged attestation (wrong signing key) — stolen-context defense', async () => {
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer tok', 'x-context-attestation': att({ nonce: 'n_forge' }, 'attacker-key') };
await expect(makeGuard().canActivate(ctxWith(headers))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
it('rejects a replayed attestation (same nonce twice)', async () => {
const guard = makeGuard();
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer tok', 'x-context-attestation': att({ nonce: 'n_replay' }) };
expect(await guard.canActivate(ctxWith(headers))).toBe(true);
await expect(guard.canActivate(ctxWith({ ...headers }))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
});
// ── doc rejection matrix: "valid token + wrong client/context → reject" ──
it('rejects a valid attestation whose app binding != the actor token app (stolen context reused by another app)', async () => {
// Attestation is validly signed for app crm-web, but the presented actor token is for a different app.
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer tok', 'x-context-attestation': att({ nonce: 'n_appmix' }) };
await expect(makeGuardForApp('other-app').canActivate(ctxWith(headers))).rejects.toThrow(/APP_MISMATCH/);
});
// ── doc rejection matrix: "valid token + wrong audience → reject before business logic" ──
it('rejects an attestation minted for another service (audience != iios-core) replayed at IIOS', async () => {
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer tok', 'x-context-attestation': att({ nonce: 'n_aud', audience: 'some-other-service' }) };
await expect(makeGuard().canActivate(ctxWith(headers))).rejects.toThrow(/WRONG_AUDIENCE/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
import { type CanActivate, type ExecutionContext, ForbiddenException, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Request } from 'express';
import { SessionVerifier } from './session.verifier';
import { ContextAttestationVerifier } from './context-attestation';
/**
* The July 12 three-proof gate on the request path. Proof #1 (a valid actor token) is done by
* the controllers; proof #2 (workload/mTLS) is the mesh's job in prod. This guard adds proof #3:
* a signed CONTEXT ATTESTATION from an authorized parent (AppShell etc.).
*
* Behaviour (safe rollout):
* attestation header present verify it; the attestation's app_id must match the actor
* token's app_id. Any failure 403.
* attestation header absent allowed ONLY when not required (dev / a zero-trust standalone
* caller that IIOS checks fully itself). With `IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION=1`, absence is a 403.
*
* The requirement is read per-request so it can be toggled without restarts and stays OFF by
* default existing callers that don't send an attestation keep working until the rollout flips.
*/
@Injectable()
export class ContextAttestationGuard implements CanActivate {
constructor(
private readonly session: SessionVerifier,
private readonly attest: ContextAttestationVerifier,
) {}
async canActivate(ctx: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {
const required = process.env.IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION === '1';
const req = ctx.switchToHttp().getRequest<Request>();
const raw = req.headers['x-context-attestation'];
const attestation = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : raw;
if (!attestation) {
if (required) throw new ForbiddenException('context attestation required');
return true; // dev / zero-trust: the actor token is still enforced downstream
}
// Bind the attestation to the token's app_id, so a stolen attestation for another app fails.
const auth = req.headers['authorization'] ?? '';
const token = String(auth).replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, '');
let appId: string;
try {
appId = this.session.verify(token).appId ?? '';
} catch {
throw new ForbiddenException('invalid actor token');
}
const result = await this.attest.verify(attestation, appId);
if (!result.ok) throw new ForbiddenException(`context attestation rejected: ${result.reason}`);
return true;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import { generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto';
import { PrismaClient } from '@prisma/client';
import {
ContextAttestationVerifier,
signDevAttestation,
signDevAttestationES256,
type ClientRegistryEntry,
type ClientRegistryPort,
type NonceStorePort,
type PublicKeyResolverPort,
} from './context-attestation';
import { PrismaNonceStore } from './attestation-stores';
import type { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
const APPSHELL_SECRET = 'appshell-dev-signing-key';
const AUD = 'iios-core';
const NOW = new Date('2026-07-13T12:00:00Z');
// ─── in-memory fakes (fast, deterministic — no DB needed) ─────────
function fakeRegistry(over: Partial<ClientRegistryEntry> = {}): ClientRegistryPort {
const entry: ClientRegistryEntry = {
clientId: 'appshell-crm',
clientType: 'SUPPORT_BFF',
allowedAppIds: ['crm-web'],
attestSecret: APPSHELL_SECRET,
status: 'ACTIVE',
...over,
};
return { find: async (id) => (id === entry.clientId ? entry : null) };
}
function fakeNonces(): NonceStorePort {
const seen = new Set<string>();
return { reserve: async ({ nonce }) => (seen.has(nonce) ? false : (seen.add(nonce), true)) };
}
const verifier = (reg: ClientRegistryPort = fakeRegistry(), nonces: NonceStorePort = fakeNonces()) =>
new ContextAttestationVerifier(reg, nonces, { audience: AUD });
/** A well-formed AppShell attestation, overridable per test. */
function attest(over: Record<string, unknown> = {}, secret = APPSHELL_SECRET, at = NOW): string {
return signDevAttestation(
{ issuer: 'appshell.crm', issuerType: 'APPSHELL', audience: AUD, clientId: 'appshell-crm', appId: 'crm-web', nonce: 'n_default', ...over },
secret,
at,
);
}
describe('ContextAttestationVerifier (July 12 trust proof)', () => {
it('accepts a valid attestation from a registered client for the matching app', async () => {
const res = await verifier().verify(attest({ nonce: 'n_ok' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
if (res.ok) expect(res.attestation.clientId).toBe('appshell-crm');
});
// ── the five rejection cases the CEO named ──
it('rejects an unknown / unregistered client (wrong client)', async () => {
const res = await verifier().verify(attest({ clientId: 'hacker-app', nonce: 'n1' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'UNKNOWN_CLIENT' });
});
it('rejects the wrong audience (token minted for another service)', async () => {
const res = await verifier().verify(attest({ audience: 'some-other-service', nonce: 'n2' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'WRONG_AUDIENCE' });
});
it('rejects an expired attestation', async () => {
// signed 10 min ago with a 5 min TTL → already expired at NOW
const stale = attest({ nonce: 'n3', ttlSeconds: 300 }, APPSHELL_SECRET, new Date(NOW.getTime() - 600_000));
const res = await verifier().verify(stale, 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'EXPIRED' });
});
it('rejects a replayed nonce (same attestation used twice)', async () => {
const v = verifier();
const token = attest({ nonce: 'n_replay' });
const first = await v.verify(token, 'crm-web', NOW);
const second = await v.verify(token, 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(first.ok).toBe(true);
expect(second).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'REPLAY' });
});
it('rejects app mismatch: token app != attestation app', async () => {
const res = await verifier().verify(attest({ appId: 'crm-web', nonce: 'n4' }), 'some-other-app', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'APP_MISMATCH' });
});
// ── extra hardening ──
it('rejects a forged signature (signed with the wrong key)', async () => {
const res = await verifier().verify(attest({ nonce: 'n5' }, 'attacker-key'), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'BAD_SIGNATURE' });
});
it('rejects a disabled client', async () => {
const res = await verifier(fakeRegistry({ status: 'DISABLED' })).verify(attest({ nonce: 'n6' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'CLIENT_DISABLED' });
});
it('rejects an app the client is not allowed to attest for', async () => {
const reg = fakeRegistry({ allowedAppIds: ['other-app'] });
const res = await verifier(reg).verify(attest({ appId: 'crm-web', nonce: 'n7' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'APP_MISMATCH' });
});
});
// ─── prod asymmetric path: ES256 verified via the client's JWKS ───
describe('ContextAttestationVerifier — JWKS / ES256 (production signing path)', () => {
const JWKS = 'https://appshell.example/.well-known/jwks.json';
const KID = 'appshell-key-1';
// A real EC P-256 keypair (what AppShell would hold; only the public half is published as JWKS).
const { privateKey, publicKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' });
const privPem = privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }) as string;
const pubPem = publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }) as string;
const { privateKey: otherPriv } = generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' });
const otherPrivPem = otherPriv.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }) as string;
// Registry entry that verifies via JWKS (no shared secret) + a resolver that maps KID → pubkey.
const jwksRegistry: ClientRegistryPort = {
find: async (id) =>
id === 'appshell-crm'
? { clientId: 'appshell-crm', clientType: 'APPSHELL', allowedAppIds: ['crm-web'], jwksUri: JWKS, status: 'ACTIVE' }
: null,
};
const resolver: PublicKeyResolverPort = { resolve: async (_uri, kid) => (kid === KID ? pubPem : null) };
const v = () => new ContextAttestationVerifier(jwksRegistry, fakeNonces(), { audience: AUD }, resolver);
// No 4th arg → no key resolver wired at all (distinct from passing undefined, which hits the default).
const vNoResolver = () => new ContextAttestationVerifier(jwksRegistry, fakeNonces(), { audience: AUD });
function es256(over: Record<string, unknown> = {}, priv = privPem, kid = KID): string {
return signDevAttestationES256(
{ issuer: 'appshell.crm', issuerType: 'APPSHELL', audience: AUD, clientId: 'appshell-crm', appId: 'crm-web', nonce: `n_${Math.random()}`, ...over },
priv,
kid,
NOW,
);
}
it('accepts an ES256 attestation whose signature verifies against the JWKS', async () => {
const res = await v().verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_ok' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
if (res.ok) expect(res.attestation.clientId).toBe('appshell-crm');
});
it('rejects an ES256 attestation signed with a DIFFERENT private key (forged)', async () => {
const res = await v().verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_forged' }, otherPrivPem), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'BAD_SIGNATURE' });
});
it('rejects when the JWT header carries an unknown kid (no matching JWKS key)', async () => {
const res = await v().verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_kid' }, privPem, 'rotated-away-kid'), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY' });
});
it('rejects when a JWKS client is configured but no key resolver is wired', async () => {
const res = await vNoResolver().verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_nores' }), 'crm-web', NOW);
expect(res).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY' });
});
it('still enforces audience / app / replay on the ES256 path', async () => {
const vv = v();
expect(await vv.verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_aud', audience: 'other' }), 'crm-web', NOW)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'WRONG_AUDIENCE' });
expect(await vv.verify(es256({ nonce: 'es_app' }), 'some-other-app', NOW)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'APP_MISMATCH' });
const tok = es256({ nonce: 'es_replay' });
expect((await vv.verify(tok, 'crm-web', NOW)).ok).toBe(true);
expect(await vv.verify(tok, 'crm-web', NOW)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, reason: 'REPLAY' });
});
});
// ─── DB-level atomicity of the nonce ledger ───────────────────────
describe('PrismaNonceStore (atomic replay defense)', () => {
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? 'postgresql://iios:iios@localhost:5434/iios?schema=public';
const prisma = new PrismaClient({ datasources: { db: { url } } });
const store = new PrismaNonceStore(prisma as unknown as PrismaService);
let dbUp = false;
beforeAll(async () => {
try { await prisma.$connect(); dbUp = true; } catch { dbUp = false; }
});
afterAll(async () => { if (dbUp) await prisma.$disconnect(); });
it('reserves a nonce once; a second reserve of the same nonce is rejected', async (ctx) => {
if (!dbUp) return ctx.skip(); // DB unreachable in this environment — the in-memory REPLAY test covers the logic
const nonce = `n_db_${NOW.getTime()}_${Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9)}`;
const expiresAt = new Date(NOW.getTime() + 300_000);
const first = await store.reserve({ nonce, clientId: 'appshell-crm', expiresAt });
const second = await store.reserve({ nonce, clientId: 'appshell-crm', expiresAt });
expect(first).toBe(true);
expect(second).toBe(false);
await prisma.iiosAttestationNonce.delete({ where: { nonce } }).catch(() => undefined);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
/**
* The July 12 "third proof". A cryptographically valid actor token is NOT enough a hacked
* app can replay a stolen one. Before IIOS processes a privileged request it must also verify
* a CONTEXT ATTESTATION: a short-lived, single-use, signed statement from an authorized parent
* (AppShell for CRM, the adapter registry for channels, Calendar for calendar) that says
* "this request, this client, this app, this context is genuinely mine."
*
* This module is the verifier + its two ports (client registry, nonce ledger) + a dev signer.
* It is intentionally decoupled from the request path so it can be unit-tested in isolation and
* wired into the messaging guard as a separate, gated step.
*/
/** The subset of AppShell's context-attestation envelope that IIOS verifies. */
export interface ContextAttestation {
attestationId?: string;
issuer: string;
issuerType?: string; // APPSHELL | SUPPORT_BFF | ADAPTER | CALENDAR | SERVICE
audience: string; // must equal the configured IIOS audience
clientId: string; // must be a registered, ACTIVE client
appId: string; // must match the actor token's app_id AND be allowed for this client
scope?: { orgId?: string; appId?: string; tenantId?: string; buId?: string };
nonce: string; // single-use
iat?: number;
exp?: number; // short-lived
}
/** A registered caller allowed to attest context on behalf of one or more apps. */
export interface ClientRegistryEntry {
clientId: string;
clientType: string;
allowedAppIds: string[];
attestSecret?: string; // dev: shared HS256 signing key (AppShell's key stand-in)
jwksUri?: string; // prod: verify the attestation signature asymmetrically (ES256) via this JWKS
status: 'ACTIVE' | 'DISABLED';
}
export interface ClientRegistryPort {
find(clientId: string): Promise<ClientRegistryEntry | null>;
}
export interface NonceStorePort {
/** Atomically reserve a nonce. Returns true if fresh, false if it was already seen (replay). */
reserve(input: { nonce: string; clientId: string; expiresAt: Date }): Promise<boolean>;
}
/**
* Resolves the PUBLIC key for a JWKS uri + key id, for the prod asymmetric (ES256) path.
* A port so the verifier stays network-free and unit-testable the real impl fetches +
* caches the client's JWKS; tests inject a fake that returns a known key.
*/
export interface PublicKeyResolverPort {
/** Return the signing key (PEM) for `kid` at `jwksUri`, or null if it can't be resolved. */
resolve(jwksUri: string, kid: string): Promise<string | null>;
}
export type AttestationReason =
| 'MALFORMED'
| 'UNKNOWN_CLIENT'
| 'CLIENT_DISABLED'
| 'NO_KEY'
| 'BAD_SIGNATURE'
| 'WRONG_AUDIENCE'
| 'APP_MISMATCH'
| 'EXPIRED'
| 'REPLAY';
export type AttestationResult =
| { ok: true; attestation: ContextAttestation }
| { ok: false; reason: AttestationReason; detail: string };
export interface AttestationConfig {
/** The audience IIOS requires on attestations addressed to it (e.g. 'iios-core'). */
audience: string;
}
const deny = (reason: AttestationReason, detail: string): AttestationResult => ({ ok: false, reason, detail });
export class ContextAttestationVerifier {
constructor(
private readonly registry: ClientRegistryPort,
private readonly nonces: NonceStorePort,
private readonly config: AttestationConfig,
/** Optional — required only for clients that verify via a JWKS (prod ES256). */
private readonly keys?: PublicKeyResolverPort,
) {}
/**
* Verify an attestation against an already-verified actor token. Fail-closed: any doubt deny.
* @param attestationJwt the signed attestation the parent issued
* @param tokenAppId the `app_id` from the verified actor token (Level-1 proof)
* @param now current time injected so tests are deterministic
*/
async verify(attestationJwt: string, tokenAppId: string, now: Date = new Date()): Promise<AttestationResult> {
// 1. Decode WITHOUT verifying, only to learn who claims to have signed it.
const claimed = jwt.decode(attestationJwt, { json: true }) as (ContextAttestation & jwt.JwtPayload) | null;
if (!claimed || typeof claimed !== 'object' || !claimed.clientId || !claimed.nonce) {
return deny('MALFORMED', 'attestation missing clientId/nonce');
}
// 2. The claimed client must be registered and ACTIVE.
const client = await this.registry.find(claimed.clientId);
if (!client) return deny('UNKNOWN_CLIENT', `client "${claimed.clientId}" is not registered`);
if (client.status !== 'ACTIVE') return deny('CLIENT_DISABLED', `client "${claimed.clientId}" is ${client.status}`);
// 3. Verify the signature with the client's key. A client verifies EITHER asymmetrically via
// its published JWKS (prod: AppShell signs ES256 with a private key) OR with a shared HS256
// secret (dev stand-in). ignoreExpiration so we can return a precise EXPIRED (step 6) rather
// than BAD_SIGNATURE.
const key = await this.resolveVerificationKey(attestationJwt, client);
if (!key.ok) return deny(key.reason, key.detail);
let att: ContextAttestation & jwt.JwtPayload;
try {
att = jwt.verify(attestationJwt, key.pem, { algorithms: [key.alg], ignoreExpiration: true }) as ContextAttestation & jwt.JwtPayload;
} catch (e) {
return deny('BAD_SIGNATURE', (e as Error).message);
}
// 4. Audience must be IIOS — a token for another service can't be replayed at IIOS.
if (att.audience !== this.config.audience) return deny('WRONG_AUDIENCE', `audience "${att.audience}" != "${this.config.audience}"`);
// 5. app binding: the attestation's app must match the token's app AND be allowed for this client.
if (att.appId !== tokenAppId) return deny('APP_MISMATCH', `attestation app "${att.appId}" != token app "${tokenAppId}"`);
if (!client.allowedAppIds.includes(att.appId)) return deny('APP_MISMATCH', `client "${client.clientId}" not allowed for app "${att.appId}"`);
// 6. Freshness — attestations are short-lived.
const expMs = (att.exp ?? 0) * 1000;
if (!expMs || expMs <= now.getTime()) return deny('EXPIRED', 'attestation expired or missing exp');
// 7. Single-use — reserve the nonce. A replayed (stolen) attestation loses here. Fail-closed.
const fresh = await this.nonces.reserve({ nonce: att.nonce, clientId: client.clientId, expiresAt: new Date(expMs) });
if (!fresh) return deny('REPLAY', `nonce "${att.nonce}" already used`);
return { ok: true, attestation: att };
}
/**
* Pick the algorithm + verification key for a client. JWKS (ES256) wins when configured:
* read the `kid` from the JWT header and resolve the public key from the client's JWKS.
* Otherwise fall back to the shared HS256 dev secret. Either way returns a precise NO_KEY
* reason when no usable key can be obtained (fail-closed).
*/
private async resolveVerificationKey(
attestationJwt: string,
client: ClientRegistryEntry,
): Promise<{ ok: true; pem: string; alg: 'ES256' | 'HS256' } | { ok: false; reason: AttestationReason; detail: string }> {
if (client.jwksUri) {
if (!this.keys) return { ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY', detail: `client "${client.clientId}" uses JWKS but no key resolver is wired` };
const decoded = jwt.decode(attestationJwt, { complete: true });
const kid = decoded && typeof decoded === 'object' ? (decoded.header?.kid as string | undefined) : undefined;
if (!kid) return { ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY', detail: 'attestation header missing kid (required for JWKS)' };
const pem = await this.keys.resolve(client.jwksUri, kid).catch(() => null);
if (!pem) return { ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY', detail: `no JWKS key for kid "${kid}"` };
return { ok: true, pem, alg: 'ES256' };
}
if (client.attestSecret) return { ok: true, pem: client.attestSecret, alg: 'HS256' };
return { ok: false, reason: 'NO_KEY', detail: `no verification key configured for "${client.clientId}"` };
}
}
/**
* DEV/TEST helper: mint a signed attestation the way AppShell would (HS256 stand-in for its
* signing key). Production AppShell signs asymmetrically and IIOS verifies via the client's JWKS.
*/
export function signDevAttestation(
claims: Omit<ContextAttestation, 'iat' | 'exp'> & { ttlSeconds?: number },
secret: string,
now: Date = new Date(),
): string {
const { ttlSeconds = 300, ...rest } = claims;
const iat = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
return jwt.sign({ ...rest, iat, exp: iat + ttlSeconds }, secret, { algorithm: 'HS256' });
}
/**
* DEV/TEST helper: mint an attestation signed ASYMMETRICALLY (ES256), the way production AppShell
* does. `privateKeyPem` is a PKCS#8 EC private key; `kid` is stamped into the JWT header so the
* verifier can pick the matching public key from the client's JWKS.
*/
export function signDevAttestationES256(
claims: Omit<ContextAttestation, 'iat' | 'exp'> & { ttlSeconds?: number },
privateKeyPem: string,
kid: string,
now: Date = new Date(),
): string {
const { ttlSeconds = 300, ...rest } = claims;
const iat = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
return jwt.sign({ ...rest, iat, exp: iat + ttlSeconds }, privateKeyPem, { algorithm: 'ES256', keyid: kid });
}
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { DevOpaPort } from './dev-opa.port';
const opa = new DevOpaPort();
describe('DevOpaPort (dev policy plane — membership rules)', () => {
it('allows every existing action by default (thread create/read, message send)', async () => {
for (const action of ['iios.thread.create', 'iios.thread.read', 'iios.message.send', undefined]) {
expect((await opa.decide({ action })).allow).toBe(true);
}
});
it('DM is capped at two: adding a 2nd is allowed, a 3rd is denied', async () => {
const add = (participantCount: number) =>
opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.add', membership: 'dm', callerRole: 'MEMBER', participantCount });
expect((await add(1)).allow).toBe(true); // 1 → adding the 2nd
const third = await add(2); // 2 → adding a 3rd
expect(third.allow).toBe(false);
expect(third.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/two people/);
});
it('adding a participant requires the caller be a member', async () => {
const d = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.add', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'NONE', participantCount: 3 });
expect(d.allow).toBe(false);
expect(d.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/member/);
});
it('group add/remove requires ADMIN', async () => {
const asMember = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.add', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'MEMBER', participantCount: 3 });
expect(asMember.allow).toBe(false);
expect(asMember.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/admin/);
const asAdmin = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.add', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'ADMIN', participantCount: 3 });
expect(asAdmin.allow).toBe(true);
});
it('group rename (thread.update) requires ADMIN; ungoverned threads allow it', async () => {
const asMember = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.update', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'MEMBER' });
expect(asMember.allow).toBe(false);
expect(asMember.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/admin/);
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.update', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'ADMIN' })).allow).toBe(true);
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.update' })).allow).toBe(true); // no membership attr → allow
});
it('group remove requires ADMIN; a member on an ungoverned thread may remove', async () => {
const asMember = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.remove', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'MEMBER' });
expect(asMember.allow).toBe(false);
expect(asMember.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/admin/);
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.remove', membership: 'group', callerRole: 'ADMIN' })).allow).toBe(true);
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.participant.remove', callerRole: 'MEMBER' })).allow).toBe(true);
});
it('media upload allows images + docs (incl. html/markdown/csv), denies unknown types and oversize', async () => {
const up = (mime: string, sizeBytes = 1024) => opa.decide({ action: 'iios.media.upload', mime, sizeBytes });
for (const mime of ['image/png', 'video/mp4', 'audio/mpeg', 'application/pdf', 'text/plain', 'text/markdown', 'text/html', 'text/csv']) {
expect((await up(mime)).allow).toBe(true);
}
const bad = await up('application/x-msdownload');
expect(bad.allow).toBe(false);
expect(bad.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/not allowed/);
const big = await up('image/png', 30 * 1024 * 1024);
expect(big.allow).toBe(false);
expect(big.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/too large/);
});
it('self-join is governed only on membership threads', async () => {
// generic / support thread (no membership attr) → open join, unchanged
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.join', alreadyMember: false })).allow).toBe(true);
// a membership (chat) thread → existing member allowed, stranger denied
expect((await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.join', membership: 'group', alreadyMember: true })).allow).toBe(true);
const stranger = await opa.decide({ action: 'iios.thread.join', membership: 'group', alreadyMember: false });
expect(stranger.allow).toBe(false);
expect(stranger.obligations[0]?.reason).toMatch(/not a member/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
import type { PolicyDecision } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
/**
* Dev stand-in for the real OPA policy plane. It evaluates a small **policy table**
* against the generic `{ action, ...context }` the kernel passes to `opa.decide`.
* Everything defaults to ALLOW (so existing actions are unchanged); only the rules
* below deny. This is the *policy plane*, NOT the kernel the chat meaning of "dm"
* vs "group" lives here as policy, and a real OPA drops in behind the same interface.
*/
export interface OpaInput {
action?: string;
membership?: string; // app-set generic thread attribute: 'dm' | 'group'
participantCount?: number;
callerRole?: string; // 'MEMBER' | 'ADMIN'
alreadyMember?: boolean;
isMember?: boolean;
mime?: string;
sizeBytes?: number;
[k: string]: unknown;
}
const MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024;
const MEDIA_ALLOWED = /^(image|video|audio)\//;
const MEDIA_ALLOWED_DOCS = new Set([
'application/pdf', 'text/plain', 'text/markdown', 'text/x-markdown', 'text/html', 'text/csv', 'application/zip',
'application/msword', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document',
'application/vnd.ms-excel', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet',
'application/vnd.ms-powerpoint', 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation',
]);
const allow = (): PolicyDecision => ({ decisionRef: 'dev-allow', allow: true, obligations: [], ttlSeconds: 60 });
const deny = (reason: string): PolicyDecision => ({ decisionRef: 'dev-deny', allow: false, obligations: [{ kind: 'AUDIT', reason }], ttlSeconds: 0 });
export class DevOpaPort {
async decide(input: unknown): Promise<PolicyDecision> {
const i = (input ?? {}) as OpaInput;
switch (i.action) {
case 'iios.thread.participant.add': {
const count = i.participantCount ?? 0;
if (i.membership === 'dm' && count >= 2) return deny('a direct message is limited to two people');
if (i.callerRole !== 'MEMBER' && i.callerRole !== 'ADMIN') return deny('only a member can add participants');
if (i.membership === 'group' && i.callerRole !== 'ADMIN') return deny('only a group admin can add or remove members');
return allow();
}
case 'iios.thread.participant.remove': {
// Same governance as add: for a group, only an ADMIN removes members. Ungoverned
// (no membership attr) threads allow removal by any member.
if (i.membership === 'group' && i.callerRole !== 'ADMIN') return deny('only a group admin can add or remove members');
if (i.membership && i.callerRole !== 'MEMBER' && i.callerRole !== 'ADMIN') return deny('only a member can remove participants');
return allow();
}
case 'iios.thread.update': {
// Rename / settings change: for a group, only an ADMIN. Ungoverned threads allow it.
if (i.membership === 'group' && i.callerRole !== 'ADMIN') return deny('only a group admin can change group settings');
return allow();
}
case 'iios.thread.join': {
// Only threads that opted into a membership model (chat dm/group) are governed;
// generic/support threads (no membership attr) keep open-join. For a governed
// thread, new members must be added first (governed add-participant).
if (!i.membership) return allow();
return i.alreadyMember ? allow() : deny('you are not a member of this thread');
}
case 'iios.interaction.annotate': {
// Annotating (e.g. reacting to) a message requires being a participant of its thread.
return i.isMember ? allow() : deny('you are not a member of this thread');
}
case 'iios.media.upload': {
const mime = i.mime ?? '';
if ((i.sizeBytes ?? 0) > MEDIA_MAX_BYTES) return deny('file too large (max 25 MB)');
if (!MEDIA_ALLOWED.test(mime) && !MEDIA_ALLOWED_DOCS.has(mime)) return deny(`file type not allowed: ${mime || 'unknown'}`);
return allow();
}
default:
return allow();
}
}
}
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
import type {
IiosPlatformPorts,
PlatformPrincipal,
PolicyDecision,
ContextDecisionBundle,
SourceHandleResolution,
} from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import { DevOpaPort } from './dev-opa.port';
/** DI token for the platform ports (Session/OPA/CMP/MDM/CRRE/SAS/Capability). */
export const PLATFORM_PORTS = Symbol('PLATFORM_PORTS');
@@ -22,11 +22,8 @@ export class LocalDevPorts implements IiosPlatformPorts {
return { principalRef: 'local-dev', orgId: 'org_demo', appId: 'portal-demo', assurance: 'service' };
},
};
opa = {
async decide(_input: unknown): Promise<PolicyDecision> {
return { decisionRef: 'local-allow', allow: true, obligations: [], ttlSeconds: 60 };
},
};
// Dev policy plane: default-allow + the membership rules (real OPA swaps in here).
opa = new DevOpaPort();
cmp = {
async checkPurpose(_input: unknown): Promise<{ receiptRef?: string; status: 'ALLOW' | 'DENY' | 'NOT_REQUIRED' }> {
return { status: 'NOT_REQUIRED' };
@@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { APP_GUARD } from '@nestjs/core';
import { PLATFORM_PORTS, LocalDevPorts } from './platform-ports';
import { RealtimeTokenRestGuard } from './realtime-token.guard';
/** Binds the platform ports (P1: the permissive in-service default). */
/**
* Binds the platform ports (P1: the permissive in-service default), and registers the
* realtime-delegation REST guard globally a socket-scoped token must not drive REST on ANY
* route, so it can't be per-controller (see realtime-token.guard).
*/
@Global()
@Module({
providers: [{ provide: PLATFORM_PORTS, useClass: LocalDevPorts }],
providers: [
{ provide: PLATFORM_PORTS, useClass: LocalDevPorts },
{ provide: APP_GUARD, useClass: RealtimeTokenRestGuard },
],
exports: [PLATFORM_PORTS],
})
export class PlatformModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
import { ArgumentsHost, Catch, HttpStatus, type ExceptionFilter } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PolicyDeniedError } from '@insignia/iios-contracts';
import type { Response } from 'express';
/**
* Maps a fail-closed `PolicyDeniedError` (from `decideOrThrow`) to HTTP 403 instead of a
* generic 500, so callers can tell "policy denied" (with the reason) from a server fault.
* Applies to every policy-gated REST endpoint (e.g. the DM-cap / membership rules).
*/
@Catch(PolicyDeniedError)
export class PolicyDeniedFilter implements ExceptionFilter {
catch(err: PolicyDeniedError, host: ArgumentsHost): void {
const res = host.switchToHttp().getResponse<Response>();
res.status(HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN).json({ statusCode: 403, code: err.code, message: err.message });
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { ForbiddenException, type ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { RealtimeTokenRestGuard } from './realtime-token.guard';
// Realtime delegation, REST half: a socket-scoped token (aud=iios-message) opens the /message
// socket and NOTHING else. The gateway enforces the mirror rule; this guard is the REST side.
const SECRET = 'dev-crm-secret';
const token = (payload: Record<string, unknown>) => jwt.sign(payload, SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256', expiresIn: '5m' });
/** An HTTP ExecutionContext carrying the given authorization header. */
function httpCtx(authorization?: string): ExecutionContext {
return {
getType: () => 'http',
switchToHttp: () => ({ getRequest: () => ({ headers: authorization ? { authorization } : {} }) }),
} as unknown as ExecutionContext;
}
const wsCtx = () => ({ getType: () => 'ws' }) as unknown as ExecutionContext;
const guard = new RealtimeTokenRestGuard();
describe('RealtimeTokenRestGuard (socket tokens must not drive REST)', () => {
afterEach(() => { delete process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE; });
it('rejects a socket-scoped token (aud=iios-message) on REST', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
const ctx = httpCtx(`Bearer ${token({ sub: 'pp_1', appId: 'crm-web', aud: 'iios-message' })}`);
expect(() => guard.canActivate(ctx)).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
});
it('allows a normal actor token (no aud)', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
expect(guard.canActivate(httpCtx(`Bearer ${token({ sub: 'pp_1', appId: 'crm-web' })}`))).toBe(true);
});
it('allows a REST-audience token (aud=iios-core)', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
expect(guard.canActivate(httpCtx(`Bearer ${token({ sub: 'pp_1', aud: 'iios-core' })}`))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects when the socket audience is one of several in an aud array', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
const ctx = httpCtx(`Bearer ${token({ sub: 'pp_1', aud: ['iios-core', 'iios-message'] })}`);
expect(() => guard.canActivate(ctx)).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
});
it('is a no-op when IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE is unset (same switch as the socket half)', () => {
const ctx = httpCtx(`Bearer ${token({ sub: 'pp_1', aud: 'iios-message' })}`);
expect(guard.canActivate(ctx)).toBe(true);
});
it('passes through unauthenticated routes (health, metrics, HMAC adapter webhooks)', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
expect(guard.canActivate(httpCtx())).toBe(true);
expect(guard.canActivate(httpCtx('Hmac abc123'))).toBe(true); // non-bearer scheme
});
it('never applies to the socket itself (ws context)', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
expect(guard.canActivate(wsCtx())).toBe(true);
});
it('passes a malformed bearer through (auth is the controller\'s job, not this filter\'s)', () => {
process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE = 'iios-message';
expect(guard.canActivate(httpCtx('Bearer not-a-jwt'))).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
import { CanActivate, ExecutionContext, ForbiddenException, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import type { Request } from 'express';
/**
* Realtime delegation the REST half.
*
* The browser's socket token is deliberately narrow: `aud = IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE` (e.g.
* iios-message), minutes-long, and good for the /message socket ONLY. The gateway enforces the
* mirror of this rule (it accepts ONLY that audience). Without this guard the narrowing is
* one-directional: REST doesn't check the actor token's audience, so a leaked socket token would
* still drive privileged REST i.e. it would be a full actor token with extra steps.
*
* Applied GLOBALLY (APP_GUARD) on purpose: every REST route is a target, not just the ones behind
* ContextAttestationGuard (inbox, media, interactions, ai, would otherwise stay open).
*
* It is a decode-only REJECT filter, never an authenticator:
* - it does not verify signatures (each controller still calls SessionVerifier) cheap, and it
* can't be bypassed by stripping `aud`, because that invalidates the signature downstream;
* - no bearer token pass through (health, metrics, HMAC adapter webhooks are not its business);
* - unset IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE no-op (same switch that turns on the socket half).
*/
@Injectable()
export class RealtimeTokenRestGuard implements CanActivate {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
if (context.getType() !== 'http') return true; // the socket enforces its own (mirror) rule
const socketAudience = process.env.IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE?.trim();
if (!socketAudience) return true;
const auth = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<Request>().headers['authorization'];
const raw = Array.isArray(auth) ? auth[0] : auth;
if (typeof raw !== 'string' || !/^Bearer\s+/i.test(raw)) return true;
const decoded = jwt.decode(raw.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, ''), { json: true });
const aud = decoded?.aud;
const isSocketToken = aud === socketAudience || (Array.isArray(aud) && aud.includes(socketAudience));
if (isSocketToken) {
throw new ForbiddenException(`socket-scoped token (aud="${socketAudience}") cannot be used for REST`);
}
return true;
}
}

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